



# THE 1<sup>ST</sup> COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OLYMPIAD

AUSTRIA ▪ BELGIUM ▪ BULGARIA ▪ CYPRUS ▪ ESTONIA ▪ FINLAND ▪ FRANCE  
GREECE ▪ ITALY ▪ LITHUANIA ▪ POLAND ▪ ROMANIA ▪ SPAIN

# **1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad Booklet**

Edited by

Symeon Zambas

With foreword of

Mr George Georgiou  
Cyprus Defence Policy Director



Disclaimer:

Any views or opinions presented in this booklet are solely those of the authors.

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## FOREWORD BY THE CYPRUS DEFENCE POLICY DIRECTOR



It was a great privilege and honour to host the first CSDP Olympiad in Cyprus. Even though we do not possess military academies, Cyprus actively participates in the exchange programme for young officers and in the Implementation Group of this initiative. Our strong motivation to actively participate in this initiative was our deep belief that creating a common European Security and Defence Policy is a basic element of the European integration process and that this procedure was the best way to achieve such a goal.

Taking into consideration that this initiative was something new and remains an on-going procedure, I strongly believe that in order for any country to participate successfully, the first prerequisite is a strong belief in the purpose of the initiative. Secondly, success is based on the willingness to engage the appropriate individuals in the procedure; individuals that have to be creative, besides their qualifications, with a clear vision and passion to undertake new missions, despite any possible predicaments and emerging difficulties.

Following an IG meeting in Brussels in September 2011, Major Symeon Zambas informed me of his idea of organising an innovative type of 'common module' concerning CSDP, in the form of a competition for military academy students. I admit that at the time I was highly sceptical, because it was not an easy task to undertake, given that a detailed description of the module had to be drafted and approved by the next IG meeting, in order to have adequate time to organise the first CSDP Olympiad during our Presidency. On the other hand, Symeon was 100% confident that we could manage this difficult endeavour successfully. Therefore, having faith in his judgement, field experience, professionalism and hardworking nature, I immediately gave him the green light to proceed.

It was a decision that I will never regret, since the entire event was successful, innovative, interesting and above all rewarding for all the participants that took part in the Initiative. It provided the cadets with the opportunity to interact and create bonds with each other and with the Initiative's experts, whilst all those involved in CSDP had the chance to assess fresh ideas, through the essays of our European cadets.

I firmly believe that the CSDP Olympiad will contribute to the further development of the Common Security and Defence culture, and that it will be an invaluable instrument for the European education and training of our young military officers. Furthermore, the distinguished audience at the opening ceremony, from several society layers and functions, in addition to the diplomatic and military experts, verified and confirmed that our Common Security and Defence Policy does not involve only experts, but the entire civil society and all European citizens.

For this momentum not to be lost, we hope that in the future, member states will continue implementing this initiative, based on the proven success that the first CSDP Olympiad had in Cyprus.

George P. Georgiou  
Defence Policy Director  
Cyprus Ministry of Defence



## PREFACE OF THE EDITOR



It was a great honour and pleasure for me to be the first CSDP Olympiad director. The whole procedure, from the conception of the idea up until the final residential phase of the competition and the publication of this booklet, has been a very exciting and above all rewarding experience.

In my capacity as member of the Implementation Group of the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, Inspired by Erasmus since 2009, I was provided with the necessary knowledge, enthusiasm and incentives to design and realise the Olympiad, as a new common module of this great Initiative.

Going back in time... it was on 21 September 2011, when I was having breakfast in Brussels that I was pondering on the 11th meeting of the IG and the agenda. One of the agenda items was the forthcoming High Level Conference for the Initiative, organised by the Polish Presidency from 12 to 14 October 2011. I had been extremely interested in following the preparation and execution phases of that conference, since the Cypriot Ministry of Defence was planning to organise a similar event during the Cyprus Presidency the following year. Considering the difficulties in identifying items for the agenda of that seminar, and in an effort to move the Initiative forward, I realised that after that HLC, the top-down approach would come to an end, at least for the next couple of years, because the main issues would have been addressed.

The time had come for a bottom-up approach. Mindful of the advice of my Director Mr George P. Georgiou to generate innovative and creative ideas, I started to seek something new and interesting, in order to engage the cadets by giving them the incentive to become protagonists in this initiative, in a bottom-up approach, and not merely participants or followers. Obviously, since Cyprus does not possess any Military Academies, it was difficult to offer something similar to other Common Modules. Therefore, the only way forward was to utilise the IDL platform to provide the cadets with the basic knowledge to write a thesis paper so as to give them the incentive to become creative, and finally to organise a competition that would promote cooperation between them in an interactive manner.

In the margins of the following 11th IG meeting, I shared these thoughts with the Head of the ESDC, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, the Training Manager of the ESDC, Dirk Dubois, and the chairman of the Initiative, Cesare Ciocca. Fortunately, they welcomed the idea and encouraged me to proceed with the implementation of the initiative, assuring me of their strong support.

The task ahead of me, despite being risky and difficult, was very clear. A common module fact sheet had to be drafted and submitted to the next Implementation group meeting, in December of the same year, in order to be approved, so that enough time would be available to organise the event during the Cyprus Presidency. Confident that the initiative would be successful, and that the new common module was a necessity, and after receiving encouragement from the ESDC Secretariat and the IG members, I took a deep breath and started the planning process.

Fortunately, my Defence Policy Director, Mr George Georgiou, and the Minister of Defence approved the proposal, and with the valuable assistance of the ESDC Secretariat, the IG adopted the new Common Module entitled "CSDP Olympiad", at its 12th meeting on 14 December 2011.

The main goal of the "CSDP OLYMPIAD" common module was to acquaint our cadets with the basic knowledge on CSDP, providing them with the incentive to study accordingly in order to write a thesis on CSDP, thus competing with cadets of other Member States in a CSDP knowledge competition. The "CSDP OLYMPIAD" module consisted of three parts: an Internet-based Distance Learning Course "IDL" with four Autonomous Knowledge Units (AKUs), the submission of a paper of 3000 words on a CSDP-related topic and a residential competition.

In this booklet, you can witness the results of the Olympiad, via the 10 best essays, the list of winners, the participants and numerous photos. It is intended to be an invaluable and memorable gift for the participants, and to give the main CSDP stakeholders and the Academies which could not participate an idea of the entire event.

I am very grateful for the wide support I received from the ESDC Secretariat, the Cyprus DPD Director and the Head of the ESDC Secretariat Mr Hans Bernhard Weisserth, who placed their confidence and support in me and also encouraged me to proceed with the planning of the event.

I would like to thank:

- the Austrian IG members Harald Gell and Mr Karl-Heinz Wiedner who, in addition to their strong support for the idea from the very beginning, postponed the Austrian CSDP Common Module, in order not to compete with the Olympiad;
- the linguistic service of the General Secretariat of the Council for carrying out a last check of the essays and articles;
- the Papers evaluation team, Mr Hans Bernhard Weisserth, Ms Pavlina Gorenc, Mrs Valentina Reynoso, Mr Dirk Dubois, Mr Harald Gell, Mr Karl-Heinz Wiedner, Mr Sylvain Paile, Mr Sven Biscop and Mr Jochen Rehrl;
- the IG members and especially the chairman Mr Cesare Ciocca for their support and for their decision to establish the CSDP Olympiad as a biennial event;
- Mr Dirk Dubois for his vast support and substantial contribution to the academic side of the event;
- the jury committee of the residential phase, Mr Karl-Heinz Wiedner, Mr Dirk Dubois and Mr Sylvain Paile, for their exceptional work, which kept the competition within the agreed rules and secured the fairness of the whole procedure;
- the Cyprus Federation of America for financing the two winners' awards and France for offering the award to the third winner;
- the Mayor of Pafos, Mr Savvas Vergas, and the Secretary of Pafos Municipality, Mr Themis Filippidis, for their great support and hospitality;
- the Headmaster of the 1st Lycium of Pafos, Dr Andreas Agathocleous, the Greek language teacher Mr Giagkos Giagkou and the participating students for their exceptional contribution to the opening ceremony.
- the personnel of the Cyprus Defence Policy Directorate and especially to Mrs Sofia Georgiou, Mrs Constantina Iliia, Mr Akis Kokkinis, Mr Christoforos Christoforou and Mr Andreas Genaris for their

undivided support during the invitation and registration process and the organisation of the residential phase.

I would like to congratulate all the cadets who participated in the 1st CSDP Olympiad, for their high level of enthusiasm and disciplined compliance with the established rules and procedures, and wish them a successful career and all the best for the future. The winners deserve special congratulations, although I believe that all the candidates have gained from their participation in the initiative.

My wish is for every future CSDP Olympiad to be better than the previous one, and for more and more Member States to endorse the initiative.

Major (AF) Symeon Zambas  
Defence Policy Directorate  
Cyprus Ministry of Defence



## 1. OPENING CEREMONY SPEECHES

(Pafos Ancient Odeon, 03 October 2012, 17:15-18:30)



## ADDRESS BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

Mr Demetris Eliades



It is a privilege and an honour to host the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad in Cyprus. We are very pleased to welcome you all here in the Ancient Odeon of Pafos.

The distinguished audience from several layers and sectors of society, in addition to the diplomatic and military experts, verifies and confirms that our Common Security and Defence Policy does not involve experts only but concerns civil society, all European citizens.

The assumption of the Presidency of the Council of the EU by Cyprus is an exceptional moment and a major challenge. We are a small country and a new Member State. We do not have a great number of experts, technocrats and specialists, neither do we have previous experience. Nevertheless, nothing prevents us from being diligent, serious and responsible, from having ideas and making proposals and suggestions, from taking initiatives or from being creative.

In our Presidency we fully co-operate with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton, the European External Action Service and all our partners. We work in moderation and in the spirit of consensus so as to serve our Common Security and Defence Policy for the peace of Europe and its people.

The contribution of the Ministry of Defence is not limited to the obligations that we have for the Presidency of the Council of the EU. It extends to a number of initiatives concerning the development of the EU's military capabilities, the advancement of international security with special emphasis on the Southern Neighbourhood and the Middle East, maritime security and the combating of piracy and the promotion of a common culture in the field of CSDP.

Within this framework, our Presidency supports the objectives of the European Security and Defence College, especially in the field of a joint military culture, by promoting the military Erasmus and undertaking a pioneering initiative through the organisation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad between cadets of military academies of EU Member States.

The proposal submitted by Cyprus was unanimously adopted by the Board of Directors of the European Security and Defence College. We would like to thank our partners who honoured Cyprus by entrusting our country with the organisation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Olympiad.

The design of the CSDP Olympiad emerged from the continuous and active participation of Cyprus in the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers and it aims at strengthening the interoperability of the armed forces of the Member States and promoting a wider European Security and Defence Culture.

Even though we do not possess Military Academies, Cyprus actively participates in the exchange programme of Young Officers and in the Implementation Group of this initiative. We are particularly pleased to welcome here today the majority of the members of the Implementation Group of the Initiative and the Head of the European Security and Defence College, who I would like to thank and congratulate for their efforts and successful work.

Dear EU cadets,

We warmly welcome your clear interest in participating in the 1<sup>st</sup> Olympiad which, coming from young European officers, gives us great cause for optimism.

In order to fulfil the vision of this initiative, you will need to pursue teamwork and a common background. The CSDP Olympiad provides an excellent starting point for each one of you to become an active link in this diverse and yet strong chain of the European Union.

The EU, as a global factor, portrays itself as a calm, cultured and trustworthy force with political and economic initiatives and a pioneering presence of humanitarian and development assistance and solidarity.

You are going to serve our CSDP as an officer of the armed forces of the Member States. The CSDP serves peace, security, stability and growth in Europe and the world. Consequently, this policy is what you are called upon to serve with honour, devotion and dedication.

We share a common vision for a better Europe and a better world. We also share the common belief that a better Europe is needed for a better world.

To conclude, I would like to express my gratitude to all those who contributed to the successful organisation of the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad in every possible way, especially the Mayor of Pafos Mr Savvas Vergas for his hospitality and his friendly support and the 1<sup>st</sup> Lyceum of Pafos for their performance.

I wish all participants a very successful and most interesting competition.

Declaring the commencement of the proceedings, I express my belief that this 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad will lead to the adoption of an annual institution with innovative and contemporary ideas emanating from our young officers, towards the fulfilment of our aspirations and our vision.

I congratulate, praise and encourage the cadets who, with their participation, plan a better, secure and peaceful future.

Thank you for your attention and for honouring the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad with your presence here with us today.





## ADDRESS BY THE MAYOR OF PAFOS

Mr Savvas Vergas



Dear friend - Minister of Defence,  
Head of the European Security and Defence College,  
Chief of the National Guard,  
Dear Members of Parliament, Dear friend - Mayor of Geroskipou, Members of the Municipal Council of Pafos,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure to be here tonight to address the opening ceremony of the 1<sup>st</sup> Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad of the European Union.

I am delighted that the town of Pafos was chosen to host this prestigious event within the framework of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and all the more so because the participants in this event are young men and women from the 27 Member States of the Union, which Cyprus joined as a full Member in 2004. Indeed I firmly believe that planning for the Europe of tomorrow cannot succeed if it is not compatible with the aspirations and visions of European youth. My joy at today's event also includes a sentimental reason, since my father was a military officer, a fact that decisively influenced my perception of the role and value of the Armed Forces as a factor promoting and safeguarding security and stability throughout all periods of global history.

The town that I have the honour to represent is proud of its European cultural identity, and of its substantial contribution towards the evolution of the common European cultural heritage. Incontestable proof lies in both its 3000 year history and its current economic, social and cultural status. The past, the present and the future of this small town, which has shown that it is capable of great accomplishments, all bear the mark of Europe.

In this spirit, I am particularly glad because your visit to Pafos comes just a few days after the decision, taken by an independent Selection Committee on 14 September 2012, recommending that Pafos be declared European Capital of Culture for 2017. The town and the entire District of



Pafos stand ready and willing to take up this huge responsibility in an efficient manner, towards the benefit of a cultural Europe.

I am aware that you are not here at this beautiful venue to listen a lecture promoting our city. However, I have faith in your judgement, and I know that after the next few days, Pafos will hold a special place in your memories.

Concluding, I would like to express my congratulations to the Minister of Defence, Mr Demetris Eliades and his staff, for the realisation of the idea of the Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad, and for its organisation. In addition, warm thanks for selecting Pafos as the venue for this event, which officially commences tonight.

Head of the European Security and Defence College,  
Ladies and Gentlemen from the other countries of the European Union,

I welcome you to Pafos which offers you its love and its traditional hospitality. I welcome you to the European Capital of Culture for 2017!



## **ADDRESS BY THE HEAD OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE**

**Mr Hans-Bernhard Weisserth**



Minister of Defence, Mr Demetris Eliades, Mayor of Pafos, Mr Savva Verga, Excellencies, Members of Parliament, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a privilege and great honour for me to address such a distinguished international audience at the opening of the first Common European Security and Defence Policy Olympiad at Pafos conducted under the umbrella of the European Security and Defence College.

First of all I would like to express my gratitude to the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union for taking this new and excellent initiative to promote the development of our Common European Security and Defence Policy among our young European military cadets and officers.

In past and more recent European polls, a clear majority of the population in the European Union expressed their clear preference for making foreign affairs, security and defence a subject to be dealt with no longer at purely national but at European level. People feel and recognise that this is the only way for the European countries to ensure that they have a say in world politics and to ensure our own security and defence.

Our Common European Security and Defence Policy is still a young and developing policy field of the European Union. To support its proper development we need to train and educate our civilian and military personnel at national and at EU level to become more knowledgeable and able to work efficiently in this field. Furthermore, we have to provide them with opportunities to develop their own European networks when working in this field.

In short - this is the main task of the European Security and Defence College. We are performing it by providing a variety of training activities and specialised programmes hosted and conducted

through the active engagement of almost all Member States, their Ministries and national civilian and military training institutes.

Cyprus is among those Member States which particularly support the development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy by engaging actively in the activities of the European Security Defence College. Two courses have been conducted to provide guidance for civilian and military personnel of Member States, EU institutions and partners of the EU in the field of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, one a few years ago in Agia Napa and a second one just two weeks ago in Brussels. It is important to emphasise that Cyprus' engagement in the military Erasmus is of particular added value and highly appreciated at EU level.

Behind such engagement, new ideas and initiatives, there are always many fathers, founders and actors - it is difficult to mention them all. However, allow me here to express my gratitude in particular to Major Symeon Zambas who has been acting not only as course director and but also as the driving factor in developing the CSDP Olympiad. It is a real pleasure for us to work with him.

Cadets and young officers,

In February this year you started the CSDP Olympiad with an internet-based distance learning phase, followed by the drafting of an essay on a CSDP-related issue, and tomorrow and on Friday you will conclude the last phase by presenting your work and finally entering the ultimate competition where we will identify the final winner - who knows most about the Common European Security and Defence Policy.

Whoever wins, all of you should recognise that a Common European Security and Defence Policy is THE framework in which you have to work and function as future European officers. The Treaty of the European Union provides that this policy might lead over time to a common European defence. I am personally involved in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy and I can see significant progress, achieved in particular over the last 10 years. On the other hand, I am personally convinced that a common European defence is a realistic and reasonable objective. As acting officers in the armed forces of the EU Member States and someday maybe in real European armed forces, you should be committed to supporting this development. It is an essential part of our future and the future of the citizens of the European Union.

To conclude, let me also express my thanks to the Mayor of Pafos, Mr Savva Verga. The City of Pafos is definitely an ideal choice for the organisation of the CSDP Olympiad because of its European cultural identity and the significant contribution which it has made to the development of a common European cultural heritage. Many thanks for your support and your great hospitality. The presence today of so many people coming from different parts of civil society proves that the development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy is not just in the interests of the military but concerns us all - and that is a good thing.

Minister of Defence, let me finally convey my thanks again to you and to Cyprus for having taken this initiative to conduct the 1st CSDP Olympiad. I wish for a successful final phase of the competition here in Pafos, which will hopefully lead to the regular organisation of such events in the future. I am also looking forward to the planned future involvement of Cyprus in other training activities of the European Security and Defence College.

Thank you very much.





## 2. MESSAGES





## THE SINGLE COMPETITION WINNER

### Second Lieutenant Thomas Van Hoecke



The CSDP Olympiad took place in Cyprus and lasted for two days. On the first day ten papers were presented. For most of us it was the first time we had to speak to an international audience of that size. This was already an enriching experience. One paper was selected by both the cadets and the jury as the best. Andrea Patrignani was the author of that paper and thus the winner of the paper competition. That night we had a traditional dinner together. On the second day we were divided into international teams of six cadets and we played the competition. After the first round my team came out as the best team. The six of us played the final individually with Andrea.

The CSDP Olympiad made it clear to me that the European Union has an important role to play in the European defence. The EU has a wide range of tools on which it can rely to solve contemporary security problems in a comprehensive way. The Olympiad was also an enjoyable introduction to the international scene in which we young officers will have to work while dealing with these security issues. Last but not least, it was a way to bring together young men and women of different origins and to incorporate the idea of European integration in these future officers.

I am grateful that the ESDC gave me the opportunity to participate in this competition. I am proud to be the winner of the first CSDP Olympiad. What I will remember most is the synergy we experienced in the international team.



## PAPER WRITING WINNER

Andrea Patrignani



### My Olympiad

Last October, the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad took place in Cyprus. The activity, held under the aegis of the European Security and Defence College and the Cypriot Presidency of the European Union, was intended to spread the principles the CSDP is based on among young officers from all the European countries. To stimulate the participants in the activity, two different competitions were organised.

The project developed through three phases.

The first, an internet-based module, aimed to give the participants basic knowledge of several aspects of the European Union: the history of the efforts made by the Member States towards a unified foreign and security policy, the legal framework behind the present Common Security and Defence Policy, the role the institutions play in the decision-making process and the tools they have to implement these decisions.

In a second phase, we were asked to write a paper to express an informed personal opinion on a topic related to the CSDP or CFSP. To increase our interest in this demanding issue (most of us were facing such a challenge for the first time) the ESDC allowed us to choose the title in line with our personal interests or studies. For instance, I decided to talk about the European Armaments Co-operation Strategy, a topic related to my PhD thesis. All the papers were assessed by a jury and the best ten were presented by the authors during the residential phase.

In the last part, we finally met all together in Pafos, where we worked on the institutional activities, while at the same time experiencing the attractions of the place. We were kept very busy but enjoyed ourselves very much too. The greatest moment of our whole stay was certainly the opening ceremony, in the theatre of ancient Pafos, when the Olympic torch was lighted. Other highlights were the visit to the ruins of the old city and the evening we spent in the first capital of the island, sampling traditional local dishes, music and dances.




As a whole, the activity was a useful opportunity to take a closer look at the instruments the European Union uses to deal with one of the most important issues of our times: security. In fact, despite having followed a university course on the history and evolution of the European institutions, I knew almost nothing about the so-called "second pillar". I think that, in the future, this will be a central point for military organisations, as will cooperation among personnel from different countries. From this point of view and, maybe for too brief a time, the chance we had to meet each other was very important: our different cultures, customs, training, studies and lives came closer together.

Thanks to the Olympiad, we experienced a new environment, with colleagues who have different ways of dealing with problems looking for a common aim: trying to build "a secure Europe in a better world".



## THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION



Cover-page of the winners – Austrian Officer Cadets HAUBNER & ENGLEITNER

From 3 to 5 October 2012, the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad took place in Pafos, Cyprus. About 50 young officers and officer cadets participated in this project, which was developed by Major ZAMBAS from Cyprus according to the principles of the European Initiative on the exchange of young officers inspired by ERASMUS.

Eleven Member States of the European Union followed the invitation and afforded their officer cadets a chance to increase interoperability and intercultural competence; among them four Austrian officer cadets from the "Hackher zu Hart" class, who are students of the Bachelor Studies of Applied Science in Military Leadership at the Theresan Military Academy in Austria. They were accompanied by Colonel (GS) Mag. WIEDNER and Colonel Dr GELL.

An impressive opening ceremony took place in the beautiful and historically interesting Odeon in Pafos under the auspices of the Cypriot Minister of Defence, Demetris ELIADES. It gave a first impression of Cyprus' great hospitality which we experienced throughout our stay.

Previous to the CSDP-Olympiad, all the officer cadets had to write an essay on CSDP. The 10 best essays, including two Austrian essays, were to be presented on the second day of the Olympiad. The points awarded to the essay, the audience evaluation and the jury evaluation were added together to give a winner.

The best presentation was won by Officer Cadet HAUBNER from Austria, and the winner of the day was Officer Cadet PATRIGNANI from Italy. The day ended with a very interesting cultural visit and a typical Cypriot dinner.

The last day of the CSDP-Olympiad was devoted to a competition on knowledge of CSDP. In a first round, six multinational groups had to compete against each other and in a second round the members of the winning group and the winner of the first day had to compete individually against

each other. The winner of this competition was Officer Cadet Thomas van HOECKE from the Royal Military Academy Brussels followed by Officer Cadet Martin ENGLEITNER from the Theresan Military Academy, who won a one-week trip to France.

Previous to the residential phase, all the officer cadets could participate in a competition to create a cover page for the publication of the essays. This competition was won by Austrian Officer Cadets HAUBNER and ENGLEITNER.

It was a great honour for all the participants to receive their certificates from the Head of the European Security and Defence College, Colonel Hans-Bernhard WEISSERTH, the organiser of the CSDP-Olympiad, Major Symeon ZAMBAS and the IG-Chairman, Admiral Cesare CIOCCA.

The whole Olympiad ended with a farewell lunch and an exchange of information between the participants. Most of them benefited from this friendly competition not only in terms of an increase of knowledge, but also in terms of creating new friendships and networks.

This extremely well organised event made clear to the young officers and officer cadets that it is mainly their own responsibility to work towards better security and a better Europe.

Officer Cadets KÖRÖCZ & PRAUS  
Class "Hackher zu Hart"  
Theresan Military Academy  
Austria

on the initiative of  
Col Dr. GELL, MSc, MSD, MBA  
Head of International Office

## THE FINNISH DELEGATION

### CSDP Olympiad Cyprus - Towards a more united, peaceful and secure EU



#### **1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad**

The very first Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad (CSDP) was held in Cyprus from 3 to 5 October, hosted by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the Republic of Cyprus. Over 30 cadets from various EU Member States attended the Olympiad, with representation from all branches.

The Finnish delegation set out for Cyprus with a certain air of excitement, as this would be a great opportunity to meet and get to know like-minded cadets from other European Union military academies and universities. Indeed many new ties and friendships were forged between the cadets during the event.

The event was glamorous and great hospitality was shown throughout our stay. The 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad was opened with a grand ceremony including a musical performance by the Cyprus Guard Orchestra, touching speeches and the lighting of a torch in the amphitheatre, symbolising the coming together of the different armed forces of the EU for a more peaceful and united Europe.

Before leaving for the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad, the cadets were given the challenge of learning the history behind the CSDP, the EU and how the various bodies of the EU function, with a focus on EU security and defence. Furthermore, a short 10 page essay competition gave the cadets the chance to show their knowledge.

In Cyprus, the top 10 cadets briefly presented their work to the whole group and naturally the winner was credited with honour and glory for his good work. The competition culminated in a group knowledge competition, with the best group then competing individually with each other. The ultimate winner of the whole competition showed great prowess and knowledge and truly showed that the Olympiad had been a greatly successful event. Finland was also successful, with the third place in the individual knowledge competition going to cadet Oinasmaa.

The city of Pafos and the ESDC went to enormous effort to make the event a great success. The knowledge competition, historical tour, dinner at a local tavern and closing ceremony all made the event truly memorable and worthwhile. Above all, the event showed that it is indeed a great asset for every young officer to understand and be aware of the CSDP and what it means to be part of the EU from a military perspective. An awareness of the other Member States and their culture helps to make future co-operation more fluid and effective, with relationships being built at an early stage of their careers. Indeed it can be said that this experience will help create awareness with the knowledge brought back to their own country by the cadets.

Hopefully the vision of creating this awareness among young officers will further increase in the future. It will be interesting indeed to follow what fruits the future Olympiads will bear for the participating cadets, and in the larger perspective, for the EU as a whole.



## THE WORDS OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE IMPLEMENTATION GROUP



When my colleague and friend Major Symeon Zambas proposed hosting the first CSDP Olympiad, my colleagues in the Implementation Group and I had the feeling that something very innovative had been conceived under the aegis of the European Initiative on the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus.

In fact, our experience in Pafos was even better than we expected.

In my personal view, this Olympiad achieved several objectives.

First, of course, it provided a stimulating opportunity to study the main aspects of CSDP: political/institutional and strategic aspects, capabilities and resources, and perspectives. It merged traditional academic study with a comparative vision between different cultural and pedagogical approaches from the participating academies.

Second, also very important, it offered the opportunity to the cadets to interact. In particular, they had the opportunity to gauge their capacities and knowledge against those of many other European colleagues with different academic backgrounds. The psychological dynamics and emotions created by the competition stimulated in their minds the enhancement of common values and common security culture.

Third, cooperation between academies and the ESDC increased further, which was particularly worthwhile in a field not yet sufficiently explored, as is the case with assessment of cadets and exchange of relevant best practices. This is the real lifeblood that the Initiative needs to achieve concrete and long-term results.

Last but not least, each of us came back from Pafos with a clear sense that an important forward step had been taken on the long road of the Initiative. It will certainly not be enough if it remains a one-off experience and if the creativity shown by our Cypriot colleagues is not adopted by other training institutions. But the idea has been launched, transformed through action and, very importantly, taken on by another Member State for the next edition in 2014: many thanks to Greece, which has accepted the challenge of taking this idea forward and providing a second opportunity.

Creativity, innovation and very frank, open competition have been the main added values of the first Olympiad. This has become a reality thanks to the courage shown by its organisers: courage in deciding to offer something really new, the unexplored option of common activities; courage in



taking risks and facing the difficulties that the new generally presents; and courage in constantly and consistently doing all that was necessary to deliver the Olympiad successfully.

The cadets participating in the Olympiad deserve special recognition: the exchanges and common activities were designed for you, your future careers and your future roles as military leaders for a stronger and more secure Europe. You showed the great merit of believing in the competition, you participated with time and energy, expressing fresh ideas and what is best in military basic education: frank and fair competition between you all, with appreciation for the skills and competences of your colleagues, exchanging ideas, experiences and feelings. The success of the Olympiad is also your personal success and your contribution will be an essential element for similar activities in the future.

I sincerely hope that these results will inspire further innovation and greater belief in the European Initiative on the Exchange of Young Officers. Its overall success will, finally, also be the success of all the Member States, national authorities, military training institutions, commandants, directors, experts, teachers, senior staff and, of course, the members of the Implementation Group!

For our armed forces, our states, our Europe!

Cesare Ciocca



## THE CSDP OLYMPIAD FROM AN ESDC TRAINING MANAGER'S POINT OF VIEW



From November 2007 until May 2012, Lieutenant-Colonel (GS) Dirk Dubois worked as a training manager in the permanent secretariat of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). During that period, he was actively engaged in the start-up and implementation of the 'European Initiative for the Exchange of young Officers, inspired by Erasmus.

It must have been in the early Autumn of 2011, when I was first contacted by Major Symeon Zambas about his idea of organising a new kind of 'common module' on CSDP in the form of a competition for the students of the military academies. As every future Presidency of the Council of the European Union comes up with new ideas to try to make a difference, I admit I was a bit sceptical at first. But slowly the idea took shape during discussions between the Cyprus MoD representatives and the ESDC secretariat, and I became convinced that it might actually work.

Once we got the final green light to go ahead with this event, my main concern was with the more academic side of the event. Knowing that the practical aspects of our stay would be looked after by our hosts, I worked on finding jury members, on working out a fair way to evaluate the participants, identifying topics for the papers the participants had to present, etc. This is where the strength of a mixed network such as the ESDC really proved itself. The network provided us with academic experts, military personnel and, above all, the necessary goodwill and mutual trust to find a good, well-balanced team of jury members and organisers in order to bring this event to a successful conclusion.

Our main concern was to make the competition as fair as possible. So we decided that the papers would be marked anonymously and that nobody would mark a paper written by a student with the same nationality as the jury member. Each written paper was marked by two persons, the final score being the average of the two scores, while the presentations were marked both by a jury of three people with different nationalities and by the other participants, with jury members not involved in evaluating presentations given by their compatriots. As the knowledge competition took place in public, it was not necessary to take these same precautions, but the questions were obviously kept secret until the day of the competition.

Of course, if you organise an event in a beautiful place like Pafos, there is always a risk that it will be looked upon as simply a touristic excursion. To avoid this, we made certain that the participants



actually put in an effort and learned something from it. First of all, by making certain that they went through the Internet-based Distance Learning material provided by the ESDC and that the papers they sent in were of an acceptable standard and were relevant to the Common Security and Defence Policy. Secondly, the good quality of most of the papers we received and the results of the knowledge competition proved that the learning objectives of the event had been met.

However, the initiative also had an affective goal: namely, to give some of the future European military elite the opportunity to interact, to engage in friendly competition and to get to know each other better. I personally remain fully convinced that getting to know each other better is a prerequisite for fruitful future cooperation and human interoperability. The Cypriot presidency made every possible effort to provide an ideal backdrop for this interaction, from the opening event in the ancient Odeon to the traditional dinner in the village of Kouklia.

Finally, I want to thank the organisers for giving me the opportunity to participate in this successful event as a jury member, even after I had left the ESDC secretariat, and, of course, my current hierarchy for allowing me to participate.

Lt. Colonel Dirk Dubois



## AUSTRIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION GROUP



### **CSDP-Olympiad in Cyprus A great event to increase European thinking**

Congratulation to Cyprus for conducting such a valuable event. The CSDP Olympiad was another great leap forward – an opportunity not just to learn about Europeanisation but to live it. Thanks to the organisers; the main responsibility was in the hands of Major Zambas Symeon, and because of his efforts, each and every participant enjoyed those days in Pafos.

Austria sent to Cyprus only those officer cadets who had passed the EU common module on CSDP the year before. Because of that module, in which numerous CSDP topics were taught, they were well prepared. The idea of requesting a seminar paper from all officer cadets was greatly beneficial for them, even if they did not see it at that stage: not just in familiarising them with CSDP ideas, but also in that Austrian officer cadets could choose the same topic for their bachelor's theses. As a result, the Austrian officer cadets' research on their chosen topics was probably intensive, because they need it to pass their exams in Austria in the coming months.

Of course Austrian officers were proud of their officer cadets, because they managed to win the cover-page competition, two Austrians were in the top ten for the quality of their essays, one Austrian won the presentation competition and another Austrian achieved second place in the single competition.

The main purpose, for us, was the bringing together of officer cadets from all over Europe. Discussion of CSDP issues served as a tool for increasing “interoperability” and “intercultural competences”. Some older officers grew up during the Cold War; in their minds “European thinking” is not all that deeply anchored. Our hope is that if we educate our officer cadets more deeply in European security and defence culture, one day, when they are promoted to responsible posts, European thinking will be a daily activity and will grow much faster than at present.

Moreover, officer cadets had a chance to create European networks, which will help them manage future European challenges – not forgetting that they also forged new friendships in a very beautiful environment, with a great history and culture. Such an event is an important opportunity to promote cooperation within Europe, to break down barriers between countries and bring different ways of thinking closer together.

From a security strategy point of view, we all have to cooperate more closely in the European Union to deal with the threats we face – all of them listed in the European Security Strategy (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, cyber-security, energy security and climate change) – and events such as the CSDP Olympiad enhanced understanding of the fact that we really do need closer cooperation.

Geographically, Cyprus is situated at the edge of the Europe Union – but after the event all participants came to the conclusion that Cyprus is at the centre of European thinking.

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## THE CSDP OLYMPIAD FROM A SCIENTIFIC POINT OF VIEW



The first CSDP Olympiad, organised under the aegis of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union, makes a very valuable contribution to the tools created within the framework of the European initiative for the exchange of young officers.

It fostered the competitive spirit of our future military elite within a policy area in which they are called upon to play fundamental executive and decisive roles. Their participation and their interaction raised their awareness of the challenges faced by the Europeans in structuring and organising their security and defence and of the need for a "European security and defence culture". As Europeans, participants and, from now on, colleagues and friends, they undoubtedly sowed the seeds of this common culture.

In a constructive manner, the Olympiad has also highlighted the challenges of the education and training of the cadets. CSDP must be better known and familiar to all European cadets. To this end, the CSDP Olympiad has legitimately and fully taken its place within the instruments for the European education and training of young military officers.

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### **3. THE TEN BEST ESSAYS**



**Andrea PATRIGNANI**

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***The European Armaments Co-operation Strategy, an instrument to strengthen cooperation among Member States and to enhance standardisation within the European Armed Forces***



Italy, June 2012



## **List of acronyms**

<b>EAC</b>	European Armament Co-operation Strategy
<b>EBB</b>	Electronic Bulletin Board
<b>EDA</b>	European Defence Agency
<b>EDTIB</b>	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>IPT</b>	Integrated Project Team
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>OCCAR</b>	Organisation Conjonte de Coopération en matière d'Armament
<b>TFEU</b>	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

# The European Armament Co-operation Strategy

As part of the framework to support the effectiveness of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), in October 2008 the European Defence Agency (EDA) approved the European Armament Co-operation Strategy (EAC), with three strategic aims:

- to generate, promote and facilitate cooperation programmes to meet capability needs, with appropriate executive agencies to manage the whole procurement process;
- to ensure the EDTIB and investment therein is capability oriented and supports future cooperation programmes, to allow the European industry to fulfil procurement needs in the long run; this requires thorough transparency and understanding between governments and industries; and
- to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of European armaments cooperation, developing the right tools to achieve the ends - harmonisation and agreement on the requirements must be reached as soon as possible<sup>1</sup>.

Although these three aims outline a structure which would work well in theory, a huge effort must be made to ensure its effectiveness.

But does the EAC strategy have an impact on the EU to strengthen co-operation among the Member States and to enhance standardisation within the European Armed Forces? This paper outlines the major issues related to this topic.

## Options for providing procedures

As the name itself suggests, the ACS is strictly linked to the industrial and economic sector. In the last few decades, armament costs have been rising for a wide variety of reasons, but especially owing to the increased technological complexity of most of them. This trend has been accompanied by a general freeze - if not a decrease - as regards the provisional budget. In fact, the defence expenditures of all the EDA-participating Member States for 2010 were about EUR 194 billion: 1.6% of total GDP<sup>2</sup>. In 2005, the amount was EUR 193 billion: 1.8% of GDP. This tendency, especially the lack of investments in research, could threaten the industrial-technological capacity to prepare for the future<sup>3</sup>.

In this international context, European countries have various options to cover their armaments needs<sup>4</sup>: the simplest one is the use of the "off-the-shelf" formula, i.e. the purchase of the finished

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<sup>1</sup> Heuninckx, B. (2009). The European Defence Agency Capability Development Plan and the European Armaments Cooperation Strategy: Two Steps in the Right Direction. *Public Procurement Law Review*

<sup>2</sup> Pires, M. L. (January 2012). Europe and United States Defence Expenditure in 2010. *European Defence Agency*. Schmitt, B. (n.d.). Armaments cooperation in Europe. *Institute for Security Studies*. Darnis, J.-P., Gasparini, G., Grams, C., Keohane, D., Liberti, F., Maulny, J.-P., et al. (October 2007). Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmes. *Institute for Security Studies - Occasional Paper n° 69*.

product directly from a producer country, generally the US. In this case, the investment required may be smaller, but the States are hugely dependent on the "producer" for supply and logistical support. Moreover, it generates problems with the possible offsets, which are discussed below.

A second option is starting a nationally-led programme, but this possibility is only available for those States which have a significant defence industry. In fact, in this case, the States must provide on their own the resources to lead the various phases of the procurement process. Moreover, although the costs of a programme could be lower than those required for a multinational procurement process, it is very difficult to make economies of scale, and more resources are thus required overall. Another problem is the capability to develop long-life logistical support for the armaments, owing to the lack of financial resources.

The third option is to rely on a collaborative procurement process, which allows the participating states to share their capabilities and resources - both technical and material - through a leading entity which has the task of controlling all the phases of the process. With this kind of approach, higher efficiency can be achieved thanks to the economies of scale, as the quantities of the final product required are usually consistent. Moreover, the reduction in the costs per piece allows the armaments to be competitive in the international markets. It is also possible to further reduce the general costs by extending the programme period: the "through-life" approach extends the collaboration within the participating States throughout the whole life cycle of the equipment, related to maintenance, training and logistical issues. The high costs of the in-service phase, often as expensive as the supply phase, and the constant updating of hi-tech equipment can be afforded<sup>5</sup>.

### **The main problems in market harmonisation**

However, why has the armaments market not achieved full integration as has occurred in other economic fields? The task of harmonising the needs of the different States a key challenge, from which other issues derive: the protectionism applied by European countries to their own national defence industries, both for the offsets and for national security reasons<sup>6</sup>. In fact, procurement within EU national borders was almost 75% of total procurement in 2009<sup>7</sup>.

This protectionism is the result of the application of Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and of the "juste retour" principle, the weak international management structures leading the projects and the delays caused by the practice of proceeding by Memorandum of Understanding.

The limits imposed by the application of Article 346 TFEU is the first important point. This article, already present in the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community in 1958 (Art. 223) and in the Treaty of the European Union (Amsterdam 1999) as Art. 296<sup>8</sup>, has retained almost the

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Edwards, J. (2011, August). The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: A Step Towards Affordability? *International Security Programme Paper*.

<sup>7</sup> Heuninckx, B. (2008). A Primer to Collaborative Defence Procurement in Europe: Troubles, Achievements and Prospects. *Public Procurement Law Review*

<sup>8</sup> *Offset Agreement*. (n.d.). Retrieved June 17th, 2012, from Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia:

same content<sup>9</sup>:

1. *The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules:*
  - a. *no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;*
  - b. *any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.*
2. *The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make changes to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply.*

Thus, a Member State can invoke the exemption in order to protect interests relating to its security. If the exemption is successfully invoked, the Member State can derogate from all the provisions of the European Community, including those on public procurement. According to research led by the EDA in 2005, over half of defence procurement was carried out outside the European Community framework as a result of the exemption<sup>10</sup>.

To limit this trend, the Agency proposed a voluntary and non-binding Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement in order to increase European defence market competition in cases in which the exemption under the TFEU does not apply<sup>11</sup>. It can be used for all projects worth at least EUR 1 million, except for research and technology, nuclear weapons, chemical, bacteriological and radiological goods and services and cryptographic equipment procurement.

In the event of pressing operational urgency, for compelling reasons of national security and for follow-on work, the competitive procurement procedures within the Code can be derogated<sup>12</sup>.

Therefore, the Code of Conduct ensures mutual transparency among Member States, thanks to the intermediation of the EDA, which collects data on the use of Art. 346 TFEU. It also promotes mutual support among the participating States in order to ensure security of supply<sup>13</sup>. In conclusion, the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement helps the participating Member States to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and move towards the creation of a competitive European Defence Equipment Market<sup>14</sup>. This might lead to increased competition within the market itself, and subsequently to lower prices and more efficient spending

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[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offset\\_agreement](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offset_agreement)

<sup>9</sup> *Article 346*. (n.d.). Retrieved June 17th, 2012, from The Lisbon Treaty: <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-7-general-and-final-provisions/589-article-346.html>

<sup>10</sup> Heuninckx, B. (2008). Towards a Coherent European Defence Procurement Regime? European Defence Agency and European Commission Initiatives. *Public Procurement Law Review*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement*. (n.d.). Retrieved June 17, 2012, from European Defence Agency: <http://eda.europa.eu/Otheractivities/Intergovernmentalregimedefenceprocurement/CoC>

of defence budgets<sup>15</sup>.

Another concern in the collaborative procurement process is the inefficient allocation of money and resources, due to the application of the principle of "juste retour"<sup>16</sup>. Under this principle, the economic value of the work allocated to the industry of a participating State - i.e. the work share - has to match the Country's financial contribution to the programme - i.e. the cost share - rather than certain exclusively technological or economic criteria.

In 1996, the *Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement* (OCCAR) was created by the four major Member States - France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom - in order to set out a procedure for collaborative procurement specifically based on the "juste retour" principle. In particular, each State must receive work amounting to at least 66% of the value of its financial participation in the programme.

The OCCAR no longer calculates the return of the programmes on a case-by-case basis, preferring a more flexible multi-year balancing<sup>17</sup>.

This principle, which on one hand offers some advantages because of the flexibility it gives to production (duplication of lines of production and dedicated factories ensures security of supplies) and the protection it guarantees for employment in the countries where the production itself is carried out, leads on the other hand to a consistent reduction in the benefits arising from economies of scale. Indeed, these economies could be achieved simply through the final assembly of the various components procured collaboratively: an increase of 1% in quantities leads to a total cost increase of only 0.89%, and there would be an even higher reduction proportional to the number of States involved in the process<sup>18</sup>.

To provide a legal framework for each collaborative defence procurement programme, the States outline a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which usually defines the phases and schedule of the programmes, the objectives, the cost share for each participating State and the work share for the work allocation, and the organizational and management framework. They might not cover the whole period of a project, and often there are various MoUs, one for each phase of development, production (sometimes in different "tranches") and in-service support<sup>19</sup>.

Therefore, the overall commitment of States cannot be known from the beginning, and each phase of the programme must be negotiated separately, often causing delays in the scheduled timetable; there is also a focus on "meeting phases" rather than on the final delivery<sup>20</sup>. Moreover, the industry is contracted phase by phase, and new contracts have to be drawn up each time.

Thus, working with MoUs increases the complexity of the procurement process and the time needed for its conclusion. International organisations such as OCCAR propose to resolve this problem by using a single MoU per project, covering all the different phases. Another valid solution might be to reduce the number of procurement process phases. This option, first

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<sup>15</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Darnis, et al., Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmes.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Heuinckx, A Primer to Collaborative Defence Procurement in Europe...

<sup>17</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Edwards, J. (2011, August). The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive...

<sup>18</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Heuinckx, B. (2008). A Primer to Collaborative Defence Procurement in Europe.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Darnis, et al., Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmes.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

introduced by single States - such as the UK, France, Germany - since 1998, aims to have only three phases: (1)predefinition; (2)development/design and (3)production<sup>21</sup>.

However, the only way to resolve the problems arising from the practice of using MoUs might be to implement the international management structure which is in charge of the programme. In fact, despite evidence that highly integrated project teams lead to successful conclusions to processes, States are not used to working in such an integrated way because of the limited control governments have over it<sup>22</sup>.

For projects started in the 1980s, the multinational project teams had no decision-making powers, and all the key decisions were taken by the national government. This method avoided long discussions on questions that could not be resolved with MoUs. More recently, in the 1990s, the States formed the first integrated project teams (IPT). However, over the years, these structures have had less and less power, although they are the bases on which the international organisations such as OCCAR are shaped<sup>23</sup>.

As a consequence, past experience shows the importance of working through IPTs made up of permanently-involved national experts<sup>24</sup>. Their key point is that the members do not represent their own governments, so that they can manage a programme and its daily routine without power limits. Moreover, as the IPTs have to deal directly with the industry, they must have a strictly hierarchical structure and a high number of different capabilities:

- operational (with military experts);
- technological;
- financial;
- legal;
- logistics<sup>25</sup>.

### **Efforts to move towards a free trade regime**

But why do EU countries want to protect their defence industry? Mainly because of the offsets, i.e. certain additional benefits - such as investment or technology transfers - over and above delivery of the equipment. In fact, an importing country decides whether to import equipment on the basis of the value of the direct or indirect<sup>26</sup> offsets rather than the quality of the goods. Because of the way in which this practice hinders free market and trade, the EU Commission decided to tackle it to improve competition within the EU defence market.

In order to address these issues and to emphasise that competition in the defence market should

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Darnis, et al., Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmes.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Direct offsets have a military nature and concern the topic directly; indirect offsets are not linked to the purchased product or service and are divided into indirect military offsets - if concerning the military subcontracts - and indirect non-military ones - if the benefits are linked to civil sectors of the buying country.

be about the quality of the goods rather than the possible advantages to be obtained by a State by purchasing specific equipment, the EU has outlined a number of steps. In 2007, the Commission drew up a "defence package" with the aim of creating a unified European defence market<sup>27</sup>. Consequently, the EU Council and the Parliament published Directive 2009/81/EC<sup>28</sup> to introduce fair and transparent rules allowing defence companies to access the markets of other Member States<sup>29</sup>. This Directive provides, for the first time, a law-level rule specifically for the defence and security markets; for non-sensitive and non-military equipment Directive 2004/18/EC is used. Indeed, the intention is to replace the non-binding Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement with a more effective and legally binding instrument<sup>30</sup>. Moreover, the Code works only for defence - not security - procurement, and it comes into play only when the Directive does not apply (if the exemption for the Article 346 is successfully invoked).

Despite the innovations this Directive brought to the defence market, there is still a key point. Being a second-level law, it cannot modify a first-level one: this means that, as Art. 346 is laid down in a constitutional-rank Treaty, Directive 2009/81/EC cannot prevent the State from invoking the exemption. However, a very tight interpretation has been made of Art. 346 TFEU, as objective evidence must be provided to support the validity of the claims<sup>31</sup>.

Another central point is that the Directive does not deal with the offsets problem. Indeed, it must be said that the offsets are embedded in the procurement process itself, and there may be no way of resolving this issue through legislation. The only possibility is to rely on the conduct of individual countries. To deal with this issue, the EDA has drawn up a Code of Conduct on Offsets, agreed by the Member States<sup>32</sup>.

## Conclusion

In summary, we can say that the main shortfalls of the international procurement programmes are:

- difficulties in harmonising operational requirements and timelines among the participating states;
- the complex or inefficient decision-making structure of both participating States and European industries;
- the use of the "juste retour" principle, leading to inefficient work allocation and duplication of

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<sup>27</sup> Di Lenna, N. (2009, Settembre). La Direttiva Europea sul Procurement della Difesa. *Quaderni IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali*.

<sup>28</sup> European Parliament and Council. (13, July 2009). Official Journal of the European Union. *Directive 2009/81/EC*.

<sup>29</sup> *Defence procurement - Frequently Asked Questions*. (2009, August 28).

<sup>30</sup> *Ivi.*; see also Commission of the European Union. (2006, December 07). Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement.; Directorate General Internal Market and Services. (s.d.). Directive 2009/81/EC on the award of contracts in the fields of defence and security. *Guidance Note - Field of application*.

<sup>31</sup> *Op. Cit., Defence procurement - Frequently Asked Questions*.

<sup>32</sup> *European Defence Agency*. (2011, May 03). *A Code of Conduct on Offsets agreed by the EU Member States participating in the EDA*.

resources and, in turn, to increased production costs<sup>33</sup>.

- All those factors cause a general lengthening of the procurement time and a rise in the final cost of the armaments, even if, once a programme has been launched, the schedule slippages and the cost overrun are comparable with those of nationally-led commitments.

From the political point of view, the participant States could reach a thorough understanding thanks to the sharing of information in the industrial and technological fields. Successful research programmes are likely to lead to successful procurement programmes<sup>34</sup>. European countries should share more information about their research projects and future plans to prevent duplication<sup>35</sup>.

Moreover, a stronger union as regards economic-related issues could lead to enhanced cohesion among the allies and would therefore be the basis for a future implementation of common, coherent political action - as suggested by the founders of the modern European Union, a thorough commitment on economic issues would lead to a political union.

Of course, the European Armed Forces could also benefit from closer political cooperation, as one of the main products would be the standardisation of armaments. In fact, focusing on family-of-weapons means that the participant States would agree to develop complementary equipment that could be produced by industrially weak countries. This would be the right way to reduce logistical costs as well, since the procurement of the components for the maintenance of the armaments would be shared. Furthermore, a "through-life" programme would be assured because of the reduced financial commitment. Closer operational co-operation could also be achieved, as all the European Armed Forces would use the same equipment, thus ensuring more flexibility and adaptability when operating together in joint or combined operations<sup>36</sup>.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that, to improve participation and the competition among the industries of different countries, in 2006 the EDA established an Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) to assure more transparency and cross-border opportunities in defence procurement, directly linking the public and private actors involved in the process.

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<sup>33</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Heuinckx, B. (2008). A Primer to Collaborative Defence Procurement in Europe.

<sup>34</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Darnis, et al., Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmes.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *Op. Cit.*, Heuinckx, B. (2008). A Primer to Collaborative Defence Procurement in Europe.



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***Climate change, the potential consequences for the European Union's internal and external security over the coming decades***



Brussels, June 2012

## **List of acronyms**

<b>CCVI</b>	Climate Change Vulnerability Index
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>CO<sub>2</sub></b>	Carbon dioxide
<b>DG CLIMA</b>	Directorate-General for Climate Action
<b>EHCI</b>	Euro Health Consumer Index
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change
<b>JRC</b>	Joint Research Center
<b>MCCIP</b>	Marine Climate Change Impacts Partnership
<b>UN</b>	United Nations

## Introduction

Climate change has been a controversial subject in recent years. People are aware that the weather these days is more extreme than it used to be. Even in a country such as Belgium, which is known for its moderate weather in habitants have experienced hurricanes and even minor natural disasters.

People know that the climate is changing and they are often confused by rules laid down by national and international authorities in order to delay climate change. People do not know that countries are exposed to a number of threats which could compromise their security.

In this paper the negative effects of climate change and the resulting threats for the European Union are explained. These include direct and indirect effects. The main objective of this paper is to describe certain consequences of climate change and to make people aware that climate change can affect all aspects of our lives.

## Climate Change: In general

### Definition climate change

The IPCC, (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), defined Climate Change as follows: "A change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer."<sup>37</sup>

### Effects of climate change in Europe

It is important to be aware of the different consequences of climate change in order to understand the risks to which Europe is exposed.

The first consequence is the global rise of the temperature. In the past century, scientist have observed a rise in temperature of 0.75°C. According to predictions however, it will become another 1.1 to 6.4°C warmer over the next 100 years.




Figure 1: Model for surface warming<sup>38</sup>

<sup>37</sup> 20/05/2012, <http://thegwpf.org/science-news/4374-ipcc-introduces-new-climate-change-definition.html>

<sup>38</sup> 20/05/2012, [http://www.ipcc.ch/publications\\_and\\_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspmp-projections-of.html](http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspmp-projections-of.html)

The problem of melting ice caps and rising seas is a second problem. The IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) carried out a study which showed that the sea level will rise by between 18 and 59 centimetres in the next 100 years.<sup>39</sup> This rise could cause serious problems to islands, low-lying land areas and countries located near seas. Those areas are extremely vulnerable: not only are they threatened by serious floods or tsunamis, but it is even possible that whole areas could disappear.




Figure 2: Time series of global mean sea level<sup>40</sup>


A third consequence is that weather conditions will become more extreme each year. Some regions will suffer from drought, while others will have to cope with heavy rain, storms and floods. Scientists say that these consequences may have serious implications for the quality and availability of water resources.<sup>41</sup> Agriculture will also suffer from these extreme conditions.

These three consequences also have implications for human health and for fauna and flora, as will be explained in this paper.

### Most vulnerable regions


Maplecroft has carried out several studies analysing the impact of climate change in different parts of the world. On the basis of those studies, they drew up a CCVI (Climate Change Vulnerability Index), showing which regions are most vulnerable to climate change. Figure 3 shows the map with the CCVI index for each country. Their conclusion was that the most vulnerable areas are located in Southern Africa, Asia and South-America.<sup>42</sup> These are fast-growing areas and as it will be explained later in this paper this could have an impact on security in Europe.

<sup>39</sup> IPCC, "Climate Change 2007 synthesis report – Summary for Policymakers, 2007, Valencia, 22p.  
<sup>40</sup> 18/05/2012, <http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2007/03/the-ipcc-sea-level-numbers/>  
<sup>41</sup> 20/05/2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/consequences/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/consequences/index_en.htm)  
<sup>42</sup> For more information about the causes, visit [http://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi\\_2012.html](http://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi_2012.html).



*Figure 3: Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2012<sup>43</sup>*

Figure 4 shows us that the different regions within Europe have a low to high risk of being affected. The European Commission published a report on the vulnerability of its own regions in 2009. This index is based on several parameters analysed by scientists, such as the probability of floods, droughts, the availability of natural resources and GDP (Gross Domestic Product), of European countries. It is assumed that countries with a low GDP are more vulnerable because they do not have the capacity and the means to react adequate to natural disasters and other problems caused by climate change.<sup>44</sup>



*Figure 4: Climate change vulnerability index in European regions*

The map shows us that regions in the South and the Southeast are most vulnerable. The Mediterranean regions are much more vulnerable; scientists have found that the availability of drinking water there could become a problem. The first problem is that salt water will penetrate

<sup>43</sup> 20/05/2012, [http://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi\\_2012.html](http://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi_2012.html)

<sup>44</sup> EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Regions 2020: The Climate change challenge for European regions", Brussels, 2009, p. 23.

into rivers and coastal aquifers due to the rise in the sea level.<sup>45</sup> The second problem is that there will be less water available as a result of drought. The effects of those problems on security in the European Union will be discussed in part 3 of this paper. The conditions in continental Europe will be better, but will also have to cope with extreme conditions such as heavy rain falls, storms and extreme drought.<sup>46</sup>

## **Threats to the European Union's internal and external security**

### **Supply of energy resources**

European countries do not have many energy resources such as oil, gas and other fossil fuels. Such resources are very important for industrialized areas, and Europe has to import most of its energy resources. This makes Europe very vulnerable. The European Union is aware of this problem and is attempting to adopt measures to secure its energy supply.<sup>47</sup><sup>48</sup> The biggest problem is that Europe depends for its energy supply on regions that are rather instable. So it is already very difficult for Europe to secure its energy supply and climate change (both current and future) is only making things more complicated. The regions on which Europe depends for its energy supply such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, and Iraq, are regions that are very vulnerable to climate change. It is even conceivable that some energy resources could disappear as a result of climate change. The countries supplying energy to Europe may become more instable and it could even become impossible to import certain energy resources. This could be catastrophic for European industry and consequently, for its economy. This must be seen as a major threat to the European Union. That is the reason why the importance of renewable energy resources should be recognised. Another major threat is that certain countries are becoming so unstable that the presence of armed forces is required. Failing states are often perfect for setting up camps for terrorists, traffickers in drugs and human beings and organized crime because of the corruption and absence of authority in those states.<sup>49</sup>

There are also other phenomena linked to energy resources and climate change. According to a study<sup>50</sup> <sup>51</sup>, there will be a reduced production in the thermoelectric sector.<sup>52</sup> Water is required to prevent thermoelectric power plants from overheating. As climate change evolves, electricity prices may increase and that it may even become impossible to supply everyone at all times. Industrial sectors cannot work efficiently without electricity and certainly not when temperatures are rising and air conditioning (which uses electricity) are needed to cool the machines. This phenomenon could have a serious social impact.

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<sup>45</sup> 20/06/2012, <http://archive.greenpeace.org/climate/science/reports/fulldesert.html>

<sup>46</sup> 20/06/2012, <http://archive.greenpeace.org/climate/science/reports/fulldesert.html>

<sup>47</sup> Certain measures and policy options can be found in the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on functioning of the European Union

<sup>48</sup> THE EUROPEAN FILES, "Security of energy supply in Europe", 2011, Brussels, p.7.

<sup>49</sup> BAKER P., "Fixing failing states: the new security agenda", Washington, 2007, 12 p.

<sup>50</sup> Published in Nature Climate Chang

<sup>51</sup> The article can be found in annex 1.

<sup>52</sup> 20/06/2012, <http://www.alphagalileo.org/ViewItem.aspx?ItemId=120744&CultureCode=en>

## Security problems as a result of rising sea levels

There are several security problems which are related to the rise in sea level, including floods and the disappearance of complete regions.<sup>53</sup> This problem could affect European security in different ways. A lot of infrastructures which are of vital importance to the economy of a country (such as ports) are located at the coast. These could be completely destroyed.



Figure 5: Population living below 5m elevation in coastal areas (% of regional population)<sup>54</sup>

Another consequence is that, as figure 5 shows, coastal regions are densely populated. People living in coastal areas could lose their lives or get seriously injured during a flood. The economic cost of such floods is enormous and it would be impossible for countries that are already struggling such as Greece and Spain (vulnerable countries) to help all the victims of natural disasters. The situation could degenerate into humanitarian disasters the cost of such a disaster cannot be calculated because human lives are priceless. The JRC (Joint Research Center), attempted to estimate the costs of natural disasters and floods, as shown in figure 6. Humanitarian aid will be very important such cases: people would have to be evacuated, areas would have to be rebuilt, etc.

<sup>53</sup> As explained in paragraph 2.3.

<sup>54</sup> EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Regions 2020: The Climate change challenge for European regions", Brussels, 2009, p. 12.






Figure 6: Annual average expected damage cumulated across administrative units<sup>55</sup>

Another consequence is that border disputes may occur. Current well, defined borders could disappear. A question arises: would the law of the sea still be applicable then or should the concept of national waters be reconsidered? History had shown that borders are a delicate issue, even in a world of globalisation. This border problem could degenerate into conflicts between different states. The border between Italy and Switzerland is an excellent example of this problem: the glaciers that form the border are melting. So some borders could be displaced by up to 100 metres. Switzerland and Italy are talking about redefining the border so the issue will be resolved peacefully in that particular case.<sup>56</sup> However, some countries are a lot more nationalistic, particularly if natural resources are involved. Such areas could become involved in long international wars, making the presence of armed forces necessary.

### Availability of natural resources and food

The availability of natural resources will decrease in the future as a result of climate change. As already explained in this paper,<sup>57</sup> there will be less drinking water available in some regions. Water is an important resource for human beings and for fauna and flora in general.

Another problem is that the agriculture, a sector that is still of vital importance for some countries, will experience a lot of problems. Extreme weather conditions would ruin complete crops. It would become impossible to supply everyone with enough food, especially in a world where the population is growing by the day.

There are also consequences for fish stocks. Studies show that fish are migrating. Some species of fish are increasingly present in Europe while others have disappeared. According to European marine researchers, the global impact of climate change on fish stocks is negative.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>55</sup> EUROPEAN COMMISSION, "Regions 2020: The Climate change challenge for European regions", Brussels, 2009, p. 14.

<sup>56</sup> 21/06/2012, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16854-climate-changes-europes-borders--and-the-worlds.html>.

<sup>57</sup> Paragraph 2.3 – vulnerable regions.

<sup>58</sup> 14/06/2012, <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/05/11/482218/study-shows-clear-indications-that-climate-change-is-impacting-european-fish-stocks/?mobile=nc>.

It is important to understand that the time will come when it will be impossible to supply everyone. It is in people's nature to fight for their lives and to stay alive by any means. It is conceivable that there will be an increase in conflicts and even civil wars owing to the shortage of natural resources and food. In the past, an estimated 40% of conflicts were caused by natural resources.<sup>59</sup>

## **Migration**

Migration is already a major challenge for EU, but the situation will only worsen as a result of climate change. People living in vulnerable areas want to migrate to other countries where their lives are not in danger. People are moving from coastal regions to continental regions but they do not pose risks to European security. The main problem relates to people migrating from other continents to Europe.

According to a study conducted by the IOM (International Organization for Migration), there will be between 25 million and 1 billion environmental migrants by 2050.<sup>60</sup> Such a high level of migration could degenerate into conflicts.<sup>61</sup> As history has shown, it is difficult for people of different cultures to live together. Those tensions, which can culminate civil wars, could put the internal security of Europe at risk.

Migration could also aggravate existing conflicts over the availability of natural resources. Owing to the scarcity of resources and the deteriorating economic situation, people will have the feeling that they should compete against each other. Some people, especially indigenous people, could feel superior to others and this could be a trigger for further conflict. The armed forces will have a dual role in such a scenario. For obvious reasons their role is important during conflicts, but they could also be deployed in border regions to carry out controls and to reduce illegal migration. This deployment scenario should not be national but rather European which is why the Common Security and Defence Policy is so valuable.

## **Health problems**

Climate change will give rise to a number of health problems for the populations of affected regions. Scientists have observed an increase in the number of insects as a result of climate change and some of these insects can transmit dangerous diseases. An example is the Asian tiger mosquito, currently present in northern Europe.<sup>62</sup> However, the Asian tiger mosquito is not the only insect that has found its way to Europe: other tropical insects, that are dangerous to human health, have also been observed.

Unfortunately, this is not the only health problem caused by the climate change. Extreme weather events could have numerous consequences for human health, in particular for the more vulnerable population groups such as elderly people, young children and indigent people. Not only will the mortality rate increase as a result of but climate change also so will the number of injuries and the

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<sup>59</sup> UNDP, "Human Development report 2011 - Sustainability and equity: a better future for all", New York, 2011, p. 88.

<sup>60</sup> 15/06/2012, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/complex-nexus#nearfar>

<sup>61</sup> Particularly ethnic and religious conflicts.

<sup>62</sup> More information about this topic can be found on this website: <http://phys.org/print254546682.html>.

number of people with mental health problems.<sup>63</sup> The effect of a heat wave on the mortality rate is shown in figure 7. Another consequence is that climate change could have a negative impact on human development.<sup>64,65</sup>




Figure 7: The effect of a heat wave on the mortality rate in Europe in 2003<sup>66</sup>

Such health problems could create major difficulties for countries. Healthcare systems in European countries are currently of good quality according to the Euro Health Consumer Index, (EHCI) 2012.<sup>67</sup> However, the medical sector may face new challenges as a result of the above-mentioned health problems. Medical research is expensive and countries that are already struggling will not be able to pay for it and as a result will not be able to help the victims of climate change. The spread of disease could cost the lives of thousands of people and could lead to a humanitarian disaster. The quality of life in Europe could deteriorate significantly and this could pose problems for Europe’s internal and external security.

### Overall security problems

China is currently the biggest polluter but many people see the United States and Europe as the culprits in relation to the greenhouse effect. They view American and European lifestyle as the cause of their problems. This could lead not only to individual actions, but also to terrorist actions by extremists convinced of the culpability of the United States and Europe. This would compromise the security of the European Union.

### The important role of the CSDP

The problems caused by climate change cannot be resolved at national level; an international policy is the only way to reduce the negative effects of climate change. Although the European Commission is already taking action to delay the effects of climate change, there is no doubt that

<sup>63</sup> AHERN M., KOVATS R., WILKINSON P., FEW R., MATTHIES F., “Global Health Impacts of Floods: Epidemiologic Evidence”, London, 2005, 11 p.

<sup>64</sup> The figure showing this can be found in Annex 2.

<sup>65</sup> More information can be found in the following publication: UNDP, “Human Development report 2011 - Sustainability and equity: a better future for all”, New York, 2011, p. 31.

<sup>66</sup> 12/06/2012, <http://www.climate.org/topics/health.html>

<sup>67</sup> HEALTH CONSUMER POWERHOUSE, “Euro Health Consumer Index 2012”, Danderyd, 2012, 81 p.

certain consequences are inevitable. Europe must be prepared to act in an appropriate way when security problems arise. This can only be done by cooperation and, as such as, through the CSDP.

National armed forces or not ready and equipped to meet the new challenges posed by climate change. Owing to budgetary cuts, it is impossible to prepare every national army separately to deal with new tasks.

A global network should be set up in the event of humanitarian disasters. As this paper shows, it is clear that humanitarian aid will become more important in the future. Armed forces should participate as much as possible in the concept of “pooling and sharing”. This would be the only way to respond effectively to terrible situations.

Terrorist actions will occur more frequently. It is hard to fight against terrorists since, it is not always clear who the enemy is and where he is hiding. Only by coordination and cooperation will it be possible respond to terrorist actions or even prevent them.

However, carrying out border controls is not currently a military task through it could become one in the future. Armed forces should be used to prevent conflicts and, whenever this is impossible, they should be used to resolve conflicts if negotiations fail to do so.

## **Conclusion**

Climate change is happening and can no longer be denied. Although the European Union is taking measures to delay the negative impact of climate change by implementing rules governing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and by taking part in international conferences on climate change, the European Union should be aware that climate change cannot be stopped. It should also take measures to reduce the negative consequences of climate change as explained in this paper. As already mentioned, there are some major threats to Europe’s internal and external security. The Directorate-General for Climate Action, established in 2010<sup>68</sup>, is raising awareness of these issues in Europe.

In my opinion problems such as environmental migration and declining natural resources should be dealt with in the very near future, since these two major threats have many other consequences such as health problems, the prospect of civil wars and other threats. But of course other problems cannot be forgotten.

Finally, I would like to make an important point. The scenarios outlined in this paper are very likely to happen in the future. But I have to say that I am not a fortune-teller. My paper is based on studies conducted by recognised and highly regarded organisations, but sometimes there is no alternative to making certain assumptions. So Europe should be prepared to meet difficult and unexpected challenges.

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<sup>68</sup> 21/06/2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/clima/mission/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/clima/mission/index_en.htm)

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## **Annexes**

### **Annex 1: US and European energy supplies vulnerable to climate change – Nature Climate Change study**

01 June 2012-10:05 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)

#### **Under embargo until 03 June 2012-18:00**

Higher water temperatures and reduced river flows in Europe and the United States in recent years have resulted in reduced production by, or temporary shutdown of, several thermoelectric power plants, resulting in increased electricity prices and rising concerns over future energy security in a changing climate.

Thermoelectric (nuclear or fossil-fuelled) power plants, supply 91% and 78% of total electricity in the US and Europe respectively, and disruption to their operation is therefore a significant concern for the energy sector.

A study published today in Nature Climate Change projects further disruption to supply, with a likely decrease in thermoelectric power generating capacity of between 6-19% in Europe and 4-16% in the United States in the period 2031-2060, owing to the lack of cooling-water. The likelihood of extreme (>90%) reductions in thermoelectric power generation will, on average, increase by a factor of three.

Compared with other water use sectors (e.g. industry, agriculture, domestic use), the thermoelectric power sector is one of the largest water users in the US (at 40%) and in Europe (43% of total surface water withdrawals). While much of this water is "recycled", the power plants rely on consistent volumes of water, at a particular temperature, to prevent overheating of power plants. Reduced water availability and higher water temperatures - caused by increasing ambient air temperatures associated with climate change - are therefore significant issues for electricity supply.

According to the authors, while recirculation (cooling) towers will be affected, power plants that rely on "once-through cooling" are the most vulnerable. These plants pump water directly from rivers, lakes, or the sea, to cool the turbine condensers; the water is then returned to its source, often at temperatures significantly higher than when the water entered the plant, causing yet another problem, that of downstream thermal pollution.

"Higher electricity prices and disruption to supply are significant concerns for the energy sector and consumers, but another growing concern is the environmental impact of increasing water temperatures on river ecosystems, affecting, for example, life cycles of aquatic organisms," says Michelle van Vliet, from Wageningen University and Research Centre.

Both the US and Europe have strict environmental standards with regard to the volume of water withdrawn and the temperature of the water discharged from power plants. Thus warm periods coupled with low river flows can lead to conflicts between environmental objectives and energy production. Additionally, given the substantial investments and the long-life expectancy (50-60

years) of thermoelectric power plants, such projections are important for the electricity sector so that it can adapt to changes in cooling water availability and plan infrastructure investments accordingly.

One adaptation strategy is to reduce reliance on freshwater sources and replace it with saltwater, according to co-author Pavel Kabat, Director/CEO of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). "However, given the life expectancy of power plants and the inability to relocate them to an alternative water source, this is not an immediate solution but should be factored into infrastructure planning. Another option is to switch to new gas-fired power plants that are both more efficient than nuclear- or fossil fuel- power plants and that also use less water."

The study focused on 61 power plants in central and eastern US and 35 power plants in Europe, both nuclear and coal-fired power plants with different cooling systems were included. Considering the projected increase in demand for electricity in these regions and globally, the study reinforces the need for improved climate adaptation strategies in the thermoelectric power sector to ensure future energy security and environmental objectives are not compromised.

The projections are based on new research that combines hydrological and water temperature models over the twenty-first century with an electricity production model. The models consider two contrasting scenarios for the energy sector - one of low levels of technological change in the energy sector and one that assumes environmental sustainability and a rapid transition to renewable energy

SOURCE: 14/06/2012, [www.alphagalileo.org/ViewItem.aspx?ItemId=120744](http://www.alphagalileo.org/ViewItem.aspx?ItemId=120744)

## Annex 2: Human development




Figure 8: Scenarios projecting impacts of environmental risks on human development through 050





**Thomas VAN HOECKE**  
Belgian Military Academy



***Energy and Energy security: Can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?***



Brussels, June 2012

## **Introduction**

In the first part of this paper I will briefly explain what energy dependence means for Europe and what the risks are. I then go on to explain how these risks can be avoided by establishing greater energy security. Finally, this paper addresses the core of the question raised: whether the establishment of greater energy security can act as a catalyst for a more integrated European security culture. In this chapter, I first analyse what security culture means. I then present my argument, followed by a conclusion. The argument has been developed using a game theory approach.

## **Energy dependence**

The fact that the European Union is highly dependent on energy will come as no surprise. EU gross domestic energy consumption, i.e. the total energy demand of the EU-27<sup>69</sup>, was 1 703 million tons of oil equivalent in 2009.<sup>70</sup> This enormous need for energy makes us dependent on our suppliers to fuel our economy and to sustain the European standard of living. In the following paragraphs I will briefly explain the risks that arise from this dependency. Where possible I will point out the link with the military aspect of security.

## **The lack of stability in energy producing regions**

As we have seen during the Arab Spring, a lack of stability can cause revolutions, which, if the revolution takes place in an oil-producing country, in turn can cause a steep increase in oil and gas prices.<sup>71</sup> We could also take account of the fact that a country which has an economy that is highly dependent on oil and gas exports is more likely to be unstable, e.g. Egypt, Libya, Sudan, etc. This risk associated with energy dependence clearly shows the link with not only security but also the military aspect of security. So, for the armed forces, this is a risk that should be closely monitored.

## **Growing energy demand vs. declining energy production**

Worldwide, energy demand will continue to rise. This will cause an increase in the price of energy. On the other hand, European production of energy will decrease to the extent that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported.<sup>72</sup> This means that our dependency on energy suppliers will only increase.

## **A possible threat to a vital interest**

This dependency will render us vulnerable to possible changes in the strategic environment that could stop the import of oil and gas into the EU, or increase prices to a level which is unsustainable. This could significantly harm the EU economy, which is the core of our power.

## **What could be done to reduce this threat and increase our energy security?**

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<sup>69</sup>See: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics\\_explained/index.php/Glossary:Gross\\_inland\\_energy\\_consumption](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Gross_inland_energy_consumption)

<sup>70</sup> See: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics\\_explained/index.php/Consumption\\_of\\_energy](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Consumption_of_energy)

<sup>71</sup> J. Ashley, "The Arab spring requires a defiantly European reply", The Guardian, 6 March 2011

<sup>72</sup> Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2008

Now that the problem has been clearly defined, I will go on to present some possible solutions to this problem, and then discuss the consequences of these solutions for the European security culture.

## Diversification

The basic solution, as set out in the report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, is diversification.<sup>73</sup> This should be the goal in several domains:

- Supplier countries: by diversifying the countries from which we import our energy, we can spread our risks. The regions that are mentioned in an American CRS report for Congress are Central Asia and the Caspian Region (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). North Africa is also mentioned as a potential source of alternative supplies (Algeria, Libya and Egypt). The report also mentions the potential of the Arctic region.<sup>74</sup> We could also focus on enhancing the stability in our supplier countries. This could be done within the framework of the CSDP and consequently contribute to the development of a more integrated European Security Culture. Projects like the Nabucco pipeline and the competition with the South Stream pipeline deserve more attention as they are critical with regard to the dependence of the European Union on Russia's gas reserves.<sup>75 76</sup>
- Fuels: the importance of renewable energy is clear to the whole of Europe, since it has both great potential in terms of energy independence and could reduce the threat of climate change. Climate change, which is identified as a global challenge and key threat by the report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, should certainly not be neglected<sup>77</sup>. Other alternative energy sources could be nuclear energy and shale gas, but their cost for future generations makes them only a temporary solution.<sup>78</sup> However, the extraction of shale gas could be used as a way to give Europe a resource which could act as a counterbalance if our suppliers ever sought to take advantage of our energy dependence.<sup>79</sup> Whatever may happen, we will be less vulnerable if we diversify our energy sources.
- Transit routes: the last form of diversification mentioned in the report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy concerns transit routes. For this kind of diversification it is important to have reliable partners - this could be a point to consider with regard to Ukraine. But it is even more important to have alternatives like the Nord Stream gas pipeline to reduce the influence of one country, in this case Ukraine,<sup>80</sup> on Europe's gas supply. In the past there have

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<sup>73</sup> Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2008

<sup>74</sup> M. Ratner, "Europe's Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification", Congressional Research Service, 2012

<sup>75</sup> D. Dombey, "Turkey close to Azeri gas deal", Financial Times, 16 May 2012

<sup>76</sup> A. McDowall, "Bulgaria's grand slam energy plans: two down, South Stream to go", Financial Times, 3 April 2012

<sup>77</sup> Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2008

<sup>78</sup> F. Harvey, "Shale gas fracking", The Guardian, 20 April 2011

<sup>79</sup> "Fracking here, fracking there", The Economist, 26 November 2011

<sup>80</sup> T. Macalister, "Russia opens gas pipeline that runs direct to western Europe", The Guardian, 7 September 2011

already been issues with Ukraine and Russia not coming to terms concerning transit fees.<sup>81</sup> The EU should avoid being the victim of these struggles.

The EU should also liberalize its energy market to become more efficient, and should have a common energy policy to increase its bargaining power. Furthermore, it should invest massively, in close collaboration with the private sector, in renewable energy, and promote energy efficiency through regulation and a tax on CO2.

### **Influence on the European security culture?**

#### **What is the European security culture?**

Let us start by asking ourselves this question. Culture is a concept which we all understand, but it remains difficult to define. The definition that I have learned during my sociology course taught by Professor Manigart is:

*"A common context in which individuals in a society live their lives ... Fundamental to all cultures are the ideas which define what is considered important, worthwhile and desirable."*<sup>82</sup>

So if I interpret European security culture in sociological terms I would end up with the following interpretation: a common context that includes the ideas which define what is considered important, worthwhile and desirable in the field of European security. This means that it would transcend the national interests of the individual countries. If one searches the Net for another, more official interpretation, one can find a paper by the Institute for Security Studies of the West European Union, and even though it was published in 2000 their interpretation of this concept accords with the sociological interpretation.

*"The aim and the means to incite common thinking, compatible reactions, coherent analysis – in short, a strategic culture that is increasingly European, one that transcends the different national security cultures and interests"*<sup>83</sup>

#### **The influence of energy security on the European security culture**


Now we will try to find out how this influence works. What is the mechanism behind this functioning of a catalyst? To do this I will use a theory called game theory. It is a way of making models which is familiar in mathematics and economics, but it is also used in geopolitics. In this diagram I will present the different relationships which, in my opinion, are involved in the influence of energy security on the development of an integrated European security culture.

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<sup>81</sup> I. Gorst, "Russian gas: under pressure", Financial Times, 3 February 2012

<sup>82</sup> A. Giddens, "Culture and society", in Sociology, 4th edition, 2011, pp.20-47

<sup>83</sup> N. Gnesotto, "For a common European security culture", WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2000



**Diagram 1**

Energy demand and supply are independent variables in this diagramme. There are more things that depend on this variable - in game theory these "things" are called the disturbance term - than are shown in this diagramme, because this diagramme is a simplification. Energy is what is needed to maintain the European economy, the hub of all European power.

Energy dependence is an intervening variable that should be kept as low as possible, because this variable implies a risk when we take into account other intervening variables, such as an infrastructural malfunction that could be responsible for a reduction in the EU's energy imports. Other intervening or moderating variables are unstable regions where a conflict could have an effect on both the price and amount of energy imports.<sup>84</sup> This is an example of a moderating variable. Russia can be seen as an intervening variable. A large proportion of the EU's gas is imported from Russia. An example of this dependency becoming a risk for Europe is the fact that Italy was struck by a shortage of Russian gas during February 2012.<sup>85</sup> It is as a matter of fact unacceptable to be reliant on such an unpredictable energy provider as Russia. We should certainly not forget there are a lot of other unpredictable factors such as extremely cold winters that could boost energy consumption<sup>86</sup>; Fukushima made it clear to the world that a problem with nuclear reactors could substantially increase the demand for alternative energy sources<sup>87</sup>; <sup>88</sup> the situation concerning Iran's nuclear programme shows us that speculation also has an effect that should not be underestimated,<sup>89</sup> etc.

This leads us to a variable of great importance, namely an increased possibility of higher national costs. This cost is to be seen in the light of a cost-benefit analysis. If the costs, or the possibility of

<sup>84</sup> J. Ashley, "The Arab spring requires a defiantly European reply", The Guardian, 6 March 2011

<sup>85</sup> G. Chazan, "Italy hit by shortage of Russian gas", Financial Times, 6 February 2012

<sup>86</sup> G. Chazan, "Italy hit by shortage of Russian gas", Financial Times, 6 February 2012

<sup>87</sup> "When the steam clears", The Economist, 24 May 2011

<sup>88</sup> J. Adelman & Y. Okada, "LNG-Soaked Japan Burns Oil as Nuclear Reactors Sit Idle", Bloomberg Businessweek, 28 March 2012

<sup>89</sup> P. Domm, "Oil Falls on Iran's Pledge to Allow Inspections", CNBC, 22 May 2012

the costs, of assuring energy security on the national level are higher than the cost of doing this on a supranational level a country will choose to do this on a supranational level. One of the costs that is the hardest to accept for a country is to place the common interest of the institution on the supranational level higher than its own national interest.

If the current strategic and geopolitical environment develops in such a way that countries will face greater risks when they do not unite, or in such a way that they place the common interest above the national interest, there could be a change in perception. This perception could create a more integrated and binding way of cooperating. This could in turn, after more institutionalization and time, lead to a more profound European security culture.

The European Union is already at this level in certain areas, but when it comes to defence and security this point has not been reached yet. There are a few ways to explain this. First of all, defence and security are the core of a nation's sovereignty. Secondly, there has to be a clearly defined common foreign policy. The armed forces are one of the instruments used to put this policy into effect. As long as there is no general consensus concerning this policy it is likely that there is not yet a widely shared European security culture. This has become clear during several conflicts. The different European visions concerning the war in Iraq are the most manifest expression of the lack of a current European security culture.<sup>90</sup> Of course one should not forget other institutions such as NATO which have member states in Europe. NATO could be seen as an institution with a stronger security culture than the EU. The reason for this is, in my opinion, to be found in the Cold War. As is shown in the diagram, the security culture is a dependent variable of the costs and benefits of handling the security issues alone. During the Cold War the USSR's conventional forces were so strong that the possibility of high national costs was so high that nations opted for institutionalization. Nowadays NATO could limit the development of a European security culture, because it is not only the sets of values of different countries that decide what is desirable and right or wrong. But there are three sets of culture and interests that have to be taken into account. This counts for the countries that are member states of NATO. Countries that are not NATO members will most likely have certain other priorities etc. New NATO member states such as Poland will probably also have a different conception of what is desirable and acceptable when it comes to security issues, both in general and concerning energy security.<sup>91</sup>

Now I will give an example of a measure that could enhance the European security culture. Look back at the diagram to understand the logic followed in this example. Libya is a country that supplies part of Europe's energy. The instability there was one of the factors that made our energy dependence a risk. When a conflict broke out in Libya, a few European states conducted a successful operation.<sup>92</sup> Such actions could lead to more institutionalization which in time could give rise to a more integrated European security culture. A consequence of this will be a widely accepted common foreign policy with the necessary instruments that can put it into effect.

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<sup>90</sup> I. Traynor & I. Black, "Eastern Europe dismayed at Chirac snub", The Guardian, 19 February 2003

<sup>91</sup> "Fracking here, fracking there", The Economist, 26 November 2011

<sup>92</sup> B. Knowlton, "In Libyan Conflict, European Power Was Felt", The New York Times, 20 October 2011

In my opinion, energy security will not immediately result in a more integrated European security culture. But the measures that are taken to provide this energy security could in turn bring about a result over time. This result may be more institutionalization and the common understanding of what is acceptable, necessary and desirable to provide our energy security. Thus these measures can result in the development of a more integrated European security culture. Energy security is an aspect of the general security of the European Union, so this common understanding could spread to security in general. Of course this will take time and a lot of measures. It is important that all measures are taken in the name of the European Union, so that the European population will interpret them as such.

## **Conclusion**

I started the paper by pointing out the relevance of energy dependence and its possible risks. I will briefly summarize the risks that arise from this dependence. The lack of stability in exporting countries causes a risk that has a clear link with defence and security issues. The second risk derives from growing energy demand. Finally there is the problem of a vital interest.

Diversification was pointed out as the solution to reduce these risks. We should diversify in three areas: supplier countries, fuels and transit routes.

I got to the core of this paper when I discussed the influence of energy security on the European security culture. We interpreted European security culture as:

*A common context that includes the ideas which define what is considered important, worthwhile and desirable in the field of European security.*

From this I inferred that a European security culture implies a transcendence of national security cultures and interests.

The analysis of the influence has been done using a game theory approach. The influence can be described as:

A cost benefit analysis will be made between the costs and benefits of diversification. This will be compared with a cost benefit analysis of individually facing the energy market and energy security issues.

When the balance shifts to the side of supranational approach, this will lead to more institutionalization. In time this institutionalization could foster a common context that includes the ideas which define what is considered important, worthwhile and desirable in the field of European security, and thus a European security culture.



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**A critical approach to the European security policy**  
**Q: Thoughts on the future of CSDP - why we need it and what should it look like**



Vienna, June 2012

## **List of acronyms**

<b>BRICS</b>	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## Foreword

The world is changing – not that this is something new, but the opportunity to take part in every development in the world, no matter how minor, almost as it is happening makes us aware how fast this change is taking place.

And despite the global interconnectedness and the new forms of media that give us a very profound insight into all these events, it still seems impossible to be aware of all the developments in advance, still less be able to estimate their aftermath. The Arab Spring or the world economic crises are only two examples which clearly prove this statement.<sup>93</sup>

However, within this interconnectedness also lies the greatest flaw.<sup>94</sup> The individual is simply overwhelmed by the information available and is therefore unable to assess its credibility. And even if there is the will to try to master this overabundance of data, to do so often means interfering with other interests such as family or work.

This task is therefore delegated to organisations such as the media or political and private think tanks which are responsible for gathering, assessing, processing and presenting the available information. Hence we are often in the situation of getting filtered information that is reduced to its essence. The process of presenting information is often influenced by political or economic interests and the consumer is in a way dependent on these organisations and what the persons in power want us to know. It is the responsibility of the individual to handle this situation with care.

There is also another thing that makes interconnectedness a boon and bane at the same time. Decision-makers nowadays have a huge pool of information which they can use as a basis for decision-making, but the sheer mass of information takes a lot of time and effort to read and assess. The decision-making process therefore takes more time than ever. The skill of information management is one of the key elements to success, not only in military operations. It takes a lot of time and requires well educated, responsible people to take care of it. Once again, this is also valid for the military.

The greatest peace project of all time, the European Union, has reduced the risk of a conventional war on our continent to a completely surreal level.<sup>95</sup> All current strategic studies state that a military strike against the European Union or one of its member states is unlikely for decades to come. And even if today's decision-makers haven't fully realised it, most decisive actions in the future won't take place in Europe, but in the BRICS countries, for example, or the Next Eleven, and the main geostrategic effort has already switched from the Europe to the Pacific region (especially the South China Sea).

The USA, China and Russia are focussing on this region now, as their revised security strategies show. And for the first time in history Europe has to face the fact that it is not the epicentre of interest anymore.

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<sup>93</sup> Muno, W., *Der Arabische Frühling – ein Frühling der Demokratie?*, 2012, Mainz [online] Available at: <[http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_30185-1522-1-30.pdf](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_30185-1522-1-30.pdf)> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

<sup>94</sup> Luke, J.S., *Catalytic Leadership: Strategies for an Interconnected World*, p. 6-15, 1998, San Francisco.

<sup>95</sup> BMLVS, *Militärstrategisches Konzept des Österreichischen Bundesheeres*, p.7, 2006, Vienna.

Simply put, the European Union has yet to find its place in this new world order.

That same situation finds its reflection in the armed forces of the European states. Most armies are either unaware of their new role or the process of identifying with it is still in progress. Also, most EU member states currently lack a national strategy or even an overall plan as regards what to do with their armed forces. While in the last century they were the key factor in preserving and securing national sovereignty, nowadays they face the fact that they have no a real task, they are dissociated from society and suffer from political isolation and chronic underfunding. In addition, more and more soldiers seem not to identify with the job itself.

The role of the military has tremendously changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of the conflict between the two power blocs formed by NATO and the USSR. The threat of a huge military strike by the USSR against NATO in Europe has evaporated and left a stunned Europe behind. Most of the former Warsaw Pact states are now part of NATO and/or the European Union itself.<sup>96</sup> And Russia, enervated as a result of the on-going arms race during the cold war, now copes with internal problems and is, aside from its nuclear arsenal and its veto right, only a shadow of its former self.

Europe currently lacks a functioning and serious supranational security strategy. The Common Security and Defence Policy is more an erratic construct of ideas than the predominant agenda it should be.

However, it isn't too late to find a common European approach to resolve these issues. Despite what has been said above, Europe is still a highly valued geostrategic player as it is the cradle of democracy, human rights and humanitarian values which it strongly proclaims throughout the world. The armed forces of the European states will have to adapt to their new role, but it is the task of the politicians to define this role. This has to be done as soon as possible as otherwise the societal role of the soldier will lose acceptance as that role can be valued only when it stands for something (e.g. the representation of European values in conflict-torn countries).

### **A perspective on the current situation**

The rest of the world expects a certain attitude when it comes to conflict and crisis management. It is expected that the Europeans will settle conflicts via diplomatic or other peaceful means and not by using military force.

Generally speaking, this is a good attitude, because the use of force to intervene should be the last resort when it comes to settling a conflict. On the other hand, it seems that no real consideration is given to the fact that a military option, as, let's say, an ace up the sleeve, surely does have a certain potential to back up one's position. Sometimes the mere mention of the use of military force is enough to make the other party give in. Armed forces are a very powerful actor and in the end are used by countries to enforce their own interests and this quintessential role should be once again recognised by the European states.

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<sup>96</sup> NATO, NATO member countries, 2009, Brussels [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato\\_countries.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm)> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

Without a doubt the European Union is a trading superpower<sup>97</sup>, but in the end far from being a global power. Despite the fact that the European Union has an enormous budget, only a fraction of that amount is invested in the security sector.<sup>98</sup> Undeniably the ending of the financial crisis takes precedence, but why is there little to no action taken in that sector ?

Nevertheless, the establishment of the European External Action Service was a necessity and a huge step forward. Although again it is way too bureaucratic, which is a general European problem, a specialised organisation was finally created to take responsibility for European foreign affairs. Again however, the military does not play a very prominent role.<sup>99</sup> The primacy of political decision-making is beyond dispute , but when it comes to taking action, swift decision-making seems impossible on account of the slowness of official channels.

It is well known that in a democracy everything takes longer<sup>100</sup>, as a lot of people are involved in a decision-making process, but in Europe it seems to take ages just to agree on when to start discussing a topic. And when this tedious process prevents the delivery of aid to people in need, as happened with Libya, then we should rethink our approach. Apart from the fact that in the case of Libya the USA had to take the lead because Europe was incapable of finding a suitable solution, this reflected very badly on European foreign affairs.<sup>101</sup>

And while we are busy bailing out financially unstable countries, the world still goes round ; 27 countries following individual foreign policy interests will keep Europe from being a serious negotiator on the international stage. These 27 interests may sometimes be congruent, but this doesn't negate the lack of a pan-European concept. This huge flaw is also the core problem of NATO.

Generally speaking, NATO membership weakens the will of the Member States to participate in CSDP tasks. Simply put, why should states be financing redundant structures? For mainly political reasons Europe is currently unable to fulfil a combined military mission under the flag of a united European Union. When it comes to fulfilling a real combat mission, the European Union backs out and shifts the responsibility to NATO.

This could be for two reasons. First of all, when NATO is responsible the USA is also involved and they are a formidable, reliable and combat -experienced partner. Secondly, the European Union seems not to want to be seen as a military power, so it's obvious to let NATO take over and be identified with this task. The decision-makers will have to decide whether they want NATO carrying out all the missions or whether that should be done on the EU's own behalf.

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<sup>97</sup> Moravcsik, A., Europe, the Second Superpower, p.91-98, 2010, Princeton University, Princeton.

<sup>98</sup> European Defence Agency. 2010 Defence Data, p.2, 2010, Brussels.

<sup>99</sup> EEAS, Organisation chart, 2010, Brussels [online] Available at: <[http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf)> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

<sup>100</sup> Downs, A., Journal of Political Economy, p.145, 1957, University of Chicago, Chicago.

<sup>101</sup> Lau, J., Eine deutsche Schande, 2011, Die Zeit, Hamburg [online] Available at: <<http://www.zeit.de/2011/35/Libyen-Versagen>> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

The biggest flaw of all is that the European Union is de facto virtually defenceless against external aggressors. Divided as the EU is between 27 only partially interoperable<sup>102</sup> and not centrally commanded forces, a dispute tending towards belligerence would be settled to our disadvantage. Also, the lack of will to conduct active foreign policy at a pan-European level to pursue European interests contributes to this issue. Generally speaking, we are currently unable to defend ourselves against the interests of other states.

Let us not forget that, once again, an arms race seems to be starting. Russia's President Putin says that he wants to invest EUR 590 billion to rearm Russia's armed forces to protect the country's natural resources from external grasp.<sup>103</sup> India has completely renewed its maritime force and plans to do the same with its air force.<sup>104</sup> China has started to operate its first aircraft carrier, launched its first stealth jet and takes part in the prestigious space race.<sup>105</sup> Meanwhile, Europe is dramatically reducing its armed forces and their equipment.<sup>106</sup> Undoubtedly, a new approach has to be found, but it has to be found as soon as possible if Europe wants to keep up with the rest of the world.

There are several key players within the Common Security and Defence Policy and each one has to deal with different problems and has a different opinion as regards security topics.

#### France

Under the leadership of the new President, Francois Hollande, France will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan earlier than expected.<sup>107</sup> A new foreign policy concept has yet to be announced and its content is also questionable as Hollande is deemed to be unversed in foreign affairs.<sup>108</sup>

#### Great Britain

The British are traditionally closely connected with the USA and seem to be more interested in representing American opinions than contributing to the European community. This leads to the fact that Great Britain does not actively participate in almost any European undertaking.

#### Germany

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<sup>102</sup> Boyer, Y., Euro-Interoperability: The effective military interoperability of European armed forces, p.2, 2007, European Parliament, Brussels.

<sup>103</sup> Anon., Putin Vows to Pursue Enormous Military Rearmament Campaign, 2012, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington [online] Available at: <<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/putin-vows-pursue-enormous-russian-rearmament-campaign/>> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

<sup>104</sup> Keating, J., The Stories You Missed in 2011 - India's Military Buildup, 2011, Foreign Policy, Washington [online] Available at: <[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the\\_stories\\_you\\_missed\\_in\\_2011](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the_stories_you_missed_in_2011)> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

<sup>105</sup> Anon., China's military modernisation: Stealth jets to aircraft carriers, 2001, The Indian Express, New Delhi [online] Available at: <<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinas-military-modernisation-stealth-jets-to-aircraft-carriers/757752/>> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

<sup>106</sup> European Defence Agency. 2010 Defence Data, p.2, 2010, Brussels.

<sup>107</sup> Erlanger, S., France, Breaking With NATO, Will Speed Afghan Exit, 2012, The New York Times, New York [online] Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/europe/france-to-speed-afghan-withdrawal.html>> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

<sup>108</sup> Gaffney, J., François Hollande and French Foreign Policy: Between Virtù and Fortuna, 2012, e-International Relations, Aston [online] Available at: <<http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/23/francois-hollande-and-french-foreign-policy-between-virtu-and-fortuna/>> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

The Germans are having huge difficulties with active participation in military operations in general. Every single deployment of military troops is widely discussed and constitutes an undertaking that is socio-politically challenging . Trapped between historical accountability and being a dominant European power, the role of Germany in the pan-European network is still pending.

### Poland

Poland is the poster boy when it comes to military policy and is engaged in nearly every currently on-going NATO mission. It seems that this is the quid pro quo for the fact that the USA financed the restructuring of their armed forces and made them currently the best equipped in Europe. Poland is a very important actor within the European Union and to get the Polish to actively participate in the project to develop a new foreign affairs concept would require no more than a friendly invitation from the other great European powers. .

To sum up generally, there is a perceptible difference between Eastern and Western Europe . While the east has a strong military and is closely connected with NATO, the west seems unsure of what to do with its armed forces, but likes the idea of a common European security community. Despite this overall difference Europe is also divided into 27 national interests, each going in a different direction, or, even worse, no direction at all.

### **A critical approach to the future of the European security policy**

The new geostrategic hotspot will be somewhere in the Pacific region<sup>109</sup>, in the neighbourhood of ambitious states like China, the Philippines or India. Europe's role in this upcoming new world order is still pending and the decisions taken in the near future will shape the face of our continent for the decades to come.

The question is whether the European Union is ready to set national interests aside and take the necessary steps and bring the Union itself to a new level of cooperation. However, it is the petty nationally- focussed behaviour that is currently preventing this development.

A change of thinking has to take place at the political level, because Europe has to step down from its role as the good guy who always wants to please everybody. All the other geostrategic players are mostly doing what is in their interest no matter what the others say about it. Europe has to strongly promote its interests and be prepared that in the end it will sometimes have to face resistance.

A change in the minds of our leaders has to take place. One European country on its own is no longer that important an actor , not even Germany or France. However, when the European Union stands together, who would oppose it? . We have a unique opportunity to become a global superpower that stands for democracy, freedom, human rights and an overall better world. The power of the USA is fading slowly and up and coming countries like China and India are not so

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<sup>109</sup> Neisloss, L., U.S. defense secretary announces new strategy with Asia, 2012, CNN International, Atlanta [online] Available at: <<http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/02/us/panetta-asia/index.html>>[Accessed 22 May 2012].



closely bound to the western world's core values. It is our duty to promote those values throughout the world as enough people have already suffered on the way to achieving them.

The military is a necessary part of this process as it often has to lay the foundation for future developments. This is because in times of war when the law is silent, who other than the military can bring peace? It seems strange that to bring peace a fight is necessary, but sometimes words are not enough. Of course, the military has to be used wisely and carefully, but Europe has to understand that it is one of the tools for achieving success in foreign affairs.

A strong political background and the support of the international community is necessary in order to carry out a military operation. It is the duty of the political decision-makers to provide a framework of rules, tasks and goals for the armed forces, because without them and a strong political and societal background the military will become a suspect or even dangerous organisation.

When it comes to the military aspect, a very radical approach seems to be the best solution. All European states must contribute troops only to European armed forces. NATO should not carry out missions by itself, nor should it actively take part in European security policy . The deployment and command of troops must lie solely within the sphere of competence of the Union itself. The role of NATO should be no more than advisory one.

The European Union has to be able to fulfil at least two military operations within its area of interest at the same time and therefore increase its strategic options by establishing a powerful quick reaction force comprising sea, air, land and special forces components, which are highly flexible and under a unified command. The capability to reacting almost instantly and on the ground should be the unit's main focus. The current EU Battlegroups are a good start, but they are too small and easily compromised by national interests. The decision where to send a battlegroup and the legal basis for that decision should be provided by one decision-making body at European Union level and should not be a matter for individual states.

The European Defence Agency must be able to fulfil its core task<sup>110</sup> and plan and carry out the ordering of armaments on a pan-European basis. This should no longer be a task at national level. In order to have a fully interoperable supranational armed force, every nation should have the same equipment. As NATO has already laid down in its Smart Defence concept, nations will have to work closely together to be more powerful and cost -efficient.

The European Union should set up a unified command for all its troops. This will avoid a long and bureaucratic process and would finally bring an end to different national mentalities. A common pool of military assets must be set up and all member states will have to contribute all their equipment and personnel to this body.

A new command structure for the armed forces must be set up. A central command for each branch (sea, air, land, special operations and space) and a central command for each area of

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<sup>110</sup> European Defence Agency, What we do, 2012, Brussels [online] Available at: <<http://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Whatwedo>> [Accessed 22 May 2012].

interest (Africa, South America, Asia, etc.) must be established. The development of the maritime force and air transport capabilities has to have top priority, as this is currently the weakest link in the European military chain.

Also, other concepts should be raised to the pan-European level. A central cyber defence agency, a common air space control and a European intelligence agency are only some of the possibilities.

The European Union also must take over the control of the nuclear assets of its member states. The potential afforded by these weapons is not something a state should be able to have at its own disposal. Also, should the presence of all US soldiers on European territory be finally ended? Europe is no longer in need of a guardian angel.

Education and training should take place in centralised training schools. Why should each nation set up a different training for e.g. infantry soldiers when throughout the world all infantry soldiers have the same tasks? Every country should have the opportunity and honour to provide one of these training schools. For example, Germany could be responsible for training tank troops, Austria i for training mountain warfare, with France and Great Britain in charge of training the navy. An equitable distribution of these schools will ensure that all nations are satisfied with their share. Also, the fact that no single state alone has all the military assets, because they are equally distributed, urges the states to work closely together.

The centralisation of NCO and officer training is also of utmost importance. All leading military staff should have the same training and education in leadership, equipment and ethics.

It is the responsibility of a highly developed society like Europe to provide its soldiers with the best training, equipment and knowledge. Society has a moral obligation to care about its soldiers as in the end they are the spearhead when it comes to defending and promoting our core values throughout the world. Soldiers are often the first foreigners to enter a conflict and are a figurehead of our society. For example, how can an Afghan soldier learn about humanitarian values when our soldiers are not acting as role models? Training and working together with personnel from 27 countries will benefit and definitely enrich the personality of every European soldier.

Today's extremely complex battlefields and conflicts require highly skilled and trained specialists at all levels. As the concept of the strategic corporal points out, a single man or woman can make the difference.<sup>111</sup> This duty cannot be put in the hands of conscripts or a militia, as morally this would be highly questionable and irresponsible.

Some states still stick to a conscript system (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland and Greece)<sup>112</sup> which is extremely cost inefficient; people are prevented from taking part in the economic system and are often taught only the basic things as they'll never return to the army again. As a conventional war seems highly improbable<sup>113</sup>, teaching a whole country at a basic level how to

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<sup>111</sup> Liddy, L., *The Strategic Corporal*, p. 139-147, 2005, Australian Army Journal, Canberra.

<sup>112</sup> Chatterji, M., *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution: sociological perspectives*, p.171, 2008, Binghamton University, Bingley.

<sup>113</sup> BMLVS, *Militärstrategisches Konzept des Österreichischen Bundesheeres*, p.7, 2006, Vienna.

defend itself seems quite useless. Establishing a European army solely with professional soldiers is the only way to get the specialists today's battlefields require.

All the above written statements would prepare Europe's armed forces for their future tasks and ensure that Europe moves a little closer towards a unified community.

And while the other global powers focus on the Pacific region, Europe should nevertheless keep its eyes on the neighbouring regions. Finally resolving the Middle East conflict must be a possible future task. . The main effort will lie in Africa as the future of this continent is closely tied to that of Europe . Also, a more aggressive and common approach should be made when it comes to land claims in the Arctic region. Climate change will make previously inaccessible natural resources in this region available and Europe should not let the other global powers divide them up among each other.

To sum it all up, Europe must strengthen its position in the world and a strong common foreign and security policy is a key element in achieving this objective.

And in the end one thing is for sure – only a united Europe is a strong Europe.

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***Climate change: what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the coming decades?***



Rome, June 2012

## List of acronyms

<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EEAS</b>	European External Agency Service
<b>ESS</b>	European Security Strategy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GHGs</b>	Greenhouse Gases
<b>GPGs</b>	Global Public Goods
<b>HR</b>	High Representative
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
<b>MS</b>	Member States
<b>SITCEN</b>	Situation Centre
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>WGBU</b>	German Advisory Council on Global Change



## INTRODUCTION

Over the past 100 years, drastic and abrupt climate changes have brought environmental problems and the question of protection of the ecosystem to the fore.

The fact is that extremely unusual weather phenomena, floods, drought and the rise in global temperature could have an impact not only on strictly environmental conditions but could also upset the current geopolitical balance and undermine the security of the international Community.

The EU, geographically speaking, may be considered a risk area as it is potentially exposed to the effects of climate change, both directly (rising sea level, drought) and indirectly (immigration, crisis of the economic system)

The aim of this document is to analyse the issue of climate change, the potential risks that the European Union will face and its role in ensuring internal security and the security of neighbouring communities.

## **PART I - CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?**

The progress of technology and studies carried out by scientists from all over the world allow us to monitor climate change in the short and long term.

And the scenario does not seem to be the best one.

In fact, the threats to which several areas of the planet might be exposed in the next 50 years are considered real and scientifically predictable by many academics.

In this connection, it is impossible to ignore the problem of greenhouse gases (GHGs), which have strongly influenced and modified the natural climatic conditions of our planet.

This chapter examines the issue from a technical point of view in the light of the most recent scientific publications and the results of recent intergovernmental technical meetings.

### **Definition**

The most general definition of climate change is "a change in the statistical properties of the climate system when considered over long periods of time, regardless of cause" .

By this we mean all those natural phenomena that, cyclically and over the medium to long term, affect the Earth's natural climate trends (e.g., volcanic and seismic activity, solar activity, etc.).

Nowadays, the issue of climate change is usually considered in connection with those environmental or ecological imbalances arising from human activity, industrial installations and all the sources that contribute to increasing the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), which is one of the major factors responsible for the rise in the Earth's surface temperature and the disruption of natural climatic processes.

### **Studies and research**


The issues of climate change and the rise in the Earth's temperature may be said to be relatively new items on the agenda for the scientific community and national Governments.



In fact, the first attempt at measuring the Earth's temperature dates only from the end of the nineteenth century.

Such data could not however be trusted until at least 1950, since the tools used were not very reliable and the measurements were not taken on a continuous basis. Only with the advent of satellite technology (around 1970) did measurements and studies acquire the accuracy and reliability needed to allow significant conclusions to be drawn.

Over the past 150 years, we have seen a rise in the temperature of the Earth and this increase is a reasonably predictable one of 0.8 C°. The latest significant observation is that, since measurement of the Earth's temperature began, the last decade has been the hottest.




(source: *Copenhagen Diagnosis 2009*); (Hadley Center and NASA/GISS)

From the results of the surveys, it is clear that the Earth's temperature has increased dramatically over the past 40 years and that it is likely to increase exponentially over the coming decades.

Moreover, on the basis of that analysis, it is believed that recent extreme weather phenomena (storms, cyclones, heat or cold waves, floods, droughts, etc.) were due to imbalances of climate (in this case attributable to the rise in global temperature).

For example, the graph below shows the evolution of the various types of cyclone since the 1970s. A certain tendency appears to increase relative to the events in categories 4 and 5 (i.e. phenomena of greater intensity).




(source: Webster et al., 2005)

Looking at the results shown in the graph, we can say that a connection between the rise in the Earth's temperature and the extreme weather phenomena is a possibility, but the annual number of events (less than 250) is not

considered sufficient to indicate total reliability of the statistics.

The same assessment problem emerges when we compare the Earth's temperature rise with the melting of the polar ice caps and the subsequent rise in sea levels.

The fact is that the planet Earth is at present in an interglacial period (the time interval between two glacial periods). About twenty thousand years have passed since the last glaciation and progressive ice melting significantly raised the level of the seas; it has been estimated that since then sea level has risen by about 120 metres. One cannot therefore exclude a priori the possibility that this rise may be due to the long period of thaw rather than to the heat of the Earth's surface.



in view of the studies carried out by scientists in the last 50 years, one might wonder if the rise in the Earth's temperature is the only critical point to be addressed and to what extent man, generally speaking, can be held responsible for such problems.

It would be too simplistic to blame these imbalances on "unrestrained" industrialisation.

In our understanding of the climate mechanism there are still a number of gaps. In fact, the weather is one of the most complex physical systems of the Earth and so many questions are still unanswered.

Consequently, the scientific community has over the years tried to bridge these gaps and to relate climate change to other possible factors, such as the influence of solar radiation on the Earth.

To fully understand how this works, we need to know in detail what kind of energy our planet receives from the Sun, energy which it absorbs, distributes and returns, having previously passed through numerous other subsystems that intertwine and affect each other.

It may therefore be said that there are no clear indications or proofs relating to this phenomenon. The climate change issue, in contrast, involves a multiplicity of factors, each of which, when considered by scientists, could be both a cause and an effect depending on perspective.

### **Greenhouse Gases (GHGs)**

As shown in the above sections climate change, exceptional weather phenomena and ecological or environmental imbalances cannot be traced to a specific cause but rather to a plurality of factors, which can generate or facilitate such phenomena if they are combined together in a given period of time .

Nevertheless, since the mid-20th century the attention of the scientific community as well as that of most of the international community has focused mainly on one aspect: the issue of greenhouse gases (GHGs).

Greenhouse gases are those gases present in the atmosphere which are transparent to incoming solar radiation on Earth but manage consistently to trap the infrared radiation given off by the Earth's surface, the atmosphere and clouds.

Greenhouse gases can be of natural or anthropogenic origin, and absorb and give off specific wavelengths in the spectrum of infrared radiation.

This property causes the phenomenon known as greenhouse gases.

They include water vapour, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone.

These gases, in reality, are already present in the Earth's atmosphere and do not necessarily derive from any human activity or industry. More specifically:

- water vapour is present in the atmosphere due to evaporation from all water sources (rivers, lakes, seas, etc.) and as a product of combustion.
- carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere especially when burning solid waste, fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal, and natural gas), wood and wood-derived products.
- methane is emitted during the production and transport of coal, natural gas and mineral oil.
- nitrous oxide is emitted during agricultural and industrial activities, as well as during the combustion of fossil fuels and waste.

However, extremely active greenhouse gases are not normally present in nature but are the products of different industrial processes.

Moreover, certain human activities, such as home heating and cooling, electricity consumption and transport increase the level of all these gases in the air and release other greenhouse gases of anthropogenic origin.

The GHGs produced by those activities are three groups of fluorinated gases (sulphur hexafluoride , HFCs , and PFCs ) and the halocarbons, among which the best known are chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).

The greenhouse gases can dramatically affect the temperature of the Earth; without them, the Earth's surface would have an average temperature of about 33° C (59° F) and would be cooler than at present.

## **PART II - THE CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION.**

As may be seen from Part I of this paper, the effects of climate change are more than just scientific theories or long-term assumptions. In fact, as the IPCC has shown, it has become clear in recent years that the effects of climate change are already in place and are to be found in certain areas of our planet.

For scientists and experts, there is no doubt that these dynamics can lead to potentially serious consequences for the global economy and the survival of populations.

In 2008, the paper on "Climate change and International security" (S113/08) produced by the High Representative and the European Commission defined climate change as a "multiplier threat" which accelerates trends, tensions and instability that already exist (e.g. in North Africa, the Middle East, etc.) with reference to the exploitation of natural resources and the availability of global public goods (GPGs).

In such a context, the European Union must face up to the phenomenon because it is developing in a geographical area which is sensitive to climate change in a narrow sense and to the indirect effects thereof.

In the following sections, the potential consequences for the internal and external security of the EU and the role that it should have on the international stage in the light of the ESS and the CSDP will be analysed.

### **Internal Security: climate and refugees.**

Since the end of the '90s, climate change has been added to the list of the main threats to European security. In fact, as a result of the major achievements in scientific research and intergovernmental debates, it was realised that rapid climate change could have catastrophic consequences for the entire planet, and especially for all those countries that are currently still developing.

On the European side, in 2008 the European Commission drafted a document for the European Council entitled "Climate change and and International security".

The document is the result of an in-depth analysis based on a UN survey of requests for emergency humanitarian aid received in 2007: only one had no connection with climate change.

The document lists the main security threats associated with climate change:

- conflict over resources
- economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructures
- loss of territory and border disputes
- environmentally-induced migration
- situation of fragility and radicalisation
- tension over energy supplies
- pressure on international governance


Taking into account the threats listed above, it is easy to imagine one factor that could endanger European internal security: migration flows.

Indeed, it is conceivable that, over the coming decades, the effects of climate change may bring some countries, if not entire geographical regions, to the brink of the abyss. Rising sea levels, the increase of average temperature, droughts and extreme weather phenomena could disturb ecosystems by causing a collapse of agricultural and commercial production.

There is therefore no doubt that uncontrollable migratory flows might increase or create new conflicts in the areas of transit and destination, thus causing a threat to internal security.

It is estimated that by 2050 there could be between 150 million and a billion environmental refugees. These mass movements in future would affect mainly the most vulnerable countries from both geographical/environmental and political /institutional points of view.

Due to the fact that many of the regions most vulnerable to climate change are on the borders of the EU (eg. North Africa, the Middle East, the Arctic), potential effects in terms of increased migratory pressure, instability and conflict along the borders of Europe and impact on energy supplies are to be expected.



Conflict constellations in selected hotspots



(Source: WGBU)

In this context, the European Union institutions must take charge of these issues by increasing the spirit of cooperation between MSs with regard to border management and reception equipment in order to properly handle the huge flow of refugees foreseen by recent studies in the international arena.

But migration flows are not the only problem that the EU will face in the coming decades. Europe extends across a geographical area potentially sensitive to the effects of climate change. Rising sea levels caused by melting polar ice caps could put the coastal states at risk of flooding.

This translates into a potential domino effect on the European economy and political stability.

In the light of the commitments and objectives set by the European Security Strategy in the context of the CSDP, the European Union is not in a position to address internal security threats if it does not first react to the effects of climate change on the inside. This being so, the European Union should show solidarity and cohesiveness in addressing these challenges. Only in this way will the EU ensure a level of security appropriate to the needs of the countries most exposed to climate changes and migratory flows.

**External Security: an eye on our neighbourhood.**

The line between the fields of internal and external security is so thin that in some cases it is hard to separate the two.

The fact is that in the era of globalisation and in a world without borders, diplomatic crises, violent conflicts, social tensions and humanitarian crises in any case affect the entire international community.

Currently, the common security and defence policy of the European Union includes numerous out-of-area EU commitments both at diplomatic and operational level. The aim is to strengthen the social and political structures of countries which have just emerged from armed conflicts or humanitarian crises, such as the Congo, Darfur, Guinea Bissau and the communities of the Middle East.

But climate change is a challenge that the UNEP has to face. It has identified at least 18 violent conflicts occurring since 1990 which were fed by the exploitation of natural resources and indicates how, over the past sixty years, at least 40% of all conflicts have had a connection with resources.

Civil wars such as those in Liberia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been fought around valuable resources such as forests, diamonds, gold, minerals and oil.

Other conflicts, including those in Darfur and the Middle East, have concerned the control of scarce resources such as water and fertile land.

Indeed, the effects of climate change could lead the institutions of the European Union to amend and reformulate the guidelines for ongoing civilian missions and for peace-keeping and peace-building operations.


In fact, the troops currently operating abroad are located in territories subject to rapid climate change and troops under the aegis of the EU might have to face issues and crises more serious than those which they are now managing.

In other words, the EU needs to reformulate the principles of CSDP and modify the mandate for troops abroad.

As we all know, many of the countries most vulnerable to climate change are on the EU's border.

Potentially, the European Union would be exposed to increased instability and conflict along its borders and therefore, in addition to the danger of such instability and conflict becoming widespread, it would suffer a severe blow regarding energy supplies.

The concept explained above is summarised in the diagram below. It can clearly be seen that imbalances of the international order are connected with a series of minor conflicts focusing on particular subjects and each being both a cause and an effect in relation to the others.



(source: WGBU)

The probability that in future conflict over resources will intensify is high because of population growth and increasing demand for resources.

Moreover, the consequences of climate change for water availability, food and the spread of disease, as well as its effects on population pressure in safer areas, are likely to aggravate tensions and generate new ones.

### **CSDP and climate change: role of the European Union**

The common security and defence policy (CSDP) of the Union has made it possible to develop an effective system of conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as the management of border security.

In relation to the movement of people and the handling of crisis areas, the EU can treat migration management and the fight against terrorism and poverty as twin objectives of the integrated border management strategy. There are several instruments for improving security, such as:

- enhancing the contribution of Frontex at external borders;
- developing common risk management across external borders: EU-level capabilities for risk analysis and targeting will be improved;
- increasing Europe's resilience in crises and disasters;

The cross-sectoral threats posed by natural and man-made crises and disasters necessitate improvements to long-standing crisis and disaster management practices in terms of efficiency and coherence. This is to be achieved through:



- making full use of the solidarity clause: a proposal on the application of the solidarity clause will be adopted;
- developing an all-hazards approach to threat and risk assessment: guidelines for disaster management will be drawn up, national approaches will be developed, cross-sectoral overviews of possible risks will be established together with overviews of current threats, an initiative on health security will be developed, and a risk management policy will be established;
- linking the different situation awareness centres: links between sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation systems will be improved, and a proposal for better coordination of classified information between EU institutions and bodies will be adopted;
- developing a European Emergency Response Capacity for tackling disasters:
- improving the analysis and early warning capacity: SITCEN;
- developing the EU's relationship with non-EU countries, in accordance with EEAS commitments.

In the face of threats that may soon appear on the international scene and undermine stability and peace, the European Union is called upon to play its part. In this context, the EU must assume a fundamental role on the stage of nations and create a solid and coherent platform that manages the new phenomena of tension and instability at both diplomatic and operative level.

### **PART III – CONCLUSIONS**

The environment and peace are two global public goods that are closely connected in the light of current climate imbalances. Climate change and security define two areas not only intertwined but coinciding in the context of globalisation, which in essence means the reduction in space and time of the phenomena and their effects.

Ongoing conflicts can be exacerbated by climate change because they generate a profound imbalance in the ecosystem and accelerate the processes of destabilisation of the affected populations.

GPGs will become increasingly scarce because agricultural production is likely to drop as a result of rising sea levels and zones under hydric stress.

However, the outlined scenario allows the European Union and the international community to direct their efforts towards new approaches to the prevention of such phenomena and to the management of the governance of internal and external security.



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***The CSDP and public opinion:  
How to improve public support for the CSDP?***



France, June 2012

## **Introduction**

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, is a multidimensional policy in the service of the foreign policy of the European Union (EU), embodied today by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in general and Catherine Ashton in particular (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)). This policy has led to more than twenty missions and external operations, mainly in the civil and civil-military field, with generally positive results. Since the EU is not a conventional military alliance, and has no integrated common army, the organisation of these missions and operations was inevitably quite problematic from a decision-making, organisational and financial point of view.

Like many EU institutions, policies and projects, the CSDP is relatively unknown to the public. And yet, democratic support is essential for any defence policy. But while collective defence is European, the armed forces remain national and every government has to answer to its public opinion for the commitment of troops in various theatres of operation worldwide. So, how does public opinion perceive European defence? How is it kept informed? Do European citizens have a positive vision of this policy? And how can we improve public support for the CSDP? This is the question that this brief paper will try to answer, with some practical suggestions.

### **Why connect European defence policy with public opinion?**

European citizens are playing an increasing role. Public opinion has thus become a significant (or even strategic) variable which political decision-makers must take into account - and will have to take into account more and more in the future. It is necessary today to strengthen the concept of "Europe for the citizens" through various initiatives to raise awareness and to open up the European institutions to better understanding. The power of the élite can lead to the risk of misunderstanding, besides the fact that EU security and defence matters remain under the control of bureaucrats, Member States and national public sectors.

What seems fundamental is the importance which public opinion has acquired in the way external commitments evolve and in support for security and defence policies. This is confirmed by the weight of opinion about the operations in Afghanistan (including European forces committed in NATO operations), with the episode of the resignation, on February 20th, 2010, of the Dutch government<sup>114</sup>. In the same way, the recent acceleration of the withdrawal of French troops from the Afghan theatre can be read as a response to the pressure of public opinion.

This is understandable since, in terms of political science, one of the inputs which plays a central role - at the level of political demand (preferences for such or such policy) as well as of political support (legitimacy of the decisions) - is really public opinion. The perception of the public actually defines the acceptable limits of policies. There is thus a real link to strengthen between

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<sup>114</sup> In fact, the Dutch cabinet collapsed over disagreements within the governing coalition on extending troop deployments in Afghanistan. The polls showed that the population was mainly against the continued presence of Dutch armed forces in the country.

politics, the military and the public within the CSDP. This can be made a reality by making efforts to educate the public: why is the European level relevant for security issues? What has the European Union done in this field? What are the advantages of defence cooperation such as pooling & sharing, etc?

### **Towards an education in the CSDP**

In actual fact, information reaches citizens, for the most part, via the daily media (newspapers and broadcast media). Television, due to its impact, plays a very important role in the perception of military operations led by European troops. Therefore, images can influence public opinion, which could then lead the public to demand the withdrawal of its soldiers. On one hand, it is much more difficult for a government or an international organization to put their message across because the top-down mode of communication prevalent at the time of the cold war is increasingly being replaced by a relationship of equal to equal where networks are important. Besides, from a sociological angle, institutional channels are judged among the least reliable by the public. On the other hand, a lot of CSDP entities and operations remain unknown to the public<sup>115</sup>, because they are too specialized, too far away, and rarely reported on by national media.

Consequently, education on these subjects is imperative. It began with the European Security and Defence College (with some initiatives such as the current CSDP Olympiad), the military Erasmus project and some academic courses at universities which include the European defence dimension in their teaching programmes. Anyway, European defence issues remain a remote subject for most citizens, except when they are involved (military personnel, European staff, academic specialists etc.) and the CSDP suffers from an obvious information deficit, much more than from a democratic deficit. To turn back the tide, public opinion and national parliaments should be fully informed about the stakes involved and the decisions in this field. Having the keys to understand the CSDP properly is necessary and useful for all those involved, according to a process of understanding / legitimisation / support.

That is why we will first of all analyse here the perception of the CSDP by European citizens and the defects of communication, and then, in a second part, put forward practical suggestions in order to establish a stronger link between a European defence structure and public opinion.

### **I/ The perception of the CSDP in European public opinion: between support and misunderstanding**

In the complex CSDP set-up, public opinion has become a major factor: without the support of the European people, it is likely that progress will be difficult. The report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing security in a changing world (2008) reminds us: *“Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is*

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<sup>115</sup> For example, the *Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)* or the EUBAM mission...

*essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home*<sup>116</sup>. For many specialists too, the support of public opinion is essential to the legitimacy of the CSDP<sup>117</sup>. So, it is necessary to analyse first of all how the CSDP is perceived by European public opinion.

### **Eurobarometer surveys**

In one of the last eurobarometer surveys<sup>118</sup>, we saw that 25 % of Europeans consider that the EU has brought them peace. This is the third important factor, after freedom of movement (42 %) and the Euro (33 %). In fact, the CSDP is not considered as a priority by European citizens (7 % does), unlike economic affairs (33 %), social and health issues (23 %) and crime prevention (23 %) etc. The effects of the economic and banking crisis partially explain these priorities at the moment.

A new question was also included in this eurobarometer n°71, with people asked what was the most important factor affecting the power and influence of a country or a group of countries in the world. Economic power came first with 55 %, followed by political influence (23 %), then military power (11 %) and finally cultural influence (4 %). And in the question about the main characteristics of the EU, Europeans consider that it is first of all an economic power (45 %), and just a few of them a military power (6 %). Looking at the results of the survey in France or in Italy, we can also see that there is general support for the CSDP as regards stabilisation (external missions) and the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the progress of the CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty should strengthen this support.

However, Europeans in general do not place the CSDP among the EU's priority policies and the concept of power is more relevant in the economic and political field. Concerning support for the CSDP, there is about 70 % support, never less. In older eurobarometer surveys (2001, 2008), the same percentage of support was expressed. Regarding these elements, real support for the CSDP emerges, but with no desire for an increase in defence budgets. Quite the reverse in fact, the approach is more in favour of rationalizing the security and defence domain, especially when the public is not really aware of the operational, military and technical parameters.

### **The communication issue**

There are several ways that can be explored to improve the communication and the content of information on the CSDP. Although there is support for the CSDP, it remains underestimated by citizens. First of all, it is often asserted that there is a democratic deficit in the European security and defence field, even though this remains controversial<sup>119</sup>. Indeed, the institutions of the EU work democratically and citizens sometimes have a greater degree of

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<sup>116</sup> Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels, 11 December 2008

<sup>117</sup> WAGNER Wolfgang, *The democratic legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy*, Occasional Paper n°57, EUISS, Paris, April 2005

<sup>118</sup> European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer n°71, fieldwork June-July 2009

<sup>119</sup> MORAVSICK Andrew, *The Myth of Europe's Democratic Deficit*, *Intereconomics : Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, November-December 2008.

confidence in the European institutions than in their national institutions. Secondly, the spirit of defence associated with the EU is more fragmentary or even non-existent compared to the national perspective. The concepts of a “European collective identity” or “culture of European defence” are difficult objectives to achieve in practice.

So, we see how the European information deficit is due above all to the paucity of European information offered by the national media. Indeed, national debates on Europe are probably too few and there is a lack of European political figures on national television studio sets. Considering television, which has become the media of reference for most people, information about the CSDP, except for important summits, is extremely scarce. In fact, if European subjects are given little coverage in the media, especially broadcast media, this is because there is a need for a simple, direct, often sensational and entertaining information which is of relevance to the public. And this is clearly not offered by the CSDP.

### **A necessary consideration for policy makers and the military**

In decision making on defence issues at national and European level political and military decision-makers should take more account of public opinion. Clearly, while the CSDP remains at intergovernmental level within Europe, popular support remains critical to support for operations and above all for the prospects for Europe in the long term, including in the field of security and defence. This raises two difficulties: there is not one but several public opinions in Europe, and the reactions of various public opinions to political initiatives or current events may vary significantly (for example, Austrian citizens will not react the same way to an event or crisis as Bulgarian, French, Irish... citizens). Moreover, action under the CSDP does not affect the daily lives of European citizens very much, in contrast to monetary, health or transport policies. It is therefore difficult to ensure that they are directly concerned. However, symbols can help to underline the achievements of European defence: EU flags on uniforms, military exchanges, joint manoeuvres... The trap is, however, to fall into excessive communication that does not directly affect the public. For it must be realised that the CSDP is primarily a matter for specialists, even within the military or among national officials. The European institutions are difficult to grasp, and often require study and an immersion in Brussels to fully understand everything that is at stake and the workings of the “CSDP machine”.

People are now probably more aware of the importance of the EU, and used to daily life with the symbols and impact of the Union (the Euro, freedom of movement for people and goods, police cooperation etc.). This is an opportunity that must be seized. For external operations, European citizens see very clearly that without peace and security, nothing is possible: neither economic, nor social nor democratic progress. In addition, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, insecure energy supplies and natural disasters are considered as direct threats for them. These are issues that the CSDP should probably invest in more, and it needs to communicate the results of its action on these issues. If we wish the public to be more receptive to security and defence issues, then we can begin with an internal debate, in every European country and in the heart of society. The very strong commitment of citizens, especially young people, to



humanitarian projects in particular, should go hand-in-hand with a shared vision of security issues and defence.

## **II/ Different ways to bring the public closer to the CSDP**

At this stage, it must be said: there are simply no CSDP campaigns. Only anniversaries (5 years and 10 years) have provided some visibility through special EUISS publications, but not for the general public. The ESDC also attempted to provide some visibility. Still, it must also be remembered that public opinion is, essentially, in favour of a European army, seen as a way to overcome limited national capabilities. Therefore we should now provide some ideas for improving public support for the CSDP, to increase understanding of its action and raise its profile.

### **Bringing the CSDP closer to European citizens**

Considering all this, there is an educational component to create within the CSDP. The first channel of communication on European defence is the Member States themselves: this channel must be exploited. Therefore, it is primarily Member States which must promote the CSDP.

Moreover, the institutional advances of the Lisbon Treaty introduce a solidarity clause (Article 222) and a mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7). These legal provisions need to be translated into action if natural disasters, terrorist attacks or serious disorders happen on European territory. If the civil and military forces of member countries were massively engaged in internal crises (earthquakes, floods, for example), it would produce a visible effect, and bring European citizens closer together. Just imagine the effect on public opinion of seeing German, Swedish, Spanish and Bulgarian etc. soldiers on television, rescuing victims of floods in Poland, for example, by clearing and rehabilitating infrastructure. The case of the earthquake in Japan in 2011 confirmed this: the massive engagement of the military in domestic relief operations (100 000 troops deployed at that time) has brought the Japanese armed forces considerably closer to civil society. The European Union has a "trump card" through its internal (within European territory) security and defence action. The CSDP also covers this field, and its efforts should significantly increase public support.

But external operations, although sometimes remote and thus of little relevance to the public, are also a showcase for the action of the CSDP. If there are operations that are initiated, it will illustrate the vitality of the CSDP. Although the citizen may probably not be aware of all operations, he will know that the EU plays an important role in the world, and that there is political solidarity on the continent of Europe. Continuing CSDP operations is also fundamental for the support of civil society for this policy.

### **Some examples of initiatives**

We can put forward a few suggestions for a new European defence education. On the one hand we should educate and train national players (government, military, civil servants, students etc.), and also inform European citizens. This would be a two-pronged approach.

- First, the creation of a proper information policy on the CSDP, with joint funding and a communication task force, in order to highlight the sources of information already available and to develop new methods (distribution in schools of an explanatory guide for the public, creation of a special radio station, etc.).
- Investigation of new media like the Internet and blogs, social networks (*Facebook, Twitter, Vimeo ...*), video-sharing sites (*Youtube, Dailymotion ...*). These tools are widely used by the public, and may be useful.
- Distribution of Council DVDs and books on CSDP missions in universities, but also in less specialised public libraries.
- Creation of a specific CSDP diploma at the College of Europe in Bruges
- Regular meetings of national directors of communication in ministries of defence in order to achieve a coherent and multinational communication strategy.
- Organization of training in Brussels on CSDP for parliamentarians, academics, civil servants and the military, including visits to the bodies and institutions of the CSDP.
- Raising the profile of European defence at annual ceremonies on May 9. For example, multinational military parades.

All of these are only suggestions and ideas. Probably not all of them will be relevant, but they should encourage players within the CSDP to consider new methods of communication to bring citizens closer to the CSDP. Education is required for the CSDP as it remains a complex institutional field. Displaying its results is also important, in order to make the policy known to civil society.

### **Conclusion**

Many other steps can be taken. They are often implemented by Member States when they take on the Presidency of the EU or to justify a national interest (industrial and arms policy for example). Communication initiatives and education would have more chance of success (gradually building a common strategic culture among citizens) if they were organised, planned and funded in a shared European framework.

Talking about a subject such as European public opinion is multidimensional. European public opinions (plural) are a fundamental factor in supporting and continuing the CSDP, and in legitimising the EU's external action, including its military aspects. This should not be left to the Member States alone, but citizens need to engage with the issue. The positioning of European public opinion on external action is also often perceived as "minor" or unimportant by policy makers. Although the CSDP remains an area of intergovernmental decision-making, the public has a vital role to play, even if it is less visible.

To forge a spirit of collective defence in Europe is not merely an incidental factor: it is directly involved in building a sense of "living together", and a common idea of Europe. It is not about militarising public sentiment, but publicising the possibility and relevance of EU external action. EU military operations are most efficient in terms of a comprehensive approach, as the EU is a political construct that is equipped with political, economic, legal, cultural etc. tools. If NATO remains, by its military might, the guarantor of the security of the continent, the EU is complementary and both organisations have a vested interest in agreeing to be mutually reinforced.

Again, this European defence identity cannot do without an understanding of defence issues by European citizens. A genuine education policy, as well as capacity-building or the harmonization of military standards, should be conducted within the scope of the CSDP. Member States, EU institutions and citizens have a common interest in this approach. The challenge of bringing European citizens closer to the CSDP therefore seems just as important as the launch of new operations abroad. This effort must be supported now. The results will only be visible in the future. But stronger public support will be essential to the CSDP.

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***Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?***



Athens, June 2012

## List of acronyms

<b>BEMIP</b>	Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>ESS</b>	European Security Strategy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>LNG</b>	Liquefied Natural Gas
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>TEU</b>	Treaty on European Union
<b>TOE</b>	Tons of oil equivalent

## **INTRODUCTION**

The meaning of the word "security" is of vital importance nowadays. New threats are arising for governments and citizens and shaking the security system. Among these are climate change, illegal immigration and terrorism. In order to confront these threats, modern measures and new strategies need to be adopted. NATO is the first organization that readjusted its mission to face up to the new challenges from the early 1990's, as soon as the Cold War was over.

On the other hand, it is only in the last ten years that the EU has tried to undertake significant action in the security sector. The most important step was the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as the second "pillar" in the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. Secondly, in 2003, the European Security Strategy set out the EU's goals in the area of security.

Nowadays, there is no need for governments and organizations that are hostile to the EU to undertake military action in order to harm the EU's security and interests. It is easy to strike at critical points such as the energy sector. So, energy and energy supplies are of major importance, especially for the developed countries.

Today, the EU is the most developed part of the modern world with the biggest GNP<sup>120</sup>, which leads to high energy demands. Its huge industrial production, combined with its large population and high standard of living, creates enormous energy demands. In order to cover these energy demands, security of supply routes, and energy security in general, is of vital importance.

In the territory of the EU's member states, there are no significant energy sources (oil, LNG). In addition, infrastructure for renewable energy sources is not being developed rapidly. These factors necessitate the creation of a more secure energy transport system as well as exploration of new, less insecure, energy routes. The EU's dependence on Russia, the Gulf and Caspian countries, with unstable political systems, for oil and LNG, constitutes a threat to unobstructed energy supply.

It is important that all the EU's member states should cooperate under this goal, because there is no European country that has yet achieved energy self-sufficiency. The desirable "security culture"<sup>121</sup> that is mentioned in the declaration of the European Security Strategy could only be achieved through co-operation, and energy security issues are one good way to achieve it.

## **SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE EU**

For the first time, with the TEU in 1992, security began to be taken into consideration, constituting the second of the three pillars of the Treaty. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was a fresh start for the EU in that area of European cooperation. However, until 2003, the EU lacked a common security strategy with which to address the new threats. The Iraq crisis prompted the creation of a security strategy along the lines of the US NSS.

The Lisbon Treaty in 2007 (implemented from December 1 2009), embodied all the security decisions in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Despite the above, there has not been any

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<sup>120</sup> *World Fact Book*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 2008

<sup>121</sup> *European Security Strategy*, European Commission, Brussels, 2003

spectacular progress in the field. National governments are suspicious of delegating security and defence issues to the EU. It should be noted that security does not just include the EU's internal defence measures. In many cases, preventive action is required in areas that will likely affect the future security of the Union. Operation ATALANTA and the reconstruction of Albania are examples of this.

'Security culture' is a new term for the EU. When the European Security Strategy was established in 2003, the term 'security culture' was not widely used in the context of the European Union. The member states had their own national security culture. This was the case because it was thought that such issues are quite sensitive and so had to remain exclusively under national control.

Until then, the Member states believed they did not face the same risks in this area. The threats to Greek security, for example from illegal immigration, are not related to Denmark. Another common belief was that there were no common interests in the security field and that, even if they existed, the only organization capable of dealing with them was the national government.

This trend began to change. Finally, the Member States accepted that they faced the same threats. In the energy sector in particular, where no EU country is self-sufficient in energy reserves, the need for joint management of these issues became apparent.

### **ENERGY DEPENDENCE OF THE EU: A SECURITY CHALLENGE**

According to EUROSTAT figures, in 2009, energy consumption in the Europe of 27 amounted to 1,703 billion toe<sup>122</sup>. This fact places the EU among the largest energy consumers worldwide. At the same time, the EU is expected to import 70% of its energy requirements by 2030<sup>123</sup>. This assessment raises the need for the EU's instruments to manage the reduction of EU's member states dependence on other countries and to ensure the protection of energy sources and supply routes.

The most important suppliers of Natural Gas to the EU are Russia, Algeria and Norway<sup>124</sup>. None of them is an EU member state, so unobstructed supply is not guaranteed. This is due to the fact that the supply routes cross countries which are neither suppliers nor importers. The Russian - Ukrainian crisis in 2009<sup>125</sup> created a huge problem for the EU's natural gas supply and showed the EU's dependence and the domino effect of a possible disruption.

The consequences of that crisis on the EU's security and prosperity were huge. About 50% of the European population, in the middle of the winter, faced difficulty in obtaining natural gas. In addition to the domestic consumers, hospitals, army camps, police stations and many other places which depend on natural gas for heating, were left unheated, or obliged to use their strategic reserves.

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<sup>122</sup> *Green Paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply* European Commission, Brussels, 2003.

<sup>124</sup> *The World Oil and Gas Review 2004*, ENI, 2004

<sup>125</sup> "Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe: the Russian Ukrainian crisis", Jonathan Stern, *Asia - Pacific Review*, 2009

The lack of interconnectivity in Europe was obvious, so many decisions were taken in order to achieve interconnectivity. It is known that the EU's energy dependence is about 70%. However, many member states depend on energy imports 100% (such as Malta). The security of these member states is threatened in the event of a supply disruption.

### **THE RECENT DISCOVERIES OF NATURAL GAS DEPOSITS IN CYPRUS**

The recent discovery of natural gas deposits, to the south of Cyprus within the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus, creates new aspects in the region. It has often been the case that countries which are underdeveloped, or militarily and economically weak, are rich in natural resources. This leads to the big players on the energy chessboard manipulating and managing their wealth illegally. As a result, the wealth of these areas of the planet becomes a curse to the States themselves. As an example, there is the case of Kuwait.

In the case of Cyprus, we have again a weak military state, with occupation forces on its territory. The discovery of large deposits of natural gas, south of Cyprus, in a highly volatile region, poses new challenges to security in the EU

Turkey is not an EU member state and has a known policy of expansion and established positions towards Cyprus, challenging the legitimacy of the Cyprus Government to proceed with the extraction of natural gas it owns. Violating any rule of law and good neighbourly endeavours, even if we disregard the illegal occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, threatens the Republic of Cyprus and its partners in this effort, on a political, diplomatic and military level.

The case of Cyprus is not a national problem and should not be treated as such. It is EU territory and the threat to the security of an EU Member State is a threat to the rest of Europe. We should bear in mind that mining takes place in a member country of the EU and therefore studying the EU as a single producer and consumer of energy reduces dependence on natural gas from other countries. It may not be the solution to Europe's energy problem on the evidence available so far, but certainly is a new energy source.

In this direction the EU should take more decisive action by joint decisions under the new CSDP in order to clarify its attitude towards Turkey. So far, Israel is emerging as the protector of the interests of the Republic of Cyprus by military guarantees and the partial breaking-off of relations with Turkey. This shows the inertia on the part of the EU institutions when it comes to defending their interests in the region.

### **THE NEW BALTIC SEA ENERGY TRANSPORTATION NETWORK**

A great example of the interconnection of the energy network among European countries is the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP). The agreement was signed on 17 June 2009 between eight Baltic Sea Member States (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Germany). The BEMIP is the fruit of nine months' work at the initiative of the European Commission (EC) to look at concrete measures to connect Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia better to the wider EU energy networks.



The agreement was signed in order to reduce the possible side-effects of a new Ukrainian-Russian crisis such as the 2008 crisis between the two countries. With this plan, energy distribution is far more easy and energy security is established.

## **CONSEQUENCES**

The Energy and Energy Security issues that arisen in recent years have prompted an effort to achieve a more integrated European security culture in general.

The problems that piracy created for cargo ships crossing the Aden Gulf, transporting the 11% of the oil produced in the area, and the inevitable reduction of the volume of oil arriving in Europe, led to the ATALANTA operation. When that energy route proved problematic, the European Union intervened with the creation of a well-organized force in order to secure its interests in the area. The ATALANTA operation is a successful one, proving that the EU is capable of protecting the security of the member states and citizens against threats, even outside its borders.

The Russian - Ukrainian crisis in January 2009 clearly showed that Europe is insecure because of its dependence on natural gas from Russia, and especially on the only corridor between Russia and the EU: Ukraine. Europe's Lessons Learned from that crisis are valuable. Since 2009, EU instruments have created a plan to reduce dependency on particular energy sources and diversify supplies. The Baltic Energy Market Integration Plan created on January 17 (just after the Russian - Ukrainian crisis) is one of the actions that the EU started to undertake in order to achieve unobstructed supply and energy security.

The possible reduction of the energy dependence of Cyprus, and of the EU in general, as a result of the natural gas deposits south of the island, is significant. However Turkey is creating many problems by threatening the Cyprus government and the companies that have undertaken the project. The actions that EU instruments need to put in place in order to ensure the security of Cyprus, as well as the unobstructed progress of the project, could lead to new security measures. Because of the major significance of the problem, a common policy needs to be adopted towards Turkey. Through this challenge, European security could become more integrated.

Nuclear energy is another critical issue. This source of energy has many benefits, such as low carbon dioxide emissions. However there is a safety issue. Three serious accidents (Three Mile Island, USA, 1979 and Chernobyl, Ukraine, 1986 and Fukushima in Japan, 2011) have occurred. The majority of people do not want these nuclear reactors in close proximity, so the possible shutdown of nuclear power plants could lead to greater dependence on fossil fuels. In addition, nuclear power plants need greater care and security. Such areas present a high risk and could be targets of a possible terrorist strike in the EU's territory. The EU has already taken measures to limit the possibility of a nuclear accident in the EU, by funding the decommissioning of the nuclear power plant at Coslodui in Bulgaria with funding of 300,000,000 EUR between 2010 and 2013<sup>126</sup>. In order to protect the security of civilians, Member States agreed to fund this effort.

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<sup>126</sup> The benefits of the nuclear power, Bruno Comby, p.38: Official Journal of the EU, C 286 E/52, December 2009

## **CONCLUSION**

The new situation at international level since the first decade of the 21st century must be taken into account by the EU Member States which are facing new forms of threats that did not previously exist. National governments are now unable to cope with them alone. The complexity of the threats, their asymmetric nature and the wide range of areas of action, makes it difficult for individual member states to deal with them. Given the specificity of the security issue, a prerequisite for the existence of each state is transnational cooperation. Especially in an organization like the EU, which has a not insignificant action in transnational cooperation (on agricultural issues, economic issues, etc.), transnational cooperation is not an insurmountable obstacle.

However, despite the uncontested need for cooperation, progress in this area has not been spectacular so far. It seems that the EU needs a catalyst in order to boost progress in the common security field. Energy issues have already started to affect the EU as well as issues of resources and ensuring the flow of energy to the EU, which is inevitably expected to lead to the acceleration of developments in security. New strategic alliances, pipe-lines through allied countries, safeguarding the nuclear power plants, a well-defined and powerful external policy on the security of the new natural gas deposits, all presuppose a strong Common Security and Defence policy, or lead to that.

In conclusion, Common Security needs to be implemented in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and not only by the developed countries of the EU. The European NATO, as the CSDP is called, is needed to ensure the Homeland and Civil Security of the Member states. The above is a precondition for the prosperity of Europeans and for every peaceful action.

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### ***Strategic Partners in CSDP***

***Q: Working with partners in CSDP: Who are our strategic partners, why would they want to engage and how can they contribute to CSDP missions and operations?***



Austria, June 2012

## List of acronyms

<b>BRICS</b>	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>ECHO</b>	European Community Humanitarian Office
<b>EEAS</b>	European External Action Service
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta</b>	European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta
<b>EUFOR</b>	European Union Force
<b>EUPOL RD CONGO</b>	European Union police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>EUSEC RD CONGO</b>	European Union security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>EUTM</b>	European Training Mission
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NATO PfP</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Partnership for Peace
<b>OSCE</b>	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>SFOR</b>	Stabilisation Force
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme

## Introduction

The EU maintains diplomatic relations with nearly all countries in the world. It has strategic partnerships with key international players, is deeply engaged with emerging powers around the globe, and has signed bilateral Association Agreements with a number of states in its vicinity. Abroad, the Union is represented by a network of 136 European Union Delegations, which have similar functions to those of an embassy.<sup>127</sup>

Cooperation is the key to success in international peace and security operations. Various organisations operate simultaneously and side by side in areas of conflict, so coordination between them is of utmost importance. As armed conflicts are getting more and more complex on all levels, all actors need to coordinate their efforts to make the best use of all the available resources.

To defend the European Union's interests all around the world certain actions are taken to achieve this goal.

These actions include:

- ❖ The Union is supporting stability in the Balkans. Assistance projects in seven countries are currently receiving European Union funding, helping to build stable societies. Countries in the Western Balkans are already candidates or potential candidates for membership of the European Union as part of its enlargement policy.
- ❖ The Union is member of the Quartet, alongside the United Nations, the United States and Russia, which is working to push for peace in the Middle East. Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. The European Union's objective is a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours.
- ❖ The Union is running military, political or civilian missions to help build and secure peace in a number of countries in Europe, Africa and beyond, such as Afghanistan.

Currently the European Union is running 10 civilian missions and 3 military operations in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy.<sup>128</sup>

In general, most of the European Union missions since 2002 have developed in the same way. The UN adopts a resolution and tries to find a willing partner to fulfil the necessary tasks. In most cases this partner is the NATO at first. Later on, when the conflict has cooled down to some extent, EUFOR starts to take over (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina – SFOR/EUFOR).

One exception was the EUFOR Chad mission where the European Union took direct action under the UN resolution.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> EEAS, 2012. What we do, Brussels [online] Available at: <[http://eeas.europa.eu/what\\_we\\_do/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/what_we_do/index_en.htm)> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

<sup>128</sup> EEAS, 2012. EU Operations, Brussels [online] Available at: <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=en>> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

## **United Nations**

### General

To quote from the Council of the European Union: "The European Security Strategy underlined the importance of the United Nations in international relations, and recalled that the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."<sup>130</sup>

So unlike the Americans, who sometimes act on their own authority (e.g. Operation Iraqi Freedom), a EUFOR engagement always depends on a UN Resolution (e.g. EUFOR/TCHAD RCA).

### Cooperation

"The relationship between the European Union and the United Nations in the field of crisis management has gone through major changes over the last five years. On the UN side, the constraints imposed by the changing and ever-demanding nature of peacekeeping have led the organisation to seek increased support from regional actors, the European Union among others. On the European side, the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) logically led the European Union to revisit its relationship with the UN, both as a legitimising body and as the main peacekeeping implementer. The convergence of these two trends has led to a genuine inter-institutional rapprochement."<sup>131</sup>

In general one can say that the EU missions depend on the resolutions of the UN and, conversely, the UN depends on the contribution of troops by the EU.

### Reasons for engagement

As mentioned above, the carrying-out of UN Resolutions requires pro-active partners. The European Union has established itself as a reliable partner since the beginning of its CSDP activity in 2002. Europe is the cradle of the UN core values and therefore a very important partner when it comes to defending these. Unlike in China or Russia, which often do not have the same understanding of humanitarian values as the European Union, these core values have matured over several hundred years and are part of the European concept of society.

### Contribution

The UN makes no direct contribution to military operations, as it is dependent on troop-contributing countries. The European Union essentially provides military support for the relief operations that are later on carried out by the United Nations. The UN has several departments for carrying out humanitarian aid operations (e.g. UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP) which work closely together with the European Union institutions such as ECHO.

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<sup>129</sup> EEAS, 2012. EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, Brussels [online] Available at: <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eufor-tchadrcra.aspx?lang=en>> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

<sup>130</sup> Council of the European Union, 2004. EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration, p. 2, Brussels.

<sup>131</sup> Tardy, T., 2005. EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping, p. 49, Geneva.

## **NATO**

### General

NATO is a key strategic partner to the European Union. "The two organizations share a majority of members (21), and all members of both organizations share common values."<sup>132</sup>

As Ari Vatanen, Member of the European Parliament, pointed out,<sup>133</sup> NATO is the backbone of European security and both organisations face the same security-policy challenges. The purpose of the European Union is to promote peace throughout the world. NATO is a necessary partner to maximize the potential to fulfil our common goals.

As mentioned above, 21 EU Member States are also NATO member states. Out of the seven remaining states, six are part of the NATO-PfP Programme (Cyprus is not). Vatanen also points out that this fact should not interfere in the cooperation between these two organisations.<sup>134</sup>

The European Security Strategy defines the key elements of partnerships for effective multilateralism as follows: "We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational co-operation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities."<sup>135</sup>

After the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO stressed the need for cooperation with its most important strategic partners: NATO's new Strategic Concept commits the alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations, by working more closely with NATO's international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.<sup>136</sup>

Despite NATO's desire to continue as the main military organisation on the European continent, the European Union is trying to increase its ability to conduct crisis-management operations independently. So while NATO still centres its efforts on successfully conducting military operations, the European Union is keeping its main focus on conducting humanitarian aid and civil protection operations.

### Cooperation

As already mentioned, NATO and the European Union have different approaches, but in the end strive for the same goals. As the European Union launches its crisis management operations in the same areas where the NATO conducts military operations, close cooperation is essential.

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<sup>132</sup> NATO, 2011. NATO-EU: a strategic partnership, Brussels [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49217.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm)> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

<sup>133</sup> European Parliament – Press Service, 2009. EU und NATO: Mit stärkerer Kooperation gegen globale Gefahren?, Brussels [online] Available at: <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT+IM-PRESS+20090213STO49398+0+DOC+XML+V0%2F%2FDE>> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

<sup>134</sup> European Parliament – Press Service, 2009. EU und NATO: Mit stärkerer Kooperation gegen globale Gefahren?, Brussels [online] Available at: <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT+IM-PRESS+20090213STO49398+0+DOC+XML+V0%2F%2FDE>> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

<sup>135</sup> Council of the European Union, 2008. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 11, Brussels.

<sup>136</sup> NATO, 2011. NATO-EU: a strategic partnership, Brussels [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49217.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm)> [Accessed 25 May 2012].



The European Security Strategy also states that:<sup>137</sup> "The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced."

The European Union can also produce interesting constellations when it comes to military operations. A case in point is Libya, as the most recent example. The European Union tried to find a common approach to the conflict but failed once again because of differing national interests. Immediately after that, all responsibility for a military operation was given to NATO, although this matter was surely of concern to the Union as a whole.

It then seemed that even the European NATO states couldn't find a common solution. The United States tried to keep out of this conflict, but as a breakdown of the alliance with a resultant loss of face throughout the international community seemed inevitable, the USA had to intervene and once again set the framework for operations. This was a disgrace for the European Union and for the European member states of NATO. It seems that both alliances are incapable of acting when it comes to taking extreme measures.

The major lesson learned from this should be that the European Union should first try to solve crises on its own, but with the assets and know-how of NATO in the background. As at national level, the same troops are usually designated to NATO and EUFOR, it would make no difference at all if, for example, EUFOR or SFOR signs were placed on vehicles and command posts. When it comes to foreign affairs, only a jointly operating European Union can accomplish military operations.

#### Reasons for engagement

As most of the NATO member states are also European Union Member States, a common approach to crisis management is the only feasible option. Due to the fact that NATO often does not come up with a plan for the aftermath of a conflict, the European Union often takes over when the main military effort (combat action) is over. Europe always strives for a long term commitment to bring stability to a region.

#### Contribution

The Union's Member States provide major support to NATO missions, and the European Union itself is engaged in governance and development at all levels.

Since its foundation in 1949 NATO has focused solely on military operations, gathering a lot of know-how and setting up all of the necessary infrastructure. The European Union depends on NATO's assets, as well as on the support of the United States as the major player in the organisation.

### **Russia**

#### General

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<sup>137</sup> Council of the European Union, 2008. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 11, Brussels.

"Russia is the EU's third biggest trade partner, with Russian supplies of oil and gas making up a large percentage of Russia's exports to Europe."<sup>138</sup>

So keeping up good relations between Russia and the European Union is in both countries' interest. Furthermore, some states which were formerly part of the Soviet Union are now EU Member States. So the ties between Russia and the European Union also have a historical and geographical basis.

When it comes to peace-keeping operations, the European Union is an even more important partner, as cooperation between Russia and NATO is simply impossible for historical reasons.

The European Union also expects that strengthening its relations with Russia will bring about lasting solutions to certain problems (e.g. internal conflicts – Chechnya).

At present, EU-Russian relations are heavily charged due to plans to station a missile defence shield in Eastern Europe.

### Cooperation

Although the major factor in cooperation is an economic one, the security-policy aspects cannot be left out. As energy and security of supply routes are topics of interest and have great prominence when it comes to security policy, both parties strive to take advantage of their full potential.

As stated in the European Security Strategy: "Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets."<sup>139</sup>

According to the EEAS, the European Union and Russia cooperate closely in five main areas:<sup>140</sup>

- ❖ Strengthening dialogue and cooperation on the international scene
- ❖ Fighting against terrorism
- ❖ Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament
- ❖ Cooperation in crisis management
- ❖ Cooperation in the field of civil protection

An indicator for the strengthening of the relationship is that in 2010 Chancellor Merkel and President Medvedev signed a memorandum in Meseberg to explore the establishment of an EU-

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<sup>138</sup> EEAS, 2012. Russia, Brussels [online] Available at: <[http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/index_en.htm)> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

<sup>139</sup> Council of the European Union, 2008. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 5, Brussels.

<sup>140</sup> Council of the European Union, 2007. The European Union and Russia: Close Neighbours, Global Players, Strategic Partners, p. 16, Brussels.

Russia Political and Security Committee (ER PSC) to establish ground rules for joint EU-Russia civil and military crisis management operations.<sup>141</sup>

### Reasons for engagement

Russia is highly interested in a stable and strong Europe. This is mainly for economic reasons, but also because Russia has to rely on working global strategic relationships. As its relationship with the United States is historically charged, Russia seeks to engage with Europe and Asia.

Lasting stability in our neighbourhood will require continued effort by the EU, together with UN, OSCE, the US and Russia. Although relations with Russia have deteriorated due to the conflict with Georgia, the EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. This partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy and the rule of law, along with market principles, as well as on common interests and objectives.<sup>142</sup>

### Contribution

Although on a formal basis the relationship between NATO and Russia is not the best, small steps towards cooperation have been taken. Both parties have set their focus on Russia's unstable neighbours and China. As already mentioned, most European Union Member States are also NATO member states. So this cooperation directly affects the EU. Russia is involved in joint anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia as well as operations in Afghanistan.<sup>143</sup>

So it can be argued that by working together with NATO, Russia also works together with the EU on military operations.

## **Africa**

### General

At the Lisbon Summit in 2007 the European Union adopted the EU-Africa Joint Strategy to accelerate the development of Africa.<sup>144</sup>

The purpose of this Joint Strategy is to take the Africa-EU relationship to a new, strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2010. Memorandum, Meseberg [online] Available at: <<http://www.russianmission.eu/sites/default/files/user/files/2010-06-05-meseberg-memorandum.pdf>> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

<sup>142</sup> Council of the European Union, 2009. European Security Strategy, p. 23, Brussels.

<sup>143</sup> Gorenburg, D., 2011. Russia-NATO military cooperation (Part 1: training and operations), Cambridge [online] Available at: <<http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2011/11/03/russia-nato-military-cooperation-part-1-training-and-operations/>> [Accessed 26 May 2012].

<sup>144</sup> Council of the European Union, 2007. THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Brussels [online] Available at: < [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf)> [Accessed 26 May 2012].

Currently there are four on-going CSDP missions in Africa

- ❖ European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)
- ❖ EUPOL RD Congo
- ❖ European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU Naval Operation Atalanta)
- ❖ European Union Somalia Training Mission (EUTM Somalia)

Africa is currently the continent facing the greatest challenges throughout the world. Everything is on the move and new events occur on a daily basis, changing the fates of millions of people.

It is a goal of the European Union to strengthen African development and to shape the future of the continent. This is mainly out of economic interest, but also because of the charitable idea behind the Union.

Europe cares about a strong Africa to hinder migration and the violation of human rights, and also to set up strong ideological and economic bonds with its states.

#### Cooperation, reasons for engagement and contribution

As most of Africa is still at a low but advancing stage of development, genuinely equal cooperation is currently not possible. Most of the African countries are beneficiaries of the European Union's substantial foreign aid budget.

Cooperation in the broader sense could be the military and civil crisis management provided by the European Union to almost all African countries. The European Union and the UN work together closely to help these developing countries.

Nevertheless, quite a few African countries are important and respected partners in UN peace missions. A lot of the UN peacekeeping troops are provided by other African states which have overcome their problems and are starting to become involved in foreign affairs.

### **China**

#### General

"The EU is a trading superpower in Asia. It is China's primary commercial partner and Japan's third largest. As the Union becomes more and more integrated with Asian economies, contributing to a stable security environment in the region becomes increasingly important for the European Union in order to maintain its current socio-economic position."<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Council of the European Union, 2007. THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Brussels [online] Available at: <[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf)> [Accessed 26 May 2012].

<sup>146</sup> Institute for Security Studies, 2012. Asia, Brussels [online] Available at: <<http://www.iss.europa.eu/regions/asia/>> [Accessed 26 May 2012].

"The declaration of strategic partnership has been accompanied by two substantial developments: the signature of the agreement allowing China to participate in the Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System and the promise by European Union policy-makers to initiate discussions on the lifting of the EU arms embargo imposed on China in 1989."<sup>147</sup>

At the European Union summit in Brussels in 2010, High Representative Catherine Ashton said that "The current arms embargo is a major impediment for developing stronger EU-China co-operation on foreign policy and security matters."<sup>148</sup>

The United States is very concerned about this development and is currently trying to stop the European Union from lifting this arms embargo. Of course it is in the interest of the European Union to lift this embargo as it would remarkably enrich the trade relations between the two parties. On the other hand, the United States is concerned about high-tech armaments being delivered to China, as they could later be used to threaten US interests in the Far East.

### Cooperation

The cooperation between China and the European Union is solely economic. Due to the great distance and widely differing strategic goals, there is currently no prospect of military cooperation. However, Chinese interests in Africa may lead to cooperation in the future.

### Reasons for engagement & contribution

For the above mentioned reason China is currently not engaged in military or civil crisis-management operations, nor does it contribute to EU CSDP missions.

Nevertheless, it is an important partner in global security matters, as these missions can only be accomplished with the involvement of a wide range of countries.

## **Latin America**

### General

Relations between the European Union and Latin America are based on a strategic partnership founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1999.

As with nearly every other partner, both parties share strong historical, cultural and economic ties, as well as a common commitment to human rights, democracy, good governance, multilateralism and social cohesion.<sup>149</sup>

As in the case of China, the geographical distance between the two parties is great and there is no common approach on CSDP topics, but a common goal will be the promotion of peace and stability throughout the world.

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<sup>147</sup> Casarini, N., 2006. The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership, p. 7, Brussels.

<sup>148</sup> Rettman, A., 2010. Ashton pragmatic on China in EU foreign policy blueprint, Brussels [online] Available at: <<http://euobserver.com/884/31538>> [Accessed 26 May 2012].

<sup>149</sup> European Commission, 2008. The strategic partnership between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: a joint commitment, p.5, Brussels.

### Cooperation

The cooperation between Latin America and the European Union is also solely economic. The Union is one of the region's main trade partners and also contributes a large amount of foreign aid to countries in need.

Latin American and EU interests in foreign policy do not concur very much. Latin America's main effort lies in South & North American affairs, whereas the European Union's interest lies in Africa, the Middle East and Russia.

### Reasons for engagement & contribution

For the above-mentioned reason Latin America is currently not engaged in military or civil crisis management operations, nor does it contribute to EU CSDP missions.

Stronger cooperation in the military and crisis management sector is not to be expected in future.

### **Summary**

All in all, it is possible to discern two kinds of strategic partners of the European Union. The first group comprises only economic partners, while the second consists of partners who also cooperate on military and security matters.

### Strategic economic partners

- ❖ China
- ❖ Latin America

### Strategic economic, military and security partners

- ❖ UN
- ❖ NATO
- ❖ Russia
- ❖ Africa

Concerning economic, security and defence matters, a united, strong and purposeful Europe would not just be a reliable trading partner, but also one who is able to influence the history of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The primary goal of a strategic partnership should be to pursue one's own advantage and not to try to meet everybody else's needs.

Unlike the United States of America, the European Union does not have an army of its own. If the European Union could find a common approach on CSDP matters, the Union would be able to focus better on relations and operations with other, external partners. In my opinion, standardised management and training for the military and the security sector is indispensable for a stronger Union. In the areas of research, development and science, too, the European Union has to focus

on its own strengths and invest more money if it is to stay a global economic power. The armaments and defence industry is an important part of the European industrial complex. The western and central parts of the European Union, in particular, must keep up with the rest of the world.<sup>150</sup>

Europe should try to stand on its own feet when it comes to military operations and crisis management. Developing an internal approach to operations concerning the armed forces, police and the intelligence services is necessary to make Europe a strong global power once again.

While all the other global powers (USA, BRICS) are focusing on the Pacific region and the further development of their supremacy in this region, the European Union has to set its own course and not blindly follow the others. As the Pacific area is far away from Europe, we should take the opportunity to become a major player in Africa and the Middle East, while keeping up good relations with the other global players.

The European Union is an economic superpower. Why shouldn't it be able to become a security superpower as well?

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<sup>150</sup> SIPRI, 2012. Military Spending and Armament – Recent trends in military expenditure, Solna. [online] Available at: <<http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends>> [Accessed 25 May 2012].

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*Reflections on the future of the CSDP: why it is needed and what form it should take?*



Italy, June 2012

## List of acronyms

<b>EDC</b>	European Defence Community
<b>BRICS</b>	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>EDA</b>	European Defence Agency
<b>ESDC</b>	European Security and Defence College
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUROGENDFOR</b>	European Gendarmerie Force
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<b>WEU</b>	Western European Union

## **Introduction**

The Common Foreign and Security Policy was established nearly 20 years ago and the EU has had some successes in this field. However, it is still the subject of debate even today and certain issues have never been fully explored, either in the many papers and articles that have been written on this subject, or within the organisations involved. We need to probe even further and look back at the origins of this policy, at the advent of the very first European Community, and understand what led us to create the CFSP – in other words, why we felt, and still feel, that it was needed.

### **1. How the concept of common defence has evolved within the European Union**

#### **1.1. The failure of the European Defence Community/EDC**

The main objective of the first European Community was purely economic – indeed, French Prime Minister René Plevén's plan for a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952 was rejected by France itself. The idea of an army formed by the same countries that had been at war with each other ten years earlier was no doubt somewhat premature, but it showed even then that, after the Second World War, Europe had become aware of the loss of its power on the international scene, and there was also a desire among states to return to the centrality of the past. However, back in 1952, the same fears that are holding up the development of a European defence policy even today were already evident, i.e. the fear of losing national sovereignty in such an important area. Some states therefore decided to develop this particular policy within the framework of the WEU (Western European Union). However, it was only possible to establish cooperation of a military nature between states.

After the Second World War the world was split between the USSR and the USA, with Europe acting as a buffer between the two while at the same time trying to be a leading player. The embryonic common defence policy, as it emerged in different guises in the WEU, was actually implemented by NATO – the real defence player at the time. Europe was still very keen to regain its original power on the international scene. The process that led to the definition of a common defence policy within the Community was a long one because a compromise had to be found between two opposing factors: on the one hand, the Member States were aware of the need to play a leading role once more in defence matters at international level, while, on the other hand, they wanted to maintain their national sovereignty.

#### **1.2. The creation and development of the CFSP**

An initial agreement was reached with the creation of the second pillar of the European Union: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which included the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). Clear objectives were set out for both the civil and the military scope of those second pillar policies. These targets were further defined and set out in more detail with the inclusion in the Treaty of Amsterdam of the "Petersberg Tasks" (1992), consisting mainly of a list of tasks – which included humanitarian missions and also the maintenance or restoration of peace – which were incorporated into and expanded by other treaties over the years. The EU has always taken a great interest in these matters, and the changing international scenario has led the Union

to develop and define ever more precisely the scope and methods of intervention. From the outset, however, there was a fundamental obstacle to the framing of this defence policy. Whereas all decisions under the first pillar were taken using the Community method, the Member States decided to use the so-called intergovernmental method for the second pillar, in order to maintain their individual sovereignty. Unlike the Community method, which enabled the EU's institutions to undertake legally valid actions and which involved, in particular, the use of qualified majority voting, decisions under the intergovernmental method were taken by unanimity. This became increasingly difficult to achieve over the years, especially following the enlargement that took place in the years after the establishment of the CFSP. More importantly, however, it meant that the European Parliament and the Commission only had a marginal role.

The main aim of the Treaty of Maastricht, which made official reference to these issues for the very first time, was not to construct a Common Foreign and Security Policy but only to enshrine the EU's desire to construct it – i.e. to first lay the foundations and only afterwards build the pillar itself. In fact, changes came about immediately with the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2002), which attempted to put the pillar on a more solid basis. One of the first building blocks was constructive abstention, which allows an EU Member State to abstain in a CFSP-related vote in the Council without blocking a unanimous decision<sup>151</sup>, thereby allowing an alternative to unanimity. Other building blocks were the common strategy and enhanced cooperation, which was extended to the second pillar. This allows a number of Member States (a minimum of eight - now nine under the Lisbon Treaty) that are able and willing to work more closely on issues that do not have military or defence implications to do so<sup>152</sup>, thereby allowing a "multi-speed Europe"<sup>153</sup> in this area as in the other pillars. Another important innovation was the creation of several agencies designed to support and assist the Union in foreign policy decisions, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA). The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) put the "finishing touches" to the CFSP. As well as renaming the policy, which is now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the Treaty allowed those EU Member States "whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions" to "establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework" (Article 42(6) TEU). It also introduced a solidarity and mutual assistance clause, based on Article 5<sup>154</sup> of the North Atlantic Treaty, that requires EU Member States to cooperate and assist other Member States affected by acts of terrorism or natural disasters or which are under attack. Today we can say that the picture is complete – as Mr Solana has written in his short treatise *A secure Europe in a better world*: "We have the instruments in place that can be used effectively"<sup>155</sup>.

So it is only natural to ask: if we have the instruments, why don't we use them?

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<sup>151</sup> *Autonomous Knowledge Unit 1 – 1.3 The Treaty of Amsterdam.*

<sup>152</sup> *Autonomous Knowledge Unit 1 – 1.3 The Treaty of Nice.*

<sup>153</sup> A. M. Calamia, V. Vigiak, *Manuale Breve –Diritto dell'Unione Europea.*

<sup>154</sup> Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

<sup>155</sup> *A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

## **2. Where to start from**

### **2.1. Thinking like a single state**

The process of framing the CSDP was very long and is still continuing, but we can see that the same problems have recurred over the years and are having a corrosive and restrictive effect on the implementation of this policy even today. Just like 60 years ago, the first of these problems is the sovereignty of nations. States are not yet ready to give up sovereignty on defence matters. If a new EDC and hence a common army were proposed today, in the belief that the time is now ripe (a possibility that is not actually excluded by Article 42 TEU (2) of the Treaty of Lisbon, which includes the phrase "... shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy" ... which "... will lead to a common defence ...", I believe that the reaction would be very similar or identical to that in 1952.

However, in one respect this reaction would appear to be contradictory, given that the terms of mutual assistance and solidarity oblige EU Member States to intervene if a state needs assistance. What better and faster way is there to intervene than with the EU's very own armed force? There is little sense in not finishing something once it has been started. Mr Solana always maintained that coherence was one of the main things needed in the policy of the former second pillar<sup>156</sup>.

On the one hand the EU Member States have created the CSDP and endowed it with extensive instruments for joint and effective action, but on the other hand they find it increasingly difficult to give up their power to a common higher authority, in this case, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. At this level of the EU, the Member States are bound together so strongly and substantially that they really should start to act together as they claim – unfortunately only on paper and not in practice – that they want to do. Now that there is total interdependence of the Member States, the enemy of one must be the enemy of all: a terrorist attack on the government of one country, a flood in another, are all emergencies that will not only have enormous repercussions for the state in question but will also have consequences and create enormous difficulties for all EU countries. Think of what happens when a natural disaster occurs in a particular region of a state. Other regions may not be directly involved but they are part of the same state, which has a duty to act, so all the regions will pay a share. We must imagine that we are a single state that has a duty to intervene to help its "regions". The period of crisis we are experiencing demonstrates that we are now dependent on each other almost as if we were a single state. It is precisely for this reason that we must continue not only to believe in but also to help develop the CSDP.

### **2.2. A new idea of European Union.**

Up until now our approach to this pillar has been like that of a doctor determined to find a cure for his patient. We have tried to keep the CSDP alive on paper – the names have changed, the instruments have changed, the tasks have expanded – but the Member States have never truly implemented this policy, probably because they don't see it as having a future or as having any

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<sup>156</sup> *A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

direct application. That it may actually do so becomes evident if we look at the international crises in which many EU Member States or the Union as a whole are involved. First and foremost, national governments must have more confidence in the means and instruments of the EU, but they are not the only ones. In all probability, those who most need to view things differently and appreciate the importance and effectiveness of a common defence policy for the EU are the citizens of the EU themselves. Public opinion does not yet seem ready to conceive of the EU as a single state; it still sees the EU as a union of different entities that share decision-making and collaborate on certain matters, such as the economy and the euro. But governments cannot act without the consent and approval of their peoples. We must therefore show European citizens the true reality of the European Union, which is much more than a mere grouping of states. A new idea of the EU must be re-launched, and must win over ordinary members of the public in the Member States. There must be a new and renewed European sentiment that goes beyond the simple concept of the nation-state, which has gradually become outmoded in today's globalised world. Without this new sense of conviction it does not make sense to continue along this road, because a foreign defence policy requires a common front, a common border. Belief in the EU will also bring a new impetus and new confidence to governments and hence also globally. It is then that we will be able to develop (for the second time) the idea of a common army.

### **2.3. A common army**

The realisation of such a military force appears necessary and not impossible today, just as it did for much of the time in 1952. An experiment in a slightly different context – the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) – is already in progress and seems to be achieving substantial results. However, this military police force is supported by only five countries (Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal), although others have asked to join, and does not so much deal with military targets as act as a framework for civil security actions, albeit sometimes in parallel with military missions. As well as EUROGENDFOR we need to create a common army of the European Union, rather than having a set of forces belonging to different countries that cooperate only in case of need. Just as the concept of the new European Union must start with acceptance by the general public, so the concept of a new common army must start at the most basic level of the armed forces, i.e. the training of individual soldiers.

This is what the European Union had envisaged from the outset. In 2005 it set up the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), which performs its task of education at all levels, from the lowest rank up to the heads of the Armed Forces or diplomats. For the time being, the courses are only given online. This is an excellent starting-point and must now be widely advertised in all the Member States, to ensure greater participation of the military. Eventually we will be able to create a European military school in which the various national armed forces will interact and get to know each other to a much greater extent. This scheme will also support another very important initiative, namely, the exchange of young military officers, a kind of military-level Erasmus that allows integration and exchanges right from the beginning of a military career. Both these initiatives are of fundamental importance, but as yet only a small number of states are implementing and taking part in them.

The proof that we are still on the right path and already some way along it is that we will be holding the first CSDP Olympiad in October, in Cyprus. This shows that we understand that exchanging information and ideas, comparing notes and simply getting to know our potential "future" colleagues better on a personal level is very important for ensuring better cooperation in any future collaboration that may gradually lead to a military union. Initiatives of this kind, promoting exchanges and comparisons, are essential and should receive more support, especially at the beginning of a soldier's career, because in order to "fight" for the same army we must first feel ourselves to be part of something. To achieve this, it is vital for us to get to know each other. We must therefore increase the number of exchanges between different countries and step up collaboration. This will bring innovative ideas into every state, and future generations will grow up with greater awareness and knowledge of their "neighbours" and future colleagues. Thanks to the increased number of partnerships, the idea of a European army that could intervene quickly and effectively in various international crisis zones will seem normal and feasible. However, if the military is ready to intervene, the EU institutions must also be ready. The intergovernmental method, which unfortunately is still a feature of the ESDP, should evolve and enable the bodies responsible in this area to take decisions more quickly and to act decisively and independently of the Member States. In other EU bodies working for the good of the community and not just for a single state, the members vote independently from the state of origin. We should establish a similar mechanism in the Common Security and Defence Policy, because it is increasingly important and necessary for the EU to intervene in international crises. The intergovernmental method must evolve and become similar to that used for all other Community policies. This will be achieved primarily by reducing the requirement of unanimity in the common decisions and positions, thus facilitating the decision-making process for defence policy.

#### **2.4. The "decline" of NATO and new responsibilities**

The European Union cannot pull back from its responsibilities, in particular from responsibilities that other states recognise it as having. The European Union has certainly achieved the goal it set itself in the Treaty of Maastricht: the EU once more plays a key role at international level and this is acknowledged by the United States and international organisations such as the UN and NATO. The crisis of the latter organisation in particular is becoming increasingly apparent. NATO was founded as a union of States against a common enemy, originally the USSR. NATO was kept alive over the years, even after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, by becoming the Western nations' instrument of action in the event of international crises. In reality, NATO has always been the primary military instrument of the European Union and the United States<sup>157</sup>, or rather, of the European Union Member States and the United States. In fact the European countries continue to act individually, pretending that the EU does not exist, adopting inconsistent and even contradictory positions<sup>158</sup> within the two organisations. NATO has not always been willing or able to solve certain crises, reflecting of course the approach adopted by the US, so the EU has found itself to be the only mediator available, frequently proving more efficient and capable than the North Atlantic Alliance.

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<sup>157</sup> *The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy* – October 2009

<sup>158</sup> *The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy* – October 2009



The gradual "decline" of NATO simply goes to show how EU defence policy has improved, but now we must find new allies beyond our borders because "the future will be dominated by large, strategic players" and if the Union wishes to safeguard its interests and not be pulled apart, it must begin to act like a large, strategic player itself<sup>159</sup>.

The EU is an international player in world politics, but still believes itself to be a set of states. The European Union must be convinced, must have a greater awareness of and confidence in itself and its means, and must start acting like a real power because that is what it is and what others expect of it. The recent Libyan crisis revealed another rift in the EU. France and the United Kingdom initially acted individually, probably thinking and knowing that the Union would never have voted unanimously for the mission. The EU still appeared divided in the eyes of the world, proving to be too young and inexperienced, contrary to the indications in the Treaties. The EU has managed to evolve in such a way that it has always been able to face up to new challenges who have changed significantly since 1992. Until now the EU has been able to develop a system allowing it to intervene and deal with any kind of situation. We only have to look today at how the Petersberg Tasks have changed since the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The "not so young" EU must now understand, must begin to think and act like one of the wise men among the world powers, must be a model providing inspiration for other emerging powers. It is precisely for this reason that we must intensify relations with the new "big players" that are emerging, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (known as the BRICS), because with them we will build tomorrow's world.

### **3. Conclusion**

The EU will be the living proof that collaboration, the union of several states with different cultures, ethnicities and religions, is possible even in the field of defence. This is the main reason why the emergence of a great new European Union, united on all fronts, is crucial for us and, above all, for the whole world. It is totally wrong to say that the road to the creation of this Union, and hence a Common Defence and Security Policy, is still a long and winding one. The road has been traced out, the imprint is discernible, but now it is time to make our move and tread firmly on the path at last. We certainly must take some important steps, and there are times when we may ask ourselves if it is really worth the effort and if we really need to do this, or we may wonder what we are doing. If, however, instead of looking to the past we start to look at the present and imagine the future, we will see that it is the most appropriate – and the only – way forward. The Member States, the European Union and the whole world need a strong and determined Union in the field of common security and defence, and this, I believe, is the only way to achieve it.

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<sup>159</sup> *The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy* – October 2009

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*Energy and Energy Security -  
can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security  
culture?*



Spain, June 2012

## **List of acronyms**

<b>CCASG:</b>	Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
<b>EC:</b>	European Commission
<b>ENP:</b>	European Neighbourhood Policy
<b>EU:</b>	European Union
<b>IEEE:</b>	Spanish Strategic Studies Institute (Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos)
<b>INOGATE:</b>	INterstate Oil and GAs Transportation to Europe
<b>IFRI:</b>	Institut Français des Relations Internationales
<b>SET-Plan:</b>	Strategic Energy Technology Plan
<b>SSER:</b>	Second Strategy Energy Review
<b>REACCESS:</b>	<i>Risk of Energy Availability: Common Corridors for Europe Supply Securit</i>

## European energy dependence

Energy plays a key role in the construction of an international strategic background, and is of immeasurable importance for guaranteeing human survival and economic development worldwide, incidentally enabling the Welfare State to be maintained.

However, economic growth usually implies higher demand for energy resources, mainly gas and oil required for the functioning of heating and transport systems as well as for industrial production, for example. From my point of view, this forces us to abandon, in some respects, the idea of its reduction and highlights the importance of analysing our own demand.

The lack of these resources inside the EU obliges us to acquire them beyond our borders<sup>160</sup>. They are geographically localized in certain regions, such as Siberia, the Middle East or the Caspian. This obviously brings a number of benefits for their owners and very few for the EU. Excessive external dependency could involve serious problems not only for European economic development, but also for the credibility of our democratic values, due to the signing of various agreements with authoritarian governments in recent years.

The vulnerability of energy supply is basically linked to fossil resources and to the needs of dependent countries, which are affected by international political changes and increases in their price. This resource dependency is not likely to decrease in the coming years unless we urgently change our way of thinking.

Luckily, the EU is making great efforts on this issue by investing in renewable energy development and in energy efficiency measures in order to preserve a secure and sustainable energy supply.

However, some questions remain: Will these efforts be effective in the short term? What can the EU really do to preserve or even increase its Energy Security?

### **What is Energy Security? What are its objectives?**

Economic development requires governability which in turn requires security. This security not only implies a capable force to dissuade any possible attack on any of the member states, but also the assurance that we will dispose of the strategic resources necessary for our maintenance and development. This is, in short, Energy Security.

Energy security is at the highest level of the European political agenda and it has become one of the most fundamental areas where the EU must exert its power.

Against this background, the EU decided to implement the *Strategic Energy Technology Plan* (SET-Plan) in Nov. 2007 (in some respects this was a document very closely related to the previous *Green Paper* by the EC). This plan entails the development and deployment of cost-effective

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<sup>160</sup> "The EU currently covers more than 50% of its energy needs through imports. In this situation, 45% of oil imports come from Middle East, while 40% of gas supply comes from Russia" EUFOCUS. "La UE y la Seguridad Energética", November 2009, p.1, [eurunion.org/espanol/EUFocusEsp/EUFocus-Energy-Esp-11-09.pdf](http://eurunion.org/espanol/EUFocusEsp/EUFocus-Energy-Esp-11-09.pdf)

technologies and renewable energies.<sup>161</sup> It also sets a deadline in 2020 for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

A year later, in the Second *Strategic Energy Review* (SSER), the European Commission proposed the establishment of an *Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan* to overcome the challenges Europe will face in the coming decades. This document was the declaration of the European Union's intent to achieve sustainability, competitiveness and security of energy supply. We can fairly say this was a milestone document, since it also sets the guidelines for the European strategy for Energy Security, which we will comment on.

But it was in the Treaty of Lisbon, in 2010, that energy was endowed with a new legal basis which definitely placed it at the core of European activity. Art. 4 determines the areas where shared competence will be established between the EU and member states, clearly marking a milestone for the development of a common energy policy. And in Title XXI, solidarity among member states is mentioned as a fundamental pillar in this area.

Only time will say if these efforts will bear fruit in the long term. Indeed, when some lines above we asked this, we already knew the answer, and so European leaders do. This is the reason why Energy Security has become key. Troubles are seen on the horizon and they are approaching us fast, prompting us to seek some shorter-term solutions. Although unanimity has not been reached, the truth is that the importance of this issue will put solidarity among member states under test in the years ahead.

In order to guarantee its Energy Security, the EU has established some lines of action, brought together in the SSER through a five-point EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan. These are:

- the improvement of interconnection infrastructures and the diversification of energy supplies;
- external relationships;
- fossil resources stocks and solidarity mechanisms among member states for crisis situations;
- energy efficiency measures;
- internal energy resources development.

As one can see, some of the points were already contained in the SET-Plan, and this emphasizes their importance not only over the long term, but also within a short timeframe.

These five points are highly interrelated too, since effective diversification implies cordial external relationships with several international actors not belonging to the EU. On the other hand, solidarity mechanisms cannot be reserved just for crisis situations but are required for permanent and effective collaboration among member states. These solidarity mechanisms, therefore, would increase mutual reliance in the EU, stimulating closer partnerships and favouring the development

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<sup>161</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/technology/set\\_plan/set\\_plan\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/technology/set_plan/set_plan_en.htm)

and exploitation of these interconnection facilities, improved efficiency measures and EU energy resources.

Currently, the EU, mainly through the European Commission (EC), is involved in an ambitious policy of initiatives and projects to attain these goals:

### **Diversification of energy supplies**

Sometimes a mismatch between producing and importing countries occurs, giving rise to tensions that influence changes in the energy context and jeopardise Energy Security.

In 2006 and 2009, a lack of understanding between the main Russian and Ukrainian energy supply corporations brought energy supply issues to the fore in some European countries, such as Italy and Hungary. This situation highlighted Europe's vulnerability and gave considerable impetus to the building of a new strategy to preserve the EU's interests.

All this made it vital to achieve a higher level of fuel diversification, obtain new supply sources and establish alternative transit nets. By these means, external dependency will be reduced and the EU will be capable of ensuring uninterrupted energy supply.

To achieve this, investments in exporting countries must be made, not only to create appropriate transportation facilities, but also to promote the EU's democratic values and stable governments.

But first of all it was necessary to define energy corridors that connected the main transit and supply areas with the EU. Defining them allowed us to reinforce and establish interconnections and make infrastructure investments. These corridors have been identified in various documents, such as the REACCESS project report (*Risk of Energy Availability: Common Corridors for Europe Supply Security*).

Although they can just be identified as just gas corridors, the truth is that some of them take advantage of their infrastructure and the already existing interconnection network for the transportation of other energy resources, such as oil or liquid hydrogen, making it possible to talk about "Energy Corridors" and not just "Gas Corridors". The main corridors are:

1. the Intra-European corridor, originating in Norway and the North Sea
2. the Russian corridor, through Turkey and Northern and Central Europe
3. the Central Asia corridor, through Turkey and Russia
4. the Middle East corridor, from the Persian Gulf through Turkey and the Mediterranean or, alternatively, around Africa
5. the Northern African corridor, mainly from the Maghreb and Egypt to Spain and Italy through the Mediterranean
6. the Atlantic corridor, originating in Western Africa.



These corridors host several oil and gas pipelines that provide primary energy to Europe. Most of the oil pipelines come from Russia and enter the EU through Poland and Slovakia, after crossing Belarus and Ukraine. Concentrating such a quantity of oil supply in one area evidently endangers our Energy Security, as has been mentioned above. That is the reason why alternative routes have been sought. Romania holds a bypass oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea, enabling Europe to ensure part of its oil supply in the event that a misunderstanding between Russia and Ukraine arose again. However, most of the oil comes from the Middle East by ship and is delivered to the main European ports. The EU should change this situation and achieve greater diversification with regard to oil. Strong efforts are being made, but to a large extent these solutions are currently unfeasible. Nevertheless, we will briefly analyze, below, possible oil distributors and their capacity to provide a reliable supply.

The situation is different with regard to gas. In this respect, the EU has done a good job and considerable diversification has been achieved, but there is still a long way to go. Although some of them are still projects, the main gas pipelines are or will be the following:

1. *Nord Stream*, linking Russia directly to Germany across the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and Belarus.
2. *South Stream*,
3. *Medgaz*, from Algeria to Spain. It also supplies gas to some central European countries, such as France.
4. *Galsi*, from Algeria to Italy. It only provides gas to Italy so we cannot really say this pipeline has the effect of increasing European Energy Security in general.
5. *Nabucco*. It is probably the most ambitious project, and represents the bridge between Asia and Europe. Nabucco links Eastern Turkey to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.<sup>162</sup> This strategic pipeline enables the EU to diversify its imports and reduce dependence on Russia.

Nevertheless, a new and important source of gas has recently been found in the Cypriot and Israeli exclusive economic zones. Its exploitation may substantially alter the energy and geopolitical map of the region, and reduce dependence on Caspian and Siberian oil. According to the last point laid down by the EC in the Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, the EU will see how its own internal energy resources are developed. On May 26 this year, a conference on EU Energy Security of Supply was held in Crete. In this conference a pipeline to carry gas from the Eastern Mediterranean was proposed<sup>163</sup>. Cyprus thus becomes a key player enhancing European Energy Security by supplying gas to the rest of the EU through Greek territory.

We have already mentioned the main European energy corridors focusing on oil and gas resources and their principal supply routes. This does not mean that these are the only resources the EU imports, but they are truly the most important with regard to Energy Security.

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<sup>162</sup> [http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/Home/the\\_project](http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/Home/the_project)

<sup>163</sup> <http://www.neurope.eu/blog/greece-cyprus-israel-redefine-southern-gas-corridor>

## **Diversification possibilities**

The EU must diversify its supply sources in order to ensure Energy Security. In recent years this aim has been achieved to a large degree, but there are still some other regions which are able to provide these resources. It is worth commenting on some of them and on whether an agreement with the EU about these resources is feasible or not.

- *South America*, which contains productive hydrocarbons in certain areas, such as the Gulf of Mexico or the Andean area. However, instability in the region and recent measures adopted by some of its governments have made it evident that South America is not a reliable partner yet.
- *Africa*, to the North African suppliers we have to add Equatorial Guinea, in Western Africa. Equatorial Guinea possess an important oil industry with capacity comparable to that of Kuwait. Still, this state is under the dictatorship of one of the most repressive governments in the world, and any energy agreements with the EU could affect the Union's credibility and its external image.
- The *Middle East*, not just Turkey or Israel. Agreements between the EU and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) should be promoted, since this would make it possible to open a new energy corridor with some of our increasingly influential partners, China and India.
- The *Caspian and Caucasian regions* have a strategic position, as they allow a direct link between Russia and the EU. Since the energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2006, the EU has seen diversification as a very necessary measure to increase European Energy Security, but still a region such as this cannot be ignored when talking about energy. In this case, the EU started the INOGATE program, which promoted cooperation between the EU and some countries bordering the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. INOGATE encompasses electricity, renewable energies and energy efficiency but still focuses on gas and oil resources.

*Norway* is, thanks to its proximity (cultural and territorial), one of our most reliable suppliers. It is the second most important source of natural gas after Russia and the world's third largest exporter of oil and gas after Saudi Arabia and Russia.

## **Interconnection infrastructures**

Nevertheless, the success of this diversification needs to be consolidated before carrying on with it. It strongly depends on the development of suitable interconnection infrastructures that allow a fluid and uninterrupted supply of energy resources. In this respect the EU still faces some obstacles and challenges, the most important one of which is, probably, restructuring the European market. Infrastructure investments will not only contribute to continuous supply of energy, but also to a free choice of suppliers.

These investments need to be made in all the segments of the energy chain, not only in internal and external transportation, but also in exploration, development, downstream infrastructure, and resource exploitation infrastructure.

Nowadays, new GNL terminals are being built to improve transportation networks between Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Holland. Nonetheless there are some EU regions that are becoming more and more "energy isolated". Together with Greece, Cyprus has recently drawn the EU's attention to this issue after the discovery of gas resources in its economic area. At the moment, one can say that Cyprus is one of these "energy isolated" regions, but undoubtedly considerable investment will be made to build the necessary infrastructure to link the island with the rest of the EU.

One can find another example in other Mediterranean countries. The mountainous terrain of Spain and Greece makes it difficult to establish very good infrastructure connections with the rest of Europe. Their strategic positions and vicinity to some of the most important EU suppliers make these countries perfect energy distribution centres for the rest of the EU. This makes it more than advisable to achieve perfect integration between their energy systems and those of their neighbours, and it is a clear example of how important interconnection is for effective energy diversification. Luckily both countries are making progress in this field and, in the case of Spain, pipeline capacity to France has been doubled, which is an important step.

Since private energy companies will mainly provide these investments, an appropriate investment environment needs to be created. Together with economic considerations, this implies the possibility of developing partnerships and a stable environment, among other things.

Interconnection infrastructures will be useless if an efficient Energy Policy does not support them. The EU is attaining these goals, but some states' reluctance still indicates a very high degree of protectionism in matters of energy, which hinders the opening-up of the market and the common policy of free competition.

However infrastructures are not just an internal issue and, as we said before, there is a need to invest in exporting countries. With this aim, the EC has launched some initiatives to increase Energy Security involving non-member states. In this connection, I would like to highlight the "Mediterranean Ring" as part of the TEN-E program to improve gas and electricity interconnections. This ring would allow energy systems in the Southern Mediterranean to link their supply networks, extending the interconnection concept beyond our borders.

This is not the only one, as there is a large number of plans and initiatives. One could also cite EUROMED (2007) or the Mediterranean Solar Plan (2008). We have also mentioned above how the five points in the SSER were interrelated. Diversification requires subsequent interrelation, and at the same time the latter depends on good external relationships. That is the reason why most of the interconnection plans involve non-member states. The European *Neighborhood Policy* (ENP) aims to improve and strengthen relationships between the EU and other countries, while other plans, such as the *Baku Initiative*, seek to develop energy markets in the Caspian States to

enhance the establishment of new infrastructures and to progress towards a gradual integration between the respective energy markets and the EU market.<sup>164</sup>

### **Can energy and Energy Security act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European Security culture?**

Until now we have been talking about the main targets the EU must achieve to guarantee its Energy Security, together with its possibilities to face this challenge; and we have also commented on the current policy and some initiatives that guide the EU's strategy.

The aims are clear, the energy policy is clear, but there is one problem left. This is member states' will to really integrate their energy systems into a European Common Energy system. Energy suppliers for Europe are relatively easy to secure - this is not the most difficult obstacle the EU has to overcome. But integrating national energy systems and adopting common energy efficiency and solidarity measures is a different matter.

Although this reluctance is decreasing, member states still attach greater value to guaranteeing national supply than to Community interests and, obviously, they prefer to follow their own lines of action. This is understandable, but member states should not see this integration as a loss of their sovereignty, but as a great opportunity to expand their international markets at the same time as ensuring energy supply. This difficulty has just one solution: the implementation and application of a legal basis that provides the EU with the necessary tools to make some national governments participate actively in a common energy structure so that member states are bound to the strategy supported by the Commission.

It is imperative for the EU jointly to develop its energy relationships with other countries. But these efforts have to be coordinated, and bilateral agreements between some member states and their suppliers need to be avoided

Following a common strategy and achieving an integrated system with adequate infrastructures will not be enough to persuade all member states if it does not ensure national supply and energy interests around the world. In April 2012, the majority of European energy companies engaged in the exploitation of fossil resources were expropriated in certain Latin-American countries. The European response to these actions was limited to a weak and verbal condemnation of these countries. This called in question the EU's capacity to protect its international investments and external infrastructures. It also caused mistrust among some member states as regards energy integration.

Moreover, some intra-European disputes occurred between member states due to the Russian government's pressure directed against the Nabucco pipeline. This may be seen as anecdotal, but it clearly reflects how national interests still take precedence on this issue.

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<sup>164</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy\\_transport/international/regional/caspian/energy\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caspian/energy_en.htm)

## Conclusions

Although some of them have already been commented on in the central part of the paper, some brief main conclusions must be drawn from the analysis.

In short, the EU counts on a high level of energy diversification to guarantee its energy supply. Although this paper has not emphasized the role of renewable energies, the truth is that they are one of the best choices, together with nuclear energy, to reduce external dependence. Energy agreements with dictatorships should also be avoided even if they are very advantageous. Credibility and coherence are, probably, the most important values for the EU.

National interests with regard to energy issues are the main obstacle to ensuring the effective interconnection and integration of the different energy systems. But I personally think that the EC is achieving progress in this respect, and that, step by step, successful interconnection can be achieved.

Nevertheless, tough measures and unanimous condemnation must be applied against those countries attacking European energy companies, as a true solidarity mechanism between member states and as lesson that the EU is, indeed, a union. Undoubtedly this will also promote investments by other European companies beyond our borders, which is a necessary condition for greater diversification.

Energy is now a fundamental sector for any country's security; and energy infrastructures, such as pipelines or power stations, have become a priority target for terrorist attacks. Evidently, it is physically impossible to cover, and protect from sabotage and attacks, all energy infrastructures. We are talking about thousands of kilometers for a pipeline, hundreds of airports and ports, etc. However this could be a perfect opportunity to achieve closer relations between member states' armed forces by carrying out combined missions to assure European energy security, not only inside our borders, but also beyond them.

Finally, I would like to bring together in bullet-point form these key conclusions extracted from the analysis in the paper. These are:

- The development of renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency measures to reduce our external dependence.
- Energy agreements with dictatorships should also be avoided even if they are advantageous.
- The development of legal tools to make some states' governments comply with the common strategy and policy adopted by the EC.
- Strongly supporting European energy companies around the world, actively condemning attacks against these corporations.

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## 4. ANNEXES





## ANNEX I: THE 10 BEST PAPERS

**1<sup>st</sup> Patrignani Andrea**, *The European Armaments co-operation Strategy, an instrument to strengthen 1<sup>st</sup> the Member States co-operation and to enhance standardization within the European Armed Forces*

**2<sup>nd</sup> Jackers Evi**, *Climate change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?*

**3<sup>rd</sup> Van Hoecke Thomas**, *Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?*

**4<sup>th</sup> Haubner Stefan**, *A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like*

**5<sup>th</sup> Petrosino Mario**, *Climate Change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?*

**6<sup>th</sup> Mammeri Lucas**, *CSDP and public opinion: how to improve society's support to CSDP?"*

**7<sup>th</sup> Evgenios Georgios**, *Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?*

**8<sup>th</sup> Engleitner Martin**, *Working with partners in CSDP. Who are our strategic partners, why would they want to engage and how can they contribute to CSDP missions and operations*

**9<sup>th</sup> Tessarotto Antonio**, *A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like?*

**10<sup>th</sup> Lozano Jimenez Francisco Javier**, *Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?<sup>165</sup>*



Head of ESDC congratulating the Italian winner of the Paper writing competition

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<sup>165</sup> The paper was only evaluated for its content by the jury committee and not in the final presentation.

## ANNEX II: 1st CSDP OLYMPIAD WINNER

Van Hoecke Thomas from the Royal Military Academy of Brussels



### **ANNEX III: LIST OF THE CONTRIBUTORS**

**Director:** Major (AF) Symeon Zambas

**Internet Distance Learning Manager:** Mr Jochen Rehl

**Papers Evaluation Team:**

Mr Hans Bernhard Weisserth, Ms Pavlina Gorenc, Mrs Valentina Reynoso, Mr Dirk Dubois, Dr Harald Gell, Mr. Karl-Heinz Wiedner ,Mr Sylvain Paile, Dr Sven Biscop, Dr Jochen Rehl and Mr Symeon Zambas.

**Final Competition Jury:**

Mr. Karl-Heinz Wiedner, Mr Dirk Dubois, Mr Sylvain Paile.

**Residential phase:** Christoforos Christoforou, Constantia Elia, Sofia Georgiou

**Implementation Group Members present to the residential phase:**

Mr Aleksander Skrzypek, Mr Cesare Ciocca, Mr Georgios Chrysochou, Mr Georgios Chasanakos, Mr Davide Ciocca, Mr Dubois Dirk, Mr Giordano Ciccarelli, Mr Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, Dr Harald Gell, Mr Joemaa Meelis, Mr Karl-Heinz Wiedner, Ms Sabrina Guyot, Mr Sylvain Paile, Mr Symeon Zambas, Ms Virpi Levomaa, and Ms Zdislava Ernestova.

**Sponsors**

Cyprus Federation of America financed the 2 winners' awards

France offered the award to the third winner.

## ANNEX IV: FACT SHEET



DEFENCE POLICY AND  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT  
NICOSIA, 1432

### Common Module "CSDP OLYMPIAD"

#### Fact Sheet

#### Aim of the module

The main goal of the “**CSDP OLYMPIAD**” common module is to acquaint our cadets with the basic knowledge on CSDP providing them with the incentive to study accordingly, in order to write a paper on CSDP, which is going to be published and circulated within the relevant EU Institutions and stakeholders, and to compete with cadets of other Member States in a CSDP knowledge Competition.

This module enables cadets to discover and understand:

- The history of the European security and defence co-operation and the development of CSDP, within the larger context of European integration.
- The context in which the European Security Strategy was elaborated, the strategy’s basic content, messages, role and its wide implications for the EU.
- The role played in the field of CFSP/ CSDP by the relevant EU Institutions (European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and European Parliament) and the inter-institutional mechanisms involved, with a brief insight on the financing of CSDP.
- How the Common Security and Defence Policy is implemented - in the larger context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - through concrete operational engagements, with emphasis on the policy decision-making for operations/ missions.

Moreover, it gives cadets the opportunity to express their personal views drafting a relevant paper and the opportunity to meet, cooperate and compete with cadets from other EU Member States.

#### 2. Content of the module

The “**CSDP OLYMPIAD**” module consists of three parts:

- an Internet – based Distance Learning Course “IDL”,
- drafting and submitting a paper on a CSDP-related topic and

- a residential Pan-European Competition.
- **CSDP IDL** consisting of 4 Autonomous Knowledge Units (AKUs)
  - AKU1 “History and Context of ESDP”
  - AKU2 “European Security Strategy”
  - AKU3 “Role of EU Institutions in the field of CFSP/ CSDP”
  - AKU4 "Overview of CSDP Operational Engagements"
- **Paper** consisting of 3000-4000 words with a relevant CSDP title.
- **CSDP Knowledge Competition**

Cadets are going to be divided into teams. Best effort will be made so as each team comprises of cadets coming from different States in order to promote the spirit of solidarity, cooperation, and mutual understanding.

25 multiple choice questions will be drawn up based on the context of the IDL, the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers Initiative and the recent developments on CSDP.

The best team’s Cadets will then compete again on an individual basis on a 15 multiple choice questions paper.

The whole team and the individual will be awarded.

3. **Language: English** (CEFR Level B2 required for participants)
4. European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS)  
Credits: 2
5. **Timetable for 2012**

Period	Activity	Info
02-16 March	Registration	
19 -30 March	IDL	
30 March-18 June	Paper writing	3,000-4,000 words
19 June-02 October	Competition preparation and team networking	The participants will be informed about the members of their competition team
03 – 05 October	Paper Presentation and Knowledge Competition	This part will be hosted in Cyprus

6. **Material**

- <http://www.emilyo.eu/>
- [http://www.miles.ac.at/campus/iep/IDL\\_modul\\_j.php](http://www.miles.ac.at/campus/iep/IDL_modul_j.php)

## ANNEX V: INVITATION



REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

Ministry of Defence



### **Invitation to the Common Module «CSDP OLYMPIAD» 27 February – 05 October 2012**

Residential phase taking place in Cyprus, 3rd – 5th October 2012

Nicosia, 02 February 2012

The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus, supported by the ESDC Secretariat, has the honour of hosting the first “CSDP OLYMPIAD” within the framework of the European Initiative on the Exchange of Young Officers, modelled on Erasmus.

The main goal of the “CSDP OLYMPIAD” common module is to acquaint our cadets with the basic knowledge on CSDP, providing them with the incentive to acquire the necessary knowledge, in order to draw up a paper on a CSDP - related issue, which in turn will be published and circulated within the relevant EU Institutions and stakeholders. In addition, they will be provided with the opportunity to compete with their fellow cadets from other Member States in a CSDP knowledge Competition.

The “**CSDP OLYMPIAD**” module consists of three main parts:

- an Internet – based Distance Learning Course “IDL”,
- drafting and submitting a paper on a CSDP -related topic and
- a residential European Competition (3 to 5 October in Cyprus).

It is our great pleasure to invite you to participate in this Common Module with up to 4 cadets.

Please also be informed that all expenses concerning the accommodation of cadets during the residential phase will be covered by the Cyprus Ministry of

Defence. However the travel costs will remain the responsibility of the participating Member States.

Attached to this letter you will find details concerning the content of the "CSDP OLYMPIAD", an indicative program and the registration process.

We would encourage the use of the administrative 'Framework regarding the European Initiative on the Exchange of Young Officers, modelled on Erasmus' (ESDC SC Decision 10-1). Additional administrative and other details will be sent to the participants in due time.

Lt. Col. George Georgiou  
Defence Policy Director

## ANNEX VI: COVER PAGE COMPETITION GUIDELINES



### "CSDP OLYMPIAD" Cover Page Designing Competition

In the context of the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad, the Cyprus Ministry of Defence will publish the papers of the participants within a special edition. In this framework, we would like to announce a competition among the 47 participants, concerning the cover page of the special edition. The title of the edition will be "The 1<sup>st</sup> Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad"

The registered cadets wishing to participate should send their proposals to [othellos4@cytanet.com.cy](mailto:othellos4@cytanet.com.cy) until the 31<sup>st</sup> of May 2012 as an attachment, in the following format: JPEG or PNG and high quality PDF (for printing).

Each design as such and its components, such as photos, should be free of any copyright. The Cyprus Ministry of Defence reserves the right to print, publish and display the proposals in grey scale or colour.

The designs have to be in A4 paper size and include the Cyprus Presidency and ESDC logos. A judging Committee will evaluate the proposals submitted and consequently choose the best 10. Thereinafter, they will be posted on the website: <http://www.emilyo.eu/>, and upon a voting procedure, the three best proposals will be awarded with commemorative plaques from the Ministry of Defence, during the residential phase of the CSDP Olympiad (3<sup>rd</sup> to 5<sup>th</sup> of October 2012).





















The best proposal will be used for the cover of the publication in question. Moreover, the personal details of the cadet (name and surname), with the proposal that wins first place, will be included in the book to be published. In addition, the 10 best proposals will be included in an exhibition to be organized during the Informal Meeting of Defence Ministers, on the 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> of September 2012 in Nicosia.









For any further information, interested parties may address queries to Major (AF) Symeon Zambas at the Cyprus Ministry of Defence.



## ANNEX VII: 1ST CSDP OLYMPIAD PARTICIPANTS' PAPER TITLES

A/A	COU- NTRY	INSTITUTION	NAME	
1	AT 	Theresan Military Academy	Praus Gustav	Climate change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?
2	AT 	Theresan Military Academy	Haubner Stefan	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like
3	AT 	Theresan Military Academy	Engleitner Martin	Working with partners in CSDP. Who are our strategic partners, why would they want to engage and how can they contribute to CSDP missions and operations
4	AT 	Theresan Military Academy	Korocz Wolfgang	"Mutual assistance" (Article 42.7 TEU), "solidarity" (Article 222 TFEU) or the Petersberg tasks: what is the real task of the European armed forces?"
5	BE 	Belgian Military Academy	Van Hoecke Thomas	Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?
6	BE 	Belgian Military Academy	Jackers Evi	Climate change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?
7	BE 	Belgian Military Academy	Derwael Simon	Climate change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?
8	BE 	Belgian Military Academy	Cornet Nicolas	"Mutual assistance" (Article 42.7 TEU), "solidarity" (Article 222 TFEU) or the Petersberg tasks: what is the real task of the European armed forces?
9	BG 	"Vasil Levski " MNU	Penev Penyo	CSDP (civilian) missions and (military) operations: what are the driving factors between past and future engagements?
10	BG 	"Vasil Levski " MNU	Stefanov Viktor	The protection of EU core values (human rights, child protection, gender,...) in operations: a strength or a necessary evil?
11	BG 	Ministry of Interior	Zhelyazkov Georgi	The milestones of CSDP from a national perspective. What lessons can we draw for the future?
12	BG 	Ministry of Interior	Dimitrov Todor	The protection of EU core values (human rights, child protection, gender,...) in operations: a strength or a necessary evil?
13	CY 	Hellenic Naval Academy	Iosif Elena	Energy and Energy Security : can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?
14	CY 	Hellenic Air Force Academy	Pilakoutas Elias	CSDP and public opinion: how to improve society's support to CSDP ?
15	CY 	Hellenic Academy	Alexandrou Georgios	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like?
16	CY 	Hellenic Army Academy	Neokleous Georgios	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like?
17	EE 	Estonian National Defence College	Klettenberg Taniel	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like?
18	EE 	Estonian National Defence College	Muuli Kristijan	Climate change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?
19	EE 	Estonian National Defence College	Nolvak Oliwer	Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?
20	FI 	National Defence University	Pankasalo Jukka Petteri	The milestones of CSDP from a national perspective. What lessons can we draw for the future?

A/A	COU- NTRY	INSTITUTION	NAME	
21	FI 	National Defence University	Vainikka Jussi Pietari	Working with partners in CSDP. Who are our strategic partners, why would they want to engage and how can they contribute to CSDP missions and operations
22	FI 	National Defence University	Paloheimo Aito Juhana	CSDP (civilian) missions and (military) operations: what are the driving factors between past and future engagements
23	FI 	National Defence University	Oinasmaa Juuso Jesperi	The protection of EU core values (human rights, child protection, gender,...) in operations: a strength or a necessary evil?
24	FR 	French Air Force Academy	Mammeri Lucas	CSDP and public opinion: how to improve society's support to CSDP ?"
25	FR 	Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coerquidan	Colin Stanislas	The protection of EU core values (human rights, child protection, gender,...) in operations: a strength or a necessary evil?
26	FR 	Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coerquidan	Abdallah Giillaume	What can a young officer contribute in the field of CSDP?
27	GR 	Hellenic Naval Academy	Papaioannou Achellefs	Transnational organized crime. Is it a significant risk for EU?
28	GR 	Hellenic Naval Academy	Bounaki Aikaterini	EU strategic contest with the BRIC (Brazil -Russia -India- China)
29	GR 	Hellenic Air Force Academy	Chrysanidis Georgios	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like?
30	GR 	Hellenic Army Academy	Evgenios Georgios	<i>Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?"</i>
31	IT 	Italian Air Force Academy	Sommariva Allesandro	CSDP (civilian) missions and (military) operations: what are the driving factors between past and future engagements
32	IT 	Scuola di Applicazione e Istituto Studi Militari dell' Esercito	Patrignani Andrea	The European Armaments co-operation Strategy, an instrument to strengthen the Member States co-operation and to enhance standardization within the European Armed Forces
33	IT 	Carambinieri	Petrosino Mario	Working with partners in CSDP. Who are our strategic partners, why would they want to engage and how can they contribute to CSDP missions and operations
34	IT 	Italian Navy Academy Ensign	Tessarotto Antonio	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like?
35	LT 	General Jonas Zemaitis Lithuanian Military Academy	Jackevisius Arnoldas	Cyber Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?
36	LT 	The General Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy of Lithuanian	Gasperavisiu s Andrius	CSDP as a small power
37	PL 	Military University of Techology	Rutkowski Arkadiusz	Mutual assistance" (Article 42.7 TEU), "solidarity" (Article 222 TFEU) or the Petersberg tasks: what is the real task of the European armed forces?
38	PL 	The Polish Air Force Academy	Ludwizal Karolina	The protection of EU core values (human rights, child protection, gender,...) in operations: a strength or a necessary evil?
39	PL 	Wyzsza Szkola Oficerska Wojsk Laddowych	Fedorowicz Michal	CSDP (civilian) missions and (military) operations: what are the driving factors between past and future engagements
40	PL 	Polish Naval Academy	Jagus Lukasz	Mutual assistance" (Article 42.7 TEU), "solidarity" (Article 222 TFEU) or the Petersberg tasks: what is the real task of the European armed forces

A/A	COU- NTRY	INSTITUTION	NAME	
41	RO 	Romanian Naval Academy	Mihaita Catalin	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like?
42	RO 	Romanian Naval Academy	Cernat Ioan Victor	Mutual assistance" (Article 42.7 TEU), "solidarity" (Article 222 TFEU) or the Petersberg tasks: what is the real task of the European armed forces?
43	RO 	Nikolae Balcescu Land Forces	Vacaru Gheorghe Gabriel	Climate change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?".
44	RO 	Land Forces Academy	Ciulei Nikoleta-Loredana	The protection of EU core values (human rights, child protection, gender,...) in operations: a strength or a necessary evil?
45	ES 	Spanish Air Forces Academy	Perez Serrano Fernando	What can a young officer contribute in the field of CSDP?
46	ES 	Spanish Naval Academy	Garcia Cardo Luis	The milestones of CSDP from a national perspective. What lessons can we draw for the future?
47	ES 	Spanish Academie Army	Notario Luna Juan Jesus	CSDP (civilian) missions and (military) operations: what are the driving factors between past and future engagements
48	ES 	Spanish Army Academy	Lozanpo Jimenez Francisco Javier	Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?

## ANNEX VIII: PAPER WRITING GUIDELINES



REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

Ministry of Defence

### **European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus**

#### **CSDP Olympiad**

#### **Guidance for drafting and submitting a paper**

##### **Aim**

This part of the CSDP Olympiad aims at improving the basic knowledge of cadets on CSDP by providing them with the incentive to study a specific aspect of CSDP in more detail, through the elaboration and submission of approximately 3000 words paper. To provide extra motivation, all accepted papers will be collected and published in printing after the competition. The authors of the 10 best papers will get the opportunity to present their paper to their peers and to a jury, during the residential phase in Cyprus. The winner of this phase will be awarded.

##### **Timeline**

##### **Choice of the title**

The participants will choose a topic in the list in Annex 1 and will inform the ESDC Secretariat of the topic that they choose no later than 04 May by e-mail ([secretariat-esdc@eeas.europa.eu](mailto:secretariat-esdc@eeas.europa.eu)). The Secretariat will confirm the receipt of the title.

Participants can, with the approval of their national Point of Contact, also suggest a title of their own choice, as long as it is related to CSDP/CFSP and allows the participant to express an informed opinion on the chosen topic. The title should be proposed to the ESDC Secretariat by the deadline mentioned above. The Secretariat will confirm whether the title is acceptable or not.

Participants that do not indicate a topic of choice by the 04 May, will be attributed a subject by the ESDC Secretariat.

There is no appeal possible against the decisions of the ESDC Secretariat concerning the choice of subjects.

### **Drafting of the paper**

The drafting of the paper can start as soon as the participant has chosen a title from the list or as soon as the suggested subject has been agreed by the ESDC Secretariat.

### **Submission of the paper**

All papers must be submitted to the ESDC Secretariat NLT 29 June by e-mail. The ESDC Secretariat will confirm the receipt of the paper. Papers arriving after the 29 June will not be eligible for the competition, unless the participant provides written proof that the document has been sent on time.

### **Grading**

All papers will be graded by a team consisting of national and EU level specialists between 29 June and 31 August. Each admitted paper shall be graded by two persons. The final score will be the average of the two scores.

The participants will receive their scores at the latest on 01 September and at the same time will be informed if they are selected to present their paper during the residential phase.

### **Guidance for the writing of the paper**

The paper will be submitted in unsecured Word or PDF document. The font to be used is Verdana 11 for the text body and Verdana 14 for titles. The name of the participant will be mentioned on the cover page only. To ensure the anonymity of the participants, the Secretariat will substitute the names of the participants with a random code before sending the paper to be graded. The Secretariat will remove any attempt to make a paper recognisable by any other means than by its content. Nevertheless, a paper will never be corrected by a specialist from the same Member State as the participant.

The paper will consist of the following elements

A cover page, mentioning the title of the paper centred in the middle of the page. The name of the participant will be mentioned in the top left corner. The Secretariat will replace the name with a confidential code.

Table of content

List of acronyms (if applicable)

List of figures (if applicable)

A logically structured text, of approximately 3000 words, containing the analysis of the title, the argumentation and the conclusion of the paper.

A bibliography (the participant will use national guidelines for his or her references)

The pages of the main of the body shall be numbered at the bottom of the page in the middle and in Arab numerals (1, 2, 3,...). All other pages shall be number in Roman numerals (I, II, III,...).

For the grading of the papers, the following elements will be taken into account.

Content will be of the highest importance. Elements that will be taken into account include a sound and thorough analysis of the topic, the originality of the expressed ideas, the formulation of a well-founded personal opinion that is both prospective and innovative.

Of course, we request a scientifically founded work, which means that you need to find different sources, refer to them correctly and systematically. The paper will contain a bibliography with a complete list of the reference material. The participant can use national guidelines for referencing, as long as it allows to find the original documents.

The form of the document, completeness, availability of list of content, list of acronyms,... will also be taken into account

To avoid preferential treatment of native speakers, the correct use of English will not be considered for the final score. However, if the ESDC Secretariat considers the level of English to be detrimental to the correct understanding of the paper, it will return the paper to the participant and the national point of contact.

### **Plagiarism**

In the case the Secretariat suspects plagiarism, the national points of contacts will be informed about the suspicion and together with the Secretariat will take a final decision. If plagiarism is considered proven, the work will be excluded from the competition and from the written publication. The appropriate disciplinary procedure will be started at national level, based on the provided evidence.

### **Oral presentation**

The 10 papers with the highest score will be eligible for an oral presentation during the residential phase in Cyprus. During the presentation, each participant will receive a score from the jury of experts and from the other participants. The final order will be based on the weighted average score of the written phase (50%), the score of the jury (25%) and the average score of the other participants (25%) for the oral presentation.

At the end of the presentations, the jury will announce who has obtained the highest core.

**CSDP Olympiad topics**

1. Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?
2. Climate change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?
3. What can a young officer contribute in the field of CSDP?
4. The milestones of CSDP from a national perspective. What lessons can we draw for the future?
5. A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and how should it look like?
6. "Mutual assistance" (Article 42.7 TEU), "solidarity" (Article 222 TFEU) or the Petersberg tasks: what is the real task of the European armed forces?
7. CSDP and public opinion: how to improve society's support to CSDP ?
8. Working with partners in CSDP. Who are our strategic partners, why would they want to engage and how can they contribute to CSDP missions and operations
9. CSDP (civilian) missions and (military) operations: what are the driving factors between past and future engagements
10. The protection of EU core values (human rights, child protection, gender,...) in operations: a strength or a necessary evil?

## ANNEX IX: INVITATION FOR THE RESIDENTIAL PART



June 13, 2012

Dear colleague,

It is a great pleasure for us to invite you to attend the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad residential phase that will take place in Pafos from 03 to 5 October 2012 in parallel with the 15<sup>th</sup> IG meeting.

The Opening Ceremony will take place on Wednesday 3<sup>rd</sup> of October at 17:15 to 18:30 at Pafos ancient Odeion at the presence of the Cyprus Ministry of Defence. A welcomed cocktail hosted by the Mayor of Pafos will follow.

We will continue the next morning, commencing at 9 am, at the Aqua Mare Hotel. Our first morning session will include the presentation of the best 10 papers giving us the opportunity to listen and realize for the first time the tangible results of our initiative.

At the afternoon we will visit the very interesting Kato Pafos Archaeological park which includes sites and monuments from prehistoric times to the Middle Ages, while most remains date to the Roman period. The marvellous mosaic floors of four Roman villas form the impressive epicentre of the finds. The complex includes other important monuments, such as the Asklepion, the Odeion, the Agora, Fortress, and the "Limeniotissa" Ruins of early Christian Basilica.

In the evening, we shall have a traditional dinner together at Kouklia village.

Friday morning the final Knowledge competition shall take place from 0900 to 1200 in parallel with the 15<sup>th</sup> IG meeting.

12.00 o' clock we will meet again with the cadets for the Award ceremony and the farewell lunch.

The number of the participants at the 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad/15<sup>th</sup> IG meeting excluded the participating cadets is limited to 2 persons per delegation.

Enclosed you will find the necessary administrative information. Attached also is a tentative program. The agenda of the IG meeting will distributed by the ESDC Secretariat.

We are looking forward to welcoming you in Cyprus.

Sincerely,

Symeon ZAMBAS



## ANNEX X: RESIDENTIAL PART PROGRAM



### **1<sup>ST</sup> CSDP OLYMPIAD Cyprus 03-05 October, 2012 Tentative Programme**

#### **Wednesday, October 03, 2012**

NLT 16.30	Arrival and check in at “Aqua Mare Hotel”, Kato Pafos (1h 30 min from Larnaca Airport, 20 min from Pafos Airport).
17.15 – 18.30	Opening Ceremony at Pafos ancient Odeion.
18.30 – 20.30	Welcome Cocktail hosted by the Mayor of Pafos

#### **Thursday, October 4, 2012**

09.00 – 09.20	General Information and procedures Major (AF) Symeon Zambas, ESDC Secretariat
09.20 – 9.40	Cyprus - General Information
09.40 – 10.00	Family photo
10.00 – 10.20	Paper Remarks Sylvain Paile, Dirk Dubois
10.20 – 11.10	Paper presentations (Cadets)
11.10 – 11.30	Break
11.30 – 13.10	Paper presentations (Cadets)
13.10 - 13.45	Evaluation/Voting
13.45 – 15.00	Lunch
16.00 – 18.00	Cultural visit part: Pafos Archaeological Park.
19.30 – 21.30	Traditional Dinner at Kouklia village

#### **Friday, October 05, 2012**

09.00 - 10.15	CSDP Knowledge competition Part I (teams of 6)
10.15 – 10.45	Coffee Break – Evaluation
10.45 – 11.30	CSDP Knowledge competition Part II (between the 6 members of the winner team and the paper writing winner)
11.30 – 12.00	Break – Evaluation
12.00 – 12.30	Award Ceremony and Certificate hand out by Cy ChoD, IG Chairman, ESDC Secretariat.
12.30 – 14.00	Farewell Lunch

## ANNEX XI: PRACTICAL INFORMATION



### 1<sup>st</sup> CSDP Olympiad 3<sup>rd</sup> - 5<sup>th</sup> October 2012 Practical Information

#### 1. REGISTRATION

You are kindly requested to register using the online accreditation system at: <https://delegations.cy2012.eu>, using the following login data:

**Username:**

**Password:**

The **deadline** for registration is **the 20<sup>th</sup> of September 2012**. As part of the registration process, you will also be requested to declare your stay at the Aqua Mare Hotel in Pafos, which has been selected by the Presidency for your pleasure and convenience. For security reasons, access to the meeting venues will only be permitted to participants who have completed the registration process via the online accreditation system.

Upon your arrival at the airport, all delegates will receive their non-transferable badge bearing their photograph. This will be used for the identification of delegates, and will also provide access to the designated areas, including the venues of the social events. Without this badge, access to these venues will not be permitted.

#### 2. TRANSPORT FROM/TO AIRPORT

The Cyprus Presidency will provide free transport from Larnaka and Pafos International Airports to the Aqua Mare Hotel, which has been designated for the accommodation of participating delegates. For this purpose, buses will depart from the airports at specified intervals.

At the airports, a Cyprus Presidency info point will be at the disposal of delegates. Upon arrival at Larnaka International Airport, please go to the Cyprus Presidency Info Point situated before passport control to collect your badge (as early as two days prior to the meeting). Wearing your accreditation badge will enable you to have free transport from the airport to the Aqua Mare Hotel. The meeting point for the free transport to the hotel is located close to the bus departure exit of the airport.

The Aqua Mare Hotel is located in Pafos, which is situated approximately 90 minutes driving distance from the Larnaca airport and 20 minutes from Pafos International Airport. Transportation will be provided by the Presidency throughout the entire duration of the visit.

Transportation to the Airports will be available as soon as the farewell Lunch on the last day of the meeting is concluded and on the following day.

If you would like to make your own travel arrangements you can use a taxi. Prices for taxis are approximately 100 euros for the Larnaka Airport – Pafos route and Pafos airport – Aqua Mare Hotel 35 euros. Please note that taxis with a sign bearing the Cyprus Presidency logo have recently passed a specific quality check (on top of the periodic technical test) from the Republic's Road Transport Department.

### **3. CADETS DRESS CODE**

Arrival and Departure: Civilian dress

Opening Ceremony/welcome Cocktail: Best Uniform

Other activities: Service Uniform

### **3. ACCOMMODATION /MEETING VENUE**

Please be informed, that the Cyprus Presidency will cover accommodation expenses (on a bed and breakfast basis) at the Aqua Mare hotel for two nights (3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> of October 2012) **only** for the participating cadets.

In this framework, cadets should indicate that they are “guests” during their registration, so that the Cyprus Presidency may proceed with the final booking arrangements on their behalf at the Aqua Mare Hotel. On completion of your booking you will receive a message with the reservation details. Please note that any arrangements for extending your stay cannot be made by the Cyprus Presidency, but should be made directly with the hotel. Other possible expenses (e.g. mini bar, phone calls, room service) will have to be borne by the guests and thus paid to the hotel directly, normally upon checkout. Please also be aware that the hotel has a smoke-free policy, whilst medical assistance will be available on a 24 hour basis.

Pafos, a small charming coastal town situated on the west of the island, possesses a history which goes back literally thousands of years, and has always attracted visitors from the rest of the island and abroad.

Pafos has been inhabited since the Neolithic period. It was the centre of the cult of Aphrodite and of pre-Hellenic fertility deities. Aphrodite's legendary birthplace was on this island, where her temple was erected by the Myceneans in the 12th century B.C. The remains of villas, palaces, theatres, fortresses and tombs mean that the site is of exceptional architectural and historical value.

The city of Pafos has a great variety of sights, tourist attractions and places of interest. With a population of just 28.000, Pafos nestles in the lee of the Western Troodos Mountains, which add another dimension to this area of scenic beauty. The recent addition of its own international airport nearby has opened up the Pafos area, and the resort is graced with several luxury hotels along the coastline. Pafos is entwined with Greek mythology, and the legendary birth of Aphrodite on her shores brought fame and worshippers there to follow the cult of the Goddess. Landmarks associated

with Aphrodite are the chunky, rugged rocks of her beautiful birth shore known as the Aphrodite Rocks or "Petra tou Romiou".

## **6. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT CYPRUS**

### **Languages**

Greek and Turkish are the official languages of the Republic of Cyprus. English is widely spoken.

### **Local Time**

Cyprus Time is GMT +2.

### **Climate & Weather**

The island's climate is characterized by hot summers and mild winters. By June, summer will have arrived in Cyprus. Temperatures continue to rise and reach their highest in July and August during which the average maximum temperatures range between 27°C and 36°C. However, in early October you should expect temperatures around 26 - 31°C.

### **What to wear**

Recommended clothes for October are light summer clothing for the day and light long - sleeve tops or shirts for the evening. Since it is still hot and very sunny do not forget about sun protection, such as hats, sunscreen and sunglasses as well as sun lotions.

### **Currency**

The currency of Cyprus is the Euro.

### **Currency Exchange**

All banks operating in Cyprus offer foreign currency exchange services and quote the exchange rates of the Euro against all major foreign currencies daily. Foreign currency can also be exchanged at hotels.

### **ATMs and Credit Cards**

All major banks in Cyprus have automatic teller machines (ATMs) in most towns and in the majority of the large villages. All major credit cards are accepted almost everywhere.

### **Electricity supply**

The electricity supply in Cyprus is 230 volts, a.c. 50 Hz. Sockets are usually 13 amps, **with 3-point plugs, square pin**. Many hotels provide adaptors upon request from the reception.

### **Smoking**

Smoking is prohibited in all indoor public places and night clubs.

### **Opening hours**

*Shops* normally open around 09:00 and close around 19:00 except Wednesday afternoon (up to 15:00 hrs). Shops in tourist areas, large shopping centres and department stores may stay open on weekends and public holidays as well.

*Banks* are open on workdays (Monday to Friday) usually between 08.30 and 13.30. Banks are closed on weekends and public holidays.

*Restaurants and cafes* have varying opening hours, but lunch is most often served between 12:00 and 15:00. Dinner is served from 19:00 until late in the evening.

### **Driving Side**

Driving is on the **left-hand side of the road**. All the international road traffic signs are in use and placed on the left-hand side of roads and highways. On roundabouts, priority is given to the right side.

### **Emergency Number**

Call 112, the EU-wide emergency number for police, fire department and ambulance.

**Dial Code for Cyprus:** +357

**Telephone Directory Assistance:** 11892, 11822, 11800, 11833, 11811.

## **7. USEFUL INFORMATION WEB LINKS:**

Cyprus Information Portal:


[http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/dmlcitizen\\_en/dmlcitizen\\_en?OpenDocument](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/dmlcitizen_en/dmlcitizen_en?OpenDocument)

Cyprus Ministry of Defence:

<http://www.mod.gov.cy>

Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the EU:

<http://www.cy2012eu.gov.cy>



Pafos Information and Municipality:

<http://www.pafos.org.cy/>

Aquamare Hotel Pafos:

<http://www.aquamarehotel.com/>

Cyprus Meteorological Service:

<http://www.moa.gov.cy>

Larnaka International Airport:

<http://www.larnaca-airport.info/> <http://www.hermesairports.com/>

Pafos International Airport

<http://www.cyprusairports.com.cy/showpage.php?PageID=3>

Cyprus Tourism Organization:

<http://www.visitcyprus.com/wps/portal>

Cyprus National Carrier for direct flights:

<http://cyprusair.com>

**ANNEX XII: 1<sup>ST</sup> CSDP OLYMPIAD – PAPER PRESENTATION BALLOT**

A/A	COU- NTRY		INSTITUTION	NAME	TITLE	score
1	AT 		Theresan Military Academy	Haubner Stefan	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like	
2	AT 		Theresan Military Academy	Engleitner Martin	Working with partners in CSDP. Who are our strategic partners, why would they want to engage and how can they contribute to CSDP missions and operations	
3	BE 		Belgian Military Academy	Van Hoecke Thomas	Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?	
4	BE 		Belgian Military Academy	Jackers Evi	Climate change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?	
5	FR 		French Air Force Academy	Mammeri Lucas	CSDP and public opinion: how to improve society's support to CSDP?"	
6	GR 		Hellenic Army Academy	Evgenios Georgios	Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?"	
7	IT 		Scuola di Applicazione e Istituto Studi Militari dell' Esercito	Patrignani Andrea	The European Armaments co-operation Strategy, an instrument to strengthen the Member States co-operation and to enhance standardization within the European Armed Forces	
8	IT 		Carambinieri	Petrosino Mario	Climate Change, what are the potential consequences for the EU's internal and external security in the next decades?	
9	IT 		Italian Navy Academy Ensign	Tessarotto Antonio	A thought for the future of CSDP: why do we need it and what should it look like?	
10	ES 		Spanish Army Academy	Lozano Jimenez Francisco Javier	Energy and Energy Security: can it act as a catalyst to create a more integrated European security culture?	∅





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